RealTime Transcriptions

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON
MR TOKOTA SC
MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 177 29 JANUARY 2014 PAGES 21127 TO 21301

© **REALTIME TRANSCRIPTIONS**

64 10th Avenue, Highlands North, Johannesburg
P O Box 721, Highlands North, 2037
Tel: 011-440-3647 Fax: 011-440-9119 Cell: 083 273-5335
E-mail: realtime@pixie.co.za
Web Address: http://mysite.mweb.co.za/residents/pak06278

NCRA
Guardians of the Record

[PROCEEDINGS ON 29 JANUARY 2014]
[09:21] CHAIRPERSON: The commission resumes. Before we carry on with the evidence to remind everybody please to turn off their cell phones. It can be very disturbing and something that, for those who were here yesterday saw that it will not be tolerated. The second point is I understand that there are signs up, I haven't seen them myself but there are signs up that indicate that no eating of food is allowed in the chamber, that's a rule imposed by the council, it creates all sorts of cleaning problems and so on. I understand that some of those present have been eating food here in the chamber and in fact leaving things here in the chamber which cause problems for the cleaners. I accept that people concerned didn't know that's against the rule that's been imposed in respect of the use of the chamber. But please in future I'd appreciate it if everybody would comply with the rule imposed by the council. As you know they gave us the use of these premises without any charge at all and at the very least we can do to show our appreciation is to comply with the rules that they've imposed for the use of the chamber. Brigadier, I don't know whether you've been eating food in the chamber, I take it not. I take it you haven't been eating food in the chambers.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die

Voorsitter, nog nie kans gehad nie.
CHAIRPERSON: Alright. You're under oath.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dankie, mnr die Voorsitter. Goeie More.
MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair and good morning Commissioner, good morning Brigadier.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Morning.
MR GOTZ: Brigadier, we were dealing with the final few pages, final pages of exhibit KKK52 and we had got to slide 6. If that can be put up on screen and if you could turn to that page, Brigadier. The page shows the configuration of the vehicles as well as the position of the protestors at 15:53:40 which is 10 seconds before the TRT open fires. The strikers marked by the blue cloud have just rounded the north west corner of the kraal. Brigadier, you will accept that at this point it is virtually impossible for people at the front of the group of strikers, including Mr Noki to turn around or reverse.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: As u praat van op hierdie punt, dit is wat ons gister na gewys het, die fotos en ek het vir u daar gewys dat dit was moontlik gewees dat daai configuration was nie so in 'n tight formasie nie en dit was vir hulle moontlik om, om te draai.
MR GOTZ: Well, no, Brigadier, we

actually, the photographs that we were looking at were some ten seconds earlier than this. At this point Mr Noki has rounded the corner of the kraal. The photographs that we were looking at were before, were slightly before that. He hadn't yet got to the kraal, that was the photograph that you highlighted and what I'm putting to you is by the time he has moved around the corner, the north west corner of the small kraal it is virtually impossible for him to reverse.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die een waarna ons verwys het was, wat u gesê het vyf sekondes vroeëre. en dis nie waar nie, hulle was toe alreeds om die kraal en nie soos u nou sê dat hulle nog nie om die kraal gekom nie. Dit was gister vasgestel, selfs in die video en selfs in u eie materiaal het ek vir u gewys en dit is op 14 sekondes waar ons kan sien hulle is reeds om die kraal en op daardie stadium het ek vir u gesê daardie foto het gewys dat hulle kon omdraai toe hulle alreeds om die kraal was.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Gotz, I don't know, why do you say that turning the corner made all the difference in this regard? If there's a reason for your contention that it did make a difference. I think you should put it to the witness so that he can deal with it.
MR GOTZ: Well, Chairperson, our case of course is that it is very difficult to reverse from a much

earlier stage and perhaps what I should put to the Brigadier is at the very least, Brigadier, would you accept that it in a sense becomes progressively more difficult for Mr Noki to reverse as the group moves passed the STF Casspirs and around the corner of the kraal, would you at least accept that?
CHAIRPERSON: But you still, I'm afraid you still haven't dealt with my difficulty, Mr Gotz, and that is, I understand what you're putting but if there's a reason upon which you rely for saying it was more difficult than the witness doesn't agree with you, then if there's a reason for saying it's more difficult then I think you should put it to him so that he can deal with it. If he can't deal with it satisfactorily then the victory will be yours and if he can't, and if he can well then the victory will be his. But at least lets have the reason that you advance for saying that it became more difficult for Mr Noki and those with him in the front line to change direction by 180 degrees once they were around the corner.
MR GOTZ: Well, Brigadier, the one reason that we did discuss yesterday was the fact that teargas been fired behind the group of protestors, some five or six seconds before that. So that's the one reason. The second reason and we can now see it on the video is that there is a push from the back as it were at this point in time and

perhaps we can show the video to get the sense of what Mr Noki is doing at this point. So if we can play JJJ194.16 from the beginning of the clip. I beg your pardon, it's 17, sorry about that, JJJ194.17.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed, I'm told that some people here have got their, they've got headphones but they haven't got them on. So before they haven't got them on the sound from the earphone is coming out clearly, we can hear it and it's making it difficult to hear what's been said. So those who haven't got their earphones on their ears must please put them on their ears or else switch them off. Yes, Mr Gotz, I can still hear it somewhere, the earphones, I don't know what the problem is. You see if people aren't listening, I haven't got a problem, then they can turn it off. The problem is they've got them on but they haven't got them their heads and so the sound –

MR MPOFU: Interferes, yes Chairperson, I was, another way of dealing with the problem is when they're not using them they must put the volume down because there's a volume adjustment on the thing.

CHAIRPERSON: Well of course if they're not listening, they won't hear the translation of what you said, so you might like to repeat it, what you just said in Xhosa, which may be helpful.

MR MPOFU: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mpofu.

MR GOTZ: Chairperson 14 seconds into this clip is the start of the TRT gunfire. I wonder whether a warning wouldn't be appropriate under the circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we've given warnings simply for gunfire.

MR GOTZ: Mr Chaskalson did in relation to this clip.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. As you would have heard we are told that 14 seconds, we can still hear that thing. We have been told that 14 seconds into this clip one can hear gunfire. It's gunfire which caused the death of a number of people who, some of them who were among the relatives, loved ones of those present, some of those present in the auditorium. So if they feel that the sound of that gunfire will cause them distress and pain then I suggest they leave the chamber. We won't start the video until a minute has lapsed after this. But I still hear that noise of, from someone's earphones. I don't know how we're going to deal with the problem.

MR GOTZ: Just to add one actually does see the TRT opening fire as the camera pulls back. One doesn't in fact see any of the people being shot but one

does see the TRT line open fire.

CHAIRPERSON: No one has left the chamber. So I assume the warning is being heard by those who were listening on the earphones and it's not necessary for the person concerned to leave. We'll proceed now with the video.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, this clip commences 14 seconds before the TRT open fires so the time is . The point of time which we are debating is four seconds later. So I want to do is play the first six seconds of the clip and see what the response of the crowd is towards the end of the first six seconds. In other words the response of the people at the front of the crowd of strikers. So if we can commence.

[VIDEO SHOWN]

MR GOTZ: Do you see, Brigadier, that what happens in those moments is that there is a shot fired by the strikers, at that point in time the crowd reacts as it were, possibly to the sound of the gunshot and starts to push forward into the channel created by the TRT vehicles, do you see that Brigadier?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, twee goed. Daar was nie 'n channel deur TRT voertuie nie.

MR GOTZ: I beg your pardon, the Papa Nyalas.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: En ons het ook verwys nie 'n channel nie, daar's 'n spasie gelaat, so om 'n channelling een van ons action modes is, het ons reeds daaroor getuig, net 'n regstelling daar, en dan nee glad nie, as ons dit frame by frame speel hierdie ses sekondes ek sien glad nie die push waarvan u praat nie. Ek sien die mense wat nog steeds glad nie hardloop nie, hulle beweeg rustig, selfs toe die skoot klap. Op daardie stadium dit is 'n skoot wat deur hulle self gevuur word. Selfs die persoon wat die skoot afvuur kon nog omgedraai het en weggehardloop het. So ons kan weer na dit kyk, ek sien glad nie laat daar 'n groep is wat soos 'n, wat u kry met ander woorde soos 'n stampede waar hulle druk nie.

CHAIRPERSON: May I suggest we play it again. Let's see the slide again and this time we all look at it very carefully and we know what Mr Gotz wants us to look out for and we will either see it or we won't.

MR GOTZ: I see that the operators have reduced it to a third of the speed. I'm not sure that that isn't going to be too slow, but let's look at it again –

CHAIRPERSON: And while we're talking terminology. What about a corridor constituted by the Nyalas on the one side and the side of the kraal on the other.

[VIDEO SHOWN]

MR GOTZ: We can stop it there. Brigadier I suggest to you that it's perfectly obvious, the moment the shot is fired possibly because of the people in the front, people around him hear the shooting of the gun there's a distinctive push by the people around him into the corridor constituted by the kraal and the Papa vehicles. I think that is obvious, Brigadier.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink, ekskuus –

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Brigadier.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ekskuus, mnr die Voorsitter, ek sien u was besig. Ek dink die materiaal is duidelik vir u sigbaar. My getuienis is obviously verskil van wat mnr Gotz sien. Ek sien mense loop, nie hardloop nie, ek sien geen druk nie, ek sien daar is tussen die voorste drie, vier, vyf persone kan ek sê amper 'n halwe meter tot 'n meter spasie, nadat die skoot klap het ek gesien in die agterkant persone beweeg sideways kan ek maar amper sê met ander woorde nie eers vorentoe nie. 'n Kant tree asof hulle agter die persoon skuiling inneem wat dan die skoot aftrek. So ek kan glad nie sien dat dit 'n groep is waarna u verwys wat die ander groep vorentoe druk nie. As ons gaan tel, ek weet nie die getal mense kan ons dan saamstel.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry can you do it once

again please, there's something I want to see. Roll it again.

[VIDEO SHOWN]

CHAIRPERSON: Can we go back a bit please, go back, yes.

[VIDEO SHOWN]

CHAIRPERSON: I must tell you what I see, the Brigadier is quite right that the persons in the front there's a gap between them and the row behind them. What one also sees is that once the shot is fired, what I saw, I think I saw, once the shot is fired the row comprising of the person who fired and those next to him appears to stop or certainly go much slower than before and those behind it then, behind them would come into them. So that part then bunches up. That's what I saw, or least I think I saw. But whether, what caused that is, it's not possible to see from the slide, there's various possibilities. One is of course that when the shot was fired the people around the shotist feared there might be some retaliation from the POP people and decided it might be an idea to somehow get cover behind the shotist so that he would take whatever was coming. But that's just speculation. I'm not sure it's possible for us simply by looking at the slide to say why people acted in the way they did but I've endeavoured to describe it as accurately

as I could what I saw. Others may differ and in which case we'd have to look at it again but I hope we won't get there.

MR GOTZ: Chairperson, for the purposes of my cross-examination I don't differ substantially from that. Save to point out that the effect as it were of the bunching rather the bunching is caused by the fact that people from the back or people further back pushed forward and that's exactly –

CHAIRPERSON: What I saw is that the people at the back continued moving forward.

MR GOTZ: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The row of the shotists if you what I mean, the shotists, those next to him appears to be, either to become stationary or move much slower and that causes the bunching. That's what I saw which I take it is essentially what you want.

MR GOTZ: Yes. Have we accepted that shotist is an English word, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: I think you'll find it in the dictionary but if it isn't someone can bring a dictionary tomorrow. Referring to shooter myself.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, there's one further piece of evidence in this clip which does demonstrate my point and it comes a few seconds later if we can just take

the clip up to seven seconds. I think, ja lets revert to normal speed for the moment. One can simply play it, I think it's -

[VIDEO SHOWN]

Let's stop here. Now, Brigadier, I'm afraid your eyes are going to have to be rather good here. In the foreground you'll see some POPS members shooting their shotguns, rubber bullets with some gusto. What I'd like to –

CHAIRPERSON: Aren't they rubber balls? I thought they were rubber balls?

MR GOTZ: Indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: They abolished or prohibited rubber bullets because even they could cause injury.

MR GOTZ: Indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: And they substituted rubber balls and I think in the interest of accuracy we must use that expression. Unless rubber bullets actually are being fired which I don't think is the case.

MR GOTZ: Rubber balls are being fired.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ons verwys dit na rubber rondtes, so rubber rounds is miskien die terme wat ons operasionele gebruik.

CHAIRPERSON: Being balls they would be

round, wouldn't they?

MR GOTZ: Now, Brigadier, what I want you to focus on is the group of protestors who appear in exactly the same position as where we saw them a couple of seconds earlier, in other words at the corner of the kraal, at this point they will be to the right of the helmet of the policeman on the left hand side of the, on the left hand side.

[09:41] So if we can play the clip from that position and what I want you to focus on –

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't been doing what I should be doing, but you must please when you play a clip indicate where on the clip it is so that those who follow on the record later will be able to understand what's being looked at. Am I right, are we now starting - where are we starting now?

MR GOTZ: Yes, this is the start of the clip – well, we're starting at 10 seconds into the clip.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, 10 seconds.

MR GOTZ: It's four seconds before the TRT opens fire and if one can - if you, Brigadier, will focus on, again on the point which is at the corner of the kraal and really at the point just to the right of the helmet of the policeman on the left-hand side of the screen that you see. So let's play it.

[VIDEO SHOWN]

Stop it there. Do you see, Brigadier, we can play it in slow motion –

CHAIRPERSON: We're stopping at 17.

MR GOTZ: Stopping at 17. Do you see, Brigadier – did you see that there is a person in white who actually does make the attempt to reverse and finds it impossible to do so and is then, as it were, pushed down the corridor?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ons kan maar net weer daarna kyk, miskien 'n stadiger spoed dan kan ek kyk waarna u verwys. Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, die persoon wat ek sien in wit, as ons daar kan stop, die persoon wat ek sien in wit is die persoon wat gehurk het asof hy in reaksie gekoets het vir die, sê nou maar die vuurlyn op hom. Ons gaan nou agtertoe plaas van vorentoe. Sien, daar buk hy. Hy koets vir die vuurlyn. U sê hy word "ge-push"; daar is geen niemand agter hom enigsins wat aan hom raak.

MR GOTZ: No, Brigadier, what I said to you was that he makes an attempt to reverse out of the corridor, fails in his attempt, and then continues to run down the corridor.

CHAIRPERSON: But the Brigadier's point is he doesn't fail because there's someone behind him blocking his way. I think that's your point, Brigadier.

Is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, hy het ook nie omgedraai nie. Hy het net "basically" "ge-crouch," asof hy gekoets het vir iets, en aanbeweeg –

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I'm putting a better point, if I may say so, and that is there was no-one behind him to stop him from going back.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek stem daarmee ook saam met u. Dankie, Meneer.

MR GOTZ: But Brigadier, do you agree with the proposition I'm putting to you, the proposition being is that he makes an attempt to reverse and fails in his attempt?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr Gotz, dit is baie duidelik dat dit nie so is nie, maar dit is sigbaar vir die paneel. Mnr die Voorsitter kan self daarna kyk. Miskien 'n punt wat ek net wil uitwys – ek weet nie of u daarby gaan kom nie – om 15:53:35 op die ander "slides" wat ek deurgegaan het wat ons gister bespreek het, "slide" 24 en dan nou hierdie video, as ons vinnig gaan tel – ek het so vinnig met my pen oorgegaan, die eerste gedeelte was wat ek sien 13, en hierdie persone wat verbykom kan nie meer as vyf of agt plus nog wees nie. Ek dink die eksperts kan vir ons die getal gaan gee. Ek kan nie dink daar gaan meer as 20 mense – wel, ek kan bietjie een of twee uit wees, maar

in daardie voorste groepie. So dit is, daar is geen massadruk van 'n groep – ek het voorheen verwys na "stampede" - waar hy gebruik word en "ge-force" word in 'n rigting nie. U sal sien daar is groot spasies tussen hulle, so die groepie, daardie groepie het deurbeweeg en toe die vuurlyn kom, so dis nie die hele groot massa wat agter gedruk het dat hulle nie kon omdraai nie, nee.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, I don't dispute for a moment that at this point there's been a dispersal in the true sense of the word in the sense that they have been broken up into smaller groups. You must take account of the fact that just prior to this the camera is not in fact focussed on that scene. As the cameraman moves back the camera points to the ground and there's a section of about four seconds where – four, five seconds where we don't see anybody. So you can't simply count them, that number of five people plus the 13 that you saw earlier because one doesn't actually see the full extent of the mass that's moved forward. But I don't dispute for a moment that at this point there's been a dispersal in the sense that the mass has been broken up into a smaller group, which then makes its way through the corridor.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek stem saam met u, mnr die Voorsitter, en daarom sê ek vir u weens daardie klein groepie wat opgebreek het was dit baie maklik vir

hulle om, om te draai selfs op daardie stadium.

MR GOTZ: In fact very few of these people make their way out of the corridor. If one continues to watch the videos, only one person makes it back out – actually one person. So Brigadier, there were 16, 17 people killed at scene 1. How many people were injured?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek het die getalle nou nie by my nie. As ek reg is, it's 78, maar ek weet nie of dit die totaal is op die dag of net op "scene" 1 nie.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, that includes scene 2. What we want to know, if you can't find it immediately never mind, we'll find it later.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, ek het dit nou nie by my –

CHAIRPERSON: At scene 1 we know how many were killed, killed or either sustained fatal injuries - some of them didn't die on the spot – and we know some others were injured. Mr Magidiwana for example was one who was injured, but what he wants to know from you is how many people were injured? If it's information that is vital we can get it now, otherwise we can get it later.

MR GOTZ: No, the Brigadier had started to do a tally and I simply wanted to suggest that one can get an accurate tally of the number of people who attempted

to make it down the corridor by adding the number of people killed –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ons sal dit vind op bladsy – "exhibit" L – ekskuus, mnr die Voorsitter, ek het op exhibit L, scene 1, deceased 16, wounded 13, 1-3, and then firearms recovered two. Dan was daar 'n aantal knopkieries, spears, iron rods, knives, pangas, all those things, they're covered. So in totaal dan –

CHAIRPERSON: Could you tell us what slide is that of L?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: 261.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: 16 gedood, 13 beseer, as my wiskunde reg is –

CHAIRPERSON: That's the answer to Mr Gotz's question.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: 29. So –

CHAIRPERSON: 13 were wounded.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, the number of 16 of course must climb to 17 because we now know – and I mean I think this fact has been established on the record – Mr Mdze had originally been thought to have been shot with a shotgun at scene 2 and die on the way to hospital. We now know that he in fact was shot at scene 1 and died on the way to hospital, so the number of people who were shot dead

or fatally wounded at scene 1 is 17.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as daardie feite wel voor die Kommissie is, ek is nie bewus daarvan nie. Ek sal u woord daarvoor vat.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that is so, but it doesn't affect the number of 13 who were wounded because the gentleman to whom you referred was wrongly allocated to scene 2 when exhibit L was compiled. So the answer to your question is 13 were wounded. As far as I could make out those who were shot in the legs were the ones who were wounded and those who were shot higher up in the body died, but what is the purpose for you asking the number wounded? I take it you want to take that point further, do you?

MR GOTZ: No, Chairperson, it was a response to Brigadier Calitz's statement that we simply needed to add the number of people who had been shot or fatally wounded to the five people that one saw in the video and one could get a sense of the number of people who had made their way down the corridor. I was pointing out that one could get a better sense from adding the number of people who were injured, so –

CHAIRPERSON: Brigadier, I mean that sounds scientific, doesn't it? If you take the people who died, who were killed or fatally wounded and you add to that the number who were wounded, but not fatally, you get

a number of about 30, I think.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: 29, or then 17 if it's true, then 31.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that's the point; 17 plus 13 is 30, isn't it? And there may have been some people who escaped unscathed completely, but I think on the probabilities that's very remote, we can ignore that. So it sounds as if –

MR MPOFU: No, Chairperson, I'm sure –

MR SEMENYA SC: No –

MR MPOFU: You know all this stuff, there's hard evidence. I don't understand –

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, give us the hard evidence then, Mr Mpofu.

MR MPOFU: Well, Mr Phatsha, who is sitting there, testified in this Commission –

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, okay –

MR MPOFU: - that he, that a group of people who went through the kraal and jumped over and –

CHAIRPERSON: You know, I'd forgotten that. I'm grateful to you for drawing my attention to it. So what we are busy with therefore is a number in excess of 30. 31 if it was only Mr Phatsha, but he says there were others with him. I can't remember how many he said, but we now are closer, I think, to the correct numbers, thanks to

Mr Mpofu's intervention. So we're looking at over 30.

MR SEMENYA SC: No, Chair, again there is hard evidence that a whole host of those people who were not responding to fire, to the water, to the teargas, ultimately ran away. They must have turned somewhere.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Phatsha's evidence was he was right near the front and he actually jumped into the kraal and that's how he escaped.

MR SEMENYA SC: But the others ran away, Chair, otherwise –

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, there were others who ran away. In fact many of them as we know ran away to, ultimately ended up at scene 2.

MR SEMENYA SC: Ja, the question is how did they run away – how do they turn if this proposition is persisted with.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the question of course is where they were in the column. If Mr Gotz is busy with those near the front of the column who he says turned around with difficulty, obviously the further you are – the closer you are to the back of the column, the easier it is for you to run. But anyway, Mr Gotz I presume is near the end of this point, so I think let's let him finish his point and then move on. Anyway, we've got a number of about, of over 30 people, it looks like, who were

near the front. There were others as well, as Mr Semenya correctly points out, who succeeded in escaping from scene 1 and getting to scene 3, but anyway, I take it enough facts are on record now for you to proceed with your point.

MR GOTZ: Yes, Brigadier, in the light of the facts that we've seen we will argue that – let me put it this way, that one can see this almost as if it were a funnel with the corridor being the stem of the corridor, the narrow, the stem of the funnel, in other words the narrow pipe and as one enters the stem of the funnel it becomes virtually impossible for the group of people in that funnel to reverse out of the corridor, out of the funnel. That's going to be our argument.

CHAIRPERSON: It sounds to me as if this is a point upon which the opposing forces', if I can call them that, positions are set in concrete. You put your position and you made it clear what it is. The Brigadier takes a different stance; he's made his view clear, and I don't know if we're going to make any further progress in getting the two opposing forces closer to each other. So I suggest we move on to the next point.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as ek net miskien iets kan byvoeg wat miskien nou nadat mnr Mpofu die opmerking gemaak het, vroeër is gesê dat hulle

kon nie links, daar was voertuie, hulle kon nie regs, die kraal was daar. As ek die "evidence" reg verstaan het, ek was nie ten tye van daardie tyd daar nie, dat die mense wel deur die kraal gespring het en so weggehardloop het, wil ek maar net byvoeg dat regs was dan ook 'n opsie, nie net omdraai nie maar deur die kraal kon hulle ook dan weggehardloop het, as daar "evidence" is, en ons weet daar was skoene en ensovoorts, u weet, in die kraal wel opgetel. So dan is daardie opsie ook moontlik gewees. Maar ons kan aanbeweeg, dankie, mnr Gotz.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, the following slide that you'll see is slide 7 of exhibit KKK52. Brigadier, you've had an opportunity to look through this presentation and the report that underpins it. Have you got any difficulties or disagreements with what we've depicted on this slide, slide 8 and slide 9?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, in the bottom right-hand corner of this slide is the number 7. So are you asking him a general question –

MR GOTZ: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: - 7, 8, 9, is he happy with the positions of the vehicles? I think he may have a problem with Papa1, but which in any event is not actually on the photograph, it's in the area above the photograph, but has he got any problem with the position of the

vehicles, or the position of the strikers?

MR GOTZ: Yes, and let's take Papa1 out of it. It's not –

CHAIRPERSON: The advancing column of strikers.

MR GOTZ: Let's take Papa1 out of it because it's not material for present purposes. Subject to that qualification, Brigadier, do you have any disagreement with what we've depicted on these slides?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as ek "slides" 7, 8 en 9 vergelyk met die dokument wat gister vir my gegee is om deur te gaan sal u dan dieselfde vind vanaf bladsy 31; die tye korrespondeer daar. Wat ons sien, u sê dit is sewe sekondes voor die vuurlyn van TRT op daardie stadium en dit is vir die eerste keer wat die Nyala – ek neem aan dit is waarna u verwys, Pappa19, en nie die res van die voertuie nie – waar hy dan die uitsig vir 'n oomblik belemmer waar hy voor die TRT-lyn en Adjudant Offisier Kuhn gaan verbyry, maar soos ek vir u gewys het gister, 14 sekondes en 10 sekondes terug kon die, was daar geen obstruksie nie. So sewe sekondes is die eerste keer wat die Nyala dan daardie "view obstruct." Hy beweeg in 49 sekondes verby Adjudant Offisier Kuhn en u "slide" 9, op 50 sekondes het u nou nie – op 49 sekondes het hy reeds verby Adjudant Kuhn beweeg en dan op 50 sekondes staan hy op

dieselfde plek waar hy dan op 49 sekondes gestaan het toe die skietery plaasvind. So dit is, ek het nie enige onduidelikheid, as dit is waarna u verwys nie, nee.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, sorry, are you saying you agree with it and you're simply giving additional commentary? Because I'm not sure that I differ from what your commentary was, or are you disagreeing with our representation –

CHAIRPERSON: I understood him to – let's see if I've got it right. I understood him to be agreeing with the position of the vehicles and I think the position of the strikers. He was disagreeing with you on your contention that you advanced that for a significant period of time the TRT line was not visible to the advancing strikers. I think that's his problem; there he disagrees with you and we went into that yesterday. I don't think we need go into it again today, but am I summarising your evidence correctly, Brigadier?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Heeltemal korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR GOTZ: Yes, Brigadier, I'm not at this point debating questions of when the TRT line became visible to the strikers. I simply wanted confirmation that you agree with the –

CHAIRPERSON: He said so. He says he

agrees. So you don't have to dance a dance of triumph on this concession. Let's move on.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, the ultimate configuration that one sees of the vehicles when one compares that to their position a minute earlier is indicative – very much, I submit, or we would submit – of some coordination. This is a, there's a clear pattern to the vehicles. They have reached a position which constitutes a formation and that is not the consequence of accidents, but of coordination, Brigadier. What would your response be?

CHAIRPERSON: So I think the question was asked yesterday, but apart from that, who was in charge at the time? You had gone by this time.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek is daar voor by Pappa1 –

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, but you'd gone already, hadn't you? You were on the point of going through the fence.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: On this in fact, volgens CALS se dokumente het ek vorentoe beweeg ten tye van, dit moet in hierdie paar sekondes wees. So wat ek –

CHAIRPERSON: Who was in charge of the vehicles down there at the TRT end of the corridor, if I can call it that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: By die TRT self – O, van die Pappa Nyalas?

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I'm talking about, you know, where P19 alias P10 –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die senior –

CHAIRPERSON: - was, that part. Who was in charge of the vehicles there, down there?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die senior by Pappa10 sal wees Luitenant Kolonel Mere.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Wat dan ook agtergebly het op die toneel, en Kolonel Makhubela, maar hy was by die, net by die draadkar lyn.

CHAIRPERSON: So if there was any deliberate formation of the vehicles, putting them into formation, who would have made that, taken that decision and issued that instruction?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as daar so 'n formasie was en iemand sou dit gegee het dan sou dit seer sekerlik deur die bevelvoerders gegee het en gesê het stop agter mekaar of "let's park in this way."

[10:01] Maar ek weet vir seker want ek het saam met hulle beweeg en my opdrag was net vir die voertuie, gaan vorentoe en gaan disperse. Ek dink wat hier gebeur het is simply, u weet die toeval, daar is nie so 'n formasie wat u na hier

verwys wat ons kan sê, gaan parkeer reguit agter mekaar, daar was nie tyd daarvoor nie. So wat hier gebeur het, elke bevelvoerder op daardie voertuig het ombeweeg en wat voor hom plaasgevind het, as die voertuig gestop het glo ek het hy gestop en die aksie wat dan plaasgevind het op hulle linkerkante soos die mense deurgekom het. So ek dink dit is individuele aksies deur die bevelvoerders wat dan sal kan getuig op daardie stadium, definitief nie gekoördineerd of opdrag gegee nie, nee.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, you gave an instruction to block, we know that and we know also from Colonel Scott's evidence that he, well, he says that you were coordinating the vehicles, you were directing vehicles at this stage. His evidence is clear and it was not challenged.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek weet nie of dit nie met hom ge-challenge is nie, maar seer sekerlik het u dit gister met my deurgegaan. U het verwys na Advokaat Chaskalson en u het verwys na die woorde, "n perfect block." Ek het u verwys na, dit was op daardie stadium wat hulle 45 grade na die kraal toe gekom het. Mnr die Voorsitter, ek wil nie weer oor die hele ding gaan nie, u het gesê dit was glad nie so nie, ek het na die transcript gaan kyk op daardie bladsy, dit is presies wat ek getuig het, "perfekte blok" en my redes gegee en toe het ek

gepraat oor die 45 grade angle wat hulle ingekom het. Net daarna het Advokaat Chaskalson vir my gevra en ons kan na die bladsy toe gaan, dat, moet ons dan eers block en dan disperse, en my antwoord was vir hom baie duidelik gewees dat indien die bevelvoerders op so 'n posisie daar voorkom en dit is te gevaarlik om 'n lyn te maak fisies met jou lede en sê, klim uit, maak 'n lyn, die gevaar lyn is te naby, dan sou die block glad nie plaasvind nie en dan sou hulle direk oorgaan in 'n dispersion.

So die block het dan heeltemal weggeval as gevolg van die aanval. Dit het ek getuig en dit is op rekord, ek kan u verwys, ek het toevallig daarna gekyk op bladsy 18,277 van dag 160. Dit is net die opvolg vraag mnr Chaskalson waar ek hom verduidelik het die block val weg as die gevaar so is en die bevelvoerders sien dit kan nie uitwerk nie, dan gaan hulle oor in 'n dispersion.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, I don't want to go over evidence that has already been given, you were the one who described this is the perfect block and we agree with it, but it is block of a particular nature and we showed you the SAPS' training manuals which indicate that this is the type of block that is used to channel people down a particular corridor. I'm not going to go through that again, I think it is clear.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek dink net een

regstelling, u sê, we agreed on it, ons het glad nie daaroor gestem nie. Ek het u verduidelik dat daardie manual is opgestel vir as dit 'n vooraf beplande operasie is en ons weet in 'n stedelike gebied, die persone gaan daar kom en ons voertuie kan in so 'n posisie geplaas word. Hier, ek dink die evidence leaders het die clip vir ons gespeel, ek dink dit is 'n minuut en 30 sekondes, waar die persone op beweeg het en om beweeg het en wat voor hulle afgespeel het moes hulle 'n besluit neem, dit sou baie dwaas en gevaarlik gewees het as daar wel Openbare Orde lede in 'n linie daar gaan staan het, dit sou lewens gevaarlik vir hulle gewees het. Ons het dit gesien en die lede het terugbeweeg na hulle voertuie toe, so nee, ons het glad nie saamgestem nie.

MR GOTZ: And the proposition that Mr Chaskalson was putting to you is that you had a number of vehicles at your disposal in order to create a block which stopped the protestors from advancing any further and he suggested to you that you could have placed that block between the north-west corner of the kraal and where you see the STF Casspir was located and then you'll recall there was a whole debate about whether or not the red line, where the red line was drawn you had accepted the proposition, I don't want to go back to that.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek het ook nie –

MR GOTZ: So based on that –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek het ook nie daardie proposisie accept nie, daar was 'n verskil en ek dit bewys met, ek dink 17 of 19 inskrywings in die transcript, so ek dink nie ons moet weer daarna toe gaan nie. Wat ek wel gesê het vir hom, hy het 'n proposal gemaak dat daar voorheen wel 'n block kon gewees het, toe vra mnr die Voorsitter, waar wou ons die persone, en ons het gesê, baie ver vorentoe en ek het dit duidelik uit die transcript uit bewys wat ons bedoel het. Om die voertuie so te koordineer binne die paar sekondes wat ons vir hulle gesê het, gaan parker reg langs mekaar, dit is feitlik onmoontlik in die operasionele omstandighede wat hier afgespeel het en ek dink my getuienis was, sou die voertuie wel langs mekaar of teen mekaar, ek dink ons het gepraat van 'n deur spasie uitmekaar uit, wat gaan hierdie persone verhoed om tussen die voertuie net deur te hardloop, tussen die kraal, tussen die voertuig, tussen die twee voertuie? Seer sekerlik is dit nie 'n soliede, hoe kan ek vir u sê, 'n lyn nie, so u moet gebruik maak van Openbare Orde Polisiëringspersone wel tussen die voertuie en dit was nie moontlik gewees nie, daarom val die block weg en ek het vir u getuig dit het oorgegaan in 'n dispersion action.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, let's look again at Exhibit KKK47 which draws various diagrams, which show that

you're completely wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: - diagram that shows he is completely wrong, I think you must draw his attention specifically to those that you say show he is wrong so that he can deal with them.

MR GOTZ: And look at slide 15, I think it is slide 15, unfortunately they're not numbered. So what that slide shows and indeed the one right next to the one following it is that you can use vehicles touching each other as it were, and you do, do that and indeed you are trained to do that.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek wil nou nie vir u 'n lesing gee op 'n lesing nie, maar as ons die voertuie so blok sal daar dan altyd Openbare Orde Polisiëringslede wees wat daardie hoeke beman, soos met ander woorde die kruisietjies wat daar aangedui is of die spasies, as u sien tussen die nommertjie 2 en die Nyala is daar 'n spasie. wie sou daardie spasie toegemaak het? Seer sekerlik as u twee Nyalas teen mekaar trek, die neuse, ons kan die praktiese oefening gaan doen, dan sal ek vir u wys daar sal nog steeds gapings wees waar u dan personeel moet insit. Nou dit was my getuienis gewees waarna ek verwys het in daardie evidence met mnr Chaskalson. Toe die bevelvoerders gearriveer het was dit hulle call gewees. Elke seksie bevelvoerder, groep bevelvoerder voor hom

maak 'n besluit en daar is van hulle wat gesê het pertinent, ek dink Papa11 is 'n voorbeeld, as ek reg is, wat vir sy lede opdrag gegee het, julle klim nie uit die voertuie uit nie, dit is te gevaarlik en hy het opdrag gegee om net oor te gaan in 'n dispersion wat glad nie verkeerd is in operasionele terme nie, so dit is –

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, you said that there must always be a space between vehicles when you do this type of block and I'm simply putting to you on the basis of your own documents that that is wrong and we can look at the following page.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, dit is nie wat ek gesê het nie, mnr Gotz, asseblief.

MR SEMENYA SC: No, no, that's not what the witness said, he said the opposite, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Let him repeat what he said and then we can move on.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek het gesê al parkeer jy die voertuie teenmekaar, die Nyala voertuie, daar sal altyd 'n spasie wees waardeur persone kan gaan. Met ander woorde sou ons teen die kraal parkeer en die ander Nyala parkeer teen die ander, die spieëltjies, ons kan tog nie die karre soort van smash teen mekaar, verstaan u wat ek probeer sê? Die kraal was nog steeds daar. U sal nog steeds gapings vind, ons kan dit prakties

gaan doen op die grond om dit vir u te demonstreer. Daar sal altyd spasies wees tussen, waar daar dan Openbare Orde Polisiëringslede gesit word. Ons werk met hierdie goed daagliks in omstandighede, in optogte en die terme block word gebruik waar ons vooraf weet. Hoekom ek dit die dag gesê het, gaan blok, is net om te probeer keer die mense en indien u gaan disperse. Die hele doel was, gaan kyk of hulle nie net wil stop nie en gehoor gee aan die uiteendrywing aksie wat alreeds by insident 2 plaasgevind het, maar die voorste militante groep weet ons daardie 30, hoekom hulle wou daar deur en hulle sou nog steeds daar kon deurkom.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, let's go back to KKK52, Exhibit KKK52, I should just put the final few slides to you. Sorry, if we go to slide 11 and bearing in mind the document that we've just seen in the training manual, what I wanted to put to you was that it was perfectly feasible for you to do a block with Nyala vehicles which had the effect of preventing the striking workers from moving down towards the TRT line.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink as u hierdie voorstel vat en u vra dieselfde vraag, Papa10 was Luitenant-Kolonel Mere, Papa5 was Luitenant-Kolonel Pitsi. Dit is persone met jare ondervinding in Openbare Orde, so u kan gerus na, as hulle kom getuig vir

hulle dieselfde proposisie gee en dit is feitlik onmoontlik in sekondes om presies te sê, ons weet die mense kom nou hier om, kom ons gaan stop die voertuie so, die een so, in aggenome waar ek was, vorentoe beweeg het. As Papa4 en 2, dan wat sou die persone verhoed het om tussen Papa4 en Papa2 deur te kom en wat sou die persone verhoed het om deur die kraal tussen Papa2 en die kraal deur te kom, en dan vir dieselfde, tussen Papa4 en die Casspir, wat sou hulle daar verhoed het om oor daardie hoek van 'n buffer van 'n Nyala te spring, wat sal ons in daardie spasie sit? Dit is nie 'n soliede, ek weet nie of u verstaan nie, miskien as ons demonstreer hoe die lyk die Nyala buitekant sal u begryp wat ek bedoel.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, it is perfectly obvious, what I'm suggesting to you is that you can use the Papa2, Papa4 or Papa5 to create a form of block which interrupts the flow of the strikers around the corner of the kraal. You could have done that if you wanted to.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, in hindsight is dit baie moeilik om te sit en sê, ja, het ons geweet dat die persone sal om hierdie hoek kom en ons gaan met 'n blok formasie hulle daar keer en dit was so beplan gewees, kon daar seer sekerlik 'n blok formasie gewees het met die Openbare Orde Polisiëringslede tussen-in. Wat ek vir u sê is, dit sou nog steeds gevaarlik, lewens gevaarlik

gewees het vir daardie Openbare Orde Polisiëringslede en hulle sou dan retreat het, terug na hulle voertuie toe en dieselfde gevolge miskien, tensy hulle gehoor gegee het, maar daardie groep was beslissend om deur te beweeg en ons weet die redes daarvoor.

MR GOTZ: Brigadier, I don't understand, why is it lewens gevaarlik vir die polisie in die Nyalas? They're in armoured vehicles. I can understand a situation where you had people firing at them with canons and automatic weapons, but we're not talking people, strikers who have those type of weapons at their disposal. These are armoured vehicles.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, ek het nie gepraat van die lede in die voertuie nie, ek het nog nie een keer daarna verwys nie.

MR GOTZ: And so again I put to you that there is nothing to prevent you from doing this sort of block and I don't ask you to accept that it has to be exactly in this formation, but this type of block was not attempted, correct?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, die blok wat u hier sien, nee, glad nie. Ek getuig weer, elke bevelvoerder wat voor hom afspeel, hy maak daardie besluit en daardie senior offisiere, Papa5 wat ek Luitenant-Kolonel Pitsi, Luitenant-Kolonel Mere, sal vir u

Page 21163

1 sê hoekom hulle wel in daardie posisies was, waar hulle
2 was, indien hulle kom getuig. Dit was agter my, ek kan nie
3 vir sê wat op daardie stadium gebeur het of die een gesê
4 het, trek agter my in of trek langs my in nie. Al wat ek
5 vir u sê is, die blok is nie vooraf beplan nie, daar was
6 nie voorsien dat ons op hierdie stadium moes van 'n blok
7 aksie gebruik gemaak het nie. Indien ons dan wel van 'n
8 blok aksie moes gebruik gemaak het kon ons maar net sowel
9 van 'n draadkar opsie gebruik gemaak het en dan 'n ander
10 spasie oop gelos het iewers. So daar is verskeie
11 moontlikhede in hindsight, mnr die Voorsitter, maar nee,
12 wat u hier teken, niks sou hulle verhoed het om dan tussen
13 die voertuie ook net deur te beweeg nie.
14 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Gotz, I think we've
15 spent a lot of time on this point. It sounds to me as if,
16 you've got as much out of the brigadier as one can expect
17 because he has left the scene at a relevant time. Colonel
18 Mere, I think, is one of those who perhaps would be able to
19 throw further light on the question. It occurs to me if
20 one looks at the various slides that you've given us, you
21 start with 15:53:30 and then 15:53:40 and then there is one
22 at, in fact there is one at 35, so if one takes 15:53:30,
23 35, 40, 45, 50, on the assumption which I think is not
24 challenged, that boldly speaking your position of the
25 various vehicles is correct, then one can see how they

Page 21164

1 moved. One can see that there was what looks like some
2 kind of a block earlier on, but for some reason, which
3 presumably will be able to be explained to us, or maybe
4 able to be explained to us by Colonel Mere, the position of
5 the vehicles was changed to what we see on the later
6 slides, but I don't know that there is any point in asking
7 this witness about it any further because he can't really
8 tell us.
9 He denies that a specific instruction was given,
10 he says it was left to the individual Nyala commanders at
11 the time, or possibly the senior Nyala commander present at
12 the scene at the time, and I don't know that there is any
13 point in asking him anymore questions on it. The
14 comparison of the position of the vehicles at the various
15 times may well prove instructive, but that's something, any
16 instruction we get won't be from this witness, I think, so
17 I suggest that you might consider moving on to your next
18 point.
19 MR GOTZ: Chairperson, the reason I'm
20 asking this witness of course is that he was the one who
21 gave on his own admission an instruction to block and what
22 I'm testing is –
23 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know that, that
24 point has been made. A further point was made that in
25 effect there was a kind of block within the meaning of the

Page 21165

1 definition –
2 MR GOTZ: Yes –
3 CHAIRPERSON: And that point was made
4 yesterday, it is either a good point or a bad point, but I
5 don't know that it is improved by being repeated and being
6 approached from various angles. We've got all the basic
7 facts, we know what the witness says about these things.
8 There will be other witnesses who can be questioned about
9 this, who were actually responsible for moving the relevant
10 vehicles at the relevant times. I mean if you look at the
11 slide at the moment, the 15:53:30 one, there is what looks
12 like a block. 2, 4 and the Casspir look very similar to
13 that picture of a block in the police manual. We know from
14 your subsequent slides that that block, if one can call it
15 that, the witness may deny that it is a block properly so
16 called, but it looks like a block, apparent block shall we
17 say. We know that that apparent block didn't persist
18 because those vehicles were moved.
19 MR GOTZ: Chairperson, -
20 CHAIRPERSON: I don't know that he can
21 help us as to why they were moved, those who moved them can
22 come and tell us.
23 MR GOTZ: Ja.
24 CHAIRPERSON: But my point is, I don't
25 know that there is any point in carrying on with this

Page 21166

1 witness at the moment on this line.
2 MR GOTZ: Chairperson, I'm happy to leave
3 it but just one clarification. What we sought to do on
4 this slide and indeed the one following is to illustrate
5 that these types of blocks could have been attempted –
6 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think you could
7 assume –
8 MR GOTZ: It was never suggested that –
9 CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you,
10 I'm assuming you could assume that we got that point. You
11 don't have to tell us what you're about, you are here at
12 the moment to ask questions, you're asking questions. I'm
13 suggesting to you the line that you are busy going along,
14 you more or less reached the, it is a cul-de-sac, you've
15 reached the dead end, you've gone as far down this line as
16 you can go, I suggest you go on another line. There are
17 other witnesses who will be in the same avenue from whom
18 you can ask questions about this later, but I don't know if
19 there is any point in carrying on further with this
20 witness. Ms Hemraj says that this line is blocked.
21 MR GOTZ: Chair, with that block I will
22 come to the end of my cross-examination.
23 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Is there any, I
24 don't know if anyone else have to cross-examine, is there,
25 except, - it was told to us that Lonmin are not proposing

to cross-examine this witness.

MR BURGER SC: No, indeed, not Chair, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination, Mr Semenya?

[10:21] RE-EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. Brigadier, this is day 26 that you have been giving us evidence and 24 of which you have been giving evidence under cross-examination. Your answers have been fairly expansive, but I would like us to deal with various topics. Maybe it is fitting that we deal with this one first.

The proposition about channelling of the strikers to the TRT line, can we start with that. You tell us that you are in the 14:30 briefing. Is that right, Brigadier?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, by "forward holding area" 1.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was the channelling of strikers discussed in that briefing of 14:30?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Were the commanders of the POP present at that briefing?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, al die bevelvoerders was daar, behalwe Luitenant Kolonel Mere wat ek dan self later "gebrief" het.

MR SEMENYA SC: As far as you know there would have been a briefing of 13:30, the mid-afternoon, right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: U bedoel die JOCCOM meeting?

MR SEMENYA SC: On the 13th, yes.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit is wat, dis vir ons gesê daar was 'n 13:30 vergadering.

MR SEMENYA SC: To your knowledge was there any discussion relating to channelling of strikers to the TRT line?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: If that was to be the operational conduct for the day, would you have expected that to be discussed in the 13:30 JOCCOM meeting?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit sal wel 'n belangrike besprekingspunt gewees het waar ek glo besluite oor sou geneem het.

MR SEMENYA SC: You were in the JOCCOM meeting of 6 o'clock where there was reference to stage 3, were you not?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was the channelling of

strikers to the TRT line ever discussed there?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: If it was part of the police planning op for the day, would it have been discussed?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit sou beslis bespreek gewees het, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: I'm just trying to explore with you because this theory is given either that the channelling of the strikers to the TRT line was by design or default, but can we explore the design one first? After the 6 o'clock JOCCOM meeting Colonel Scott was asked to continue perfecting the plan, so to speak.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek glo hy het agtergebly, hy was besig daarmee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Now we know the plan as was given before this Commission, does it or does it not have any channelling of strikers to the TRT line?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek is nie bewus van enige "channelling" in daardie plan nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would you have expected it to be there if that was part of the police plan for the 16th?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, beslis, mnr die

Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Now the evidence leaders have trawled basically the hard drive of Colonel Scott. You are aware of that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek het so verneem in die media.

MR SEMENYA SC: And they have mapped it in terms of time when all the stages of the plans were contemplated and brought to the computer. Are you aware of that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek is bewus van al die "drafts," die samestelling wat op sy rekenaar was. Ek het daarvan gehoor, ja.

MR SEMENYA SC: Have you come across any of those drafts that are depicting a channelling of the strikers to the TRT line?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Volgens my was dit nooit bespreek of aan hom oorgegee of gevind nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Now throughout the planning of this operation did the police anticipate in advance that the strikers would approach Nyala 4, as they did?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ons het eers daarna dit verwag, nie op daardie stadium nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Just so that I follow your evidence correctly, and given the questions of whether this would have happened by happenstance or coincidence, can we look at the last slide, which is KKK52, 15:53:30, and that is slide 11 that Mr Gotz has been dealing in his cross-examination of you. That is supposed to depict a scenario that, we are told, you ought to have done on the day, correct?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dis die voorstel dat ons daardie blok, hy noem dit 'n blok formasie, moes gebruik het. Dis korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, let us see how that is achievable operationally. Would the person in Papa2 have had a briefing about it before?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, dit is – hy het, hy sou glad nie 'n voorligting daarvan gehad het nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: What I'm asking is to achieve that result would you have to inform the driver of the Nyala what they must do?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Oh, in order to achieve – ek het u verkeerd verstaan. Ja, hy moes beslis voorligting gekry het, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would you have to advise the driver of Papa4 that that must be the position they must take?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Hy sal deel gewees het van daardie beplanning.

MR SEMENYA SC: That of the Casspir?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: That of the STF?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Selfs hulle as 'n "tactical" sou ook daarvan deel gewees het, dis korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: So all of those would have to have a briefing before this is realisable?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Hulle sou dan deel van die beplanning uitgemaak het waar daar dan nou beplanning was en ook 'n voorligting.

MR SEMENYA SC: As a matter of fact do we know if there was any discussions with Papa2 driver to take any particular formation on the day?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Do we know any information that the driver of Papa4 on the day was informed that is the formation he must take?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: That of the Casspir?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ook nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Now I would like

to throw us back to another slide.

CHAIRPERSON: It's now half past 10, Mr Semenya. When it's convenient we'll take the tea adjournment, I think. If you need some time to find the slide you're going to show perhaps we can take tea now, otherwise we can see the slide and deal with the point that you're going to make in relation to the slide and then take the tea adjournment, but I'm in your hands.

MR SEMENYA SC: We can take the break now, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: We take the tea adjournment.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]

[11:02] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Brigadier, you're still under oath. Mr Semenya.

ADRIAAN MARTHINUS CALITZ: Dankie, mnr die Voorsitter.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC (CONTD.): Thank you, Chair. Perhaps, Brigadier, before we go to the next slide, can we just finalise some few outstanding issues relevant to the previous slide, which is KKK52 and slide 11, the one dealing with a hypothesis of blocking. On this hypothesis, Brigadier, what would have been the protection, if at all, of Papa11?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, op hierdie

stadium sal daar dan nie vir hom enige "protection" wees nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would that be consistent with how a Public Order Policing operation should happen?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie, mnr die Voorsitter. Dit sal nie so beplan wees nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: And in the event this formation was to be carried as proposed, what would have happened to the plan to disperse, disarm the protesters?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Daardie plan is nog steeds uitgevoer by wat ons verwys na insident 2 toe. By Nyala 4 het hulle alreeds daardie uiteendrywing gedoen, as ek u reg verstaan.

MR SEMENYA SC: I may not have expressed myself well. I'm trying to understand if this blocking in the form that is proposed here had happened, i.e. the Nyalas and the Casspirs had formed in the way of that blocking, what would have happened to the plan to disperse the crowd and to disarm them?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, net om te blok sou nie gewerk het nie, daarom het ek gesê dit is saam met die "dispersion," so daarom sal ons die Openbare Orde lede aan die buitekant hê om dan voort te gaan met daardie "dispersion action" wat ek na verwys het, wat sou gevaarlik wees.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would you have still been able to disperse in that formation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit sou moeilik wees in daardie formasie.

MR SEMENYA SC: How do you preclude them going through the kraal with that formation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: As ek u reg verstaan, ek het voorheen getuig dat hulle kon nog steeds deur die kraal gaan aan die kant van Pappa2 en die kraal.

MR SEMENYA SC: How would you have prevented them going through the fence that is bordering that property?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie met hierdie formasie nie, nee. Daar sal 'n totale ander formasie moes gesit gewees het want daardie "fence" is net 'n drie-lyn draad, so dit is maklik om daardeur te kom.

MR SEMENYA SC: Could this formation have happened spontaneously?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would you have had to be told as the operational commander that this becomes necessary?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja-nee, as dit bespreek was, beslis.

MR SEMENYA SC: In terms of the timelines, how much time would have been required to properly inform everybody that this blocking has become necessary?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Sjoe, mnr die Voorsitter, as ons 'n behoorlike "blocking" in plek moet sit dan beteken dit ons sal voorligting moet gee vir die bevelvoerders en hulle sal dan daardie voorligting aan hulle lede op die voertuie moet oordra. So definitief nie in die minuut en 30 sekondes, of die tydperk wat hier, ons, dit sou baie langer gevat het.

MR SEMENYA SC: If as the operational commander you wanted spontaneously to achieve this, or instantly to achieve this feat, how much time would you have needed?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek dink die, mnr die Voorsitter het verwys na, van waar hulle om gekom het, die 30, of die 20 tot by 50, dit gee so 'n paar sekondes, 10, 20 sekondes, wat heeltemal te min tyd is om dit in plek te sit.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, can I invite you to comment on another exhibit, which is KKK51, slide 5, the one below this one. That's the one. This is a blown-up version of the previous slide. We are told this is now 29 seconds before the TRT responded to the crowd.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, ek dink dit is 'n in zoom van die foto van Kolonel Vermaak, as ek dit nie mis het nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Ja, according to your study of the material, Brigadier, would scene 2 have happened this time? Incident 2, rather.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Insident 2 het klaar plaasgevind. Hierdie is waar hulle ombeweeg na insident 3.

MR SEMENYA SC: And the water cannon, according to your understanding of the evidence had it already sprayed the crowd?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek het gesê ek was nie bewus die tyd wanneer hy "ge-spray" het nie, so ek kon nie daaroor getuig nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Let us look there at the opportunity of people turning back and going to their respective destinations of choice. Is there anything on the part of the police precluding these members from going to all various spaces that we see on that photograph?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: As u sê "precluding," ek wil net seker maak –

MR SEMENYA SC: Is there anything by the police which prevents any of these people from going back?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink as ons kyk en dan miskien na die

videomateriaal wat ons nou net gesien het –

MR SEMENYA SC: Shortly before –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ekskuus, mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek wil net die antwoord. Nee, as ons kyk na die videomateriaal wat ons nou ook gesien het en die groot groepie, sal ons sien dat die uiteendrywing wat plaasgevind het, het wel gewerk, en die groter meerderheid – ek dink as ons kan uit zoom sal ons sien hoe groot massa het gevolg op hierdie stadium. So daardie groepie van 30 het dan deurgedruk. Die ander het gereageer op die uiteendrywing en die aksie van die polisie. So niks het hulle verhoed om, om te draai en weg te beweeg na daardie uiteendrywing nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: And we see the Nyalas there in what is called the corridor, the channel, or the funnel. Was that ever discussed in any briefing that the Nyalas should be in that formation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, dit was nooit bespreek nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: As the operational commander did you talk to any of those drivers to take that formation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie om daardie formasie te vat nie, nee. Ek het wel gesê volg my – wel, ek het gesê volg my, maar van hulle was reeds daar toe ek

gesê het gaan om, keer die persone, en "disperse, so die "commanders" het dan, sou dan daardie posisies ingeneem het.

MR SEMENYA SC: Were you minded when you gave whatever instructions you gave to form a corridor?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie, nie in daardie sin nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: Were the drivers of the various Nyalas aware that a corridor ought to be formed for the purposes of channelling these strikers to the TRT line?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dis nooit bespreek met hulle nie, as ek u vraag reg verstaan. So hulle sou nie bewus gewees het daarvan nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: At the time of incident 2 were you as the operational commander alive to the fact that the strikers would want to go around the kraal, the small kraal?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink ek het getuig dat ek kon die voorste punt sien na die, waar Nyala 4 geblok het, en ek het gesê die groter agter deel het ons dan gesien ombeweeg en dit is hoekom ek vir die voertuie gesê het om, om te beweeg en hulle te probeer stop.

MR SEMENYA SC: What I'm trying to establish is whether at the time incident 2 happens, were

you as the police aware that closing of that route by Nyala 4 would lead the group to go around the kraal?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, die effektiewe doel van insident 2 en dan ook die opdragte om op te tree was om hulle te "disperse" en hulle sou dan in 'n westelike rigting wegbeweeg het.

MR SEMENYA SC: And how much time did you have at that point to then rearrange the Nyalas as we see them on this slide?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek het nie die presiese tyd nie tussen insident 2 en 3. Ek dink die video wat vir ons gewys het waar ons op beweeg het was so iets soos 'n minuut en 30 sekondes, ek dink, as ek, onder korreksie.

MR SEMENYA SC: As the operational commander did you talk to TRT this time?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie spesifieke opdragte aan TRT nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was there anything – let me ask it differently. Papa11, we see it where it is. Was it through any of the direct instructions that you gave it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Om in daardie posisie te parkeer, nee. Die "commander" self het besluit om vorentoe te gaan en daar te parkeer.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. I would like us to

also deal with various other slides and obtain your input. If we go to page 25 of exhibit KKK52, that is the slide dealing with 14 seconds before the action by the TRT on the – no, the one which is page 25, screenshot from exhibit UU3 bis at 5 seconds, and which is 14 seconds before the TRT line opens fire. Yes, that's the one, Brigadier. Is the TRT line visible to the approaching strikers?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Are the members of the police visible, of POP rather, to the approaching strikers?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die Openbare Orde Polisiëringslede is ook "visible" vir hulle, dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: The Nyalas by the police, are those visible to the approaching strikers?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit sal duidelik in hulle sig wees.

MR MPOFU: Sorry, Chairperson, I don't know what this means. The approaching strikers, what is being spoken about here? How many people? 3 000? Two? Three?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, Mr Mpofu wants you to clarify your question, so can you oblige?

MR SEMENYA SC: At least to the 10, minimum of 10 on that photo, would they have reasonably

been able to see what we are talking about?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter, hulle sal dit wel kan sien.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought this was covered yesterday, Mr Semenya. I don't want to stop you, but I thought this matter was dealt with fairly fully. The whole question of the visibility to the strikers of the TRT group was gone into in some depth. The proposition was put by Mr Gotz, which the witness didn't agree with, and he then referred to various slides and so on, indicating there's a longer period than Mr Gotz had suggested. I'm not sure that anything new has been added at this stage so that you have to go over this ground again in re-examination, but look, you may be leading up to something so I won't stop you at this stage, but it's not necessary to repeat evidence that was given yesterday just because it's re-examination and not cross-examination.

The point you're apparently seeking to make at the moment is the amount of time which was available to the strikers at the front to see the TRT ahead of them. That point was fully dealt with yesterday and I don't know it has to be repeated, unless there's something new that was not drawn to our attention yesterday which puts an extra aspect to the matter that we haven't got at the moment.

COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr Semenya, can we

have some assistance about the distances between where the strikers appear on this photograph and where the POPS police can be seen, and where the TRT police line is?

MR SEMENYA SC: I do not have that, but we will attempt to ascertain the distance, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I'd understood that some calculation has been done on the Google Earth, but we're going to have to have an inspection I think at some stage, one more, one perhaps final inspection, and perhaps at one of the exercises that can be performed at the inspection – I think we were told what it is in Mpofu paces, but that's not a scientific measurement. So various measurements, Mpofu paces, but at the inspection we can measure them exactly and remove any difficulty or lack of clarity on this aspect, and similar aspects.

MR SEMENYA SC: I would like, Brigadier, still on that photograph, is there an opportunity for those strikers in the front to move in between the Nyalas if they so elected?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, ja.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was there anything in your assessment that would have prevented them from doing so, by the police?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die Openbare Orde

Polisiëringslede, daar was, wat ons op die video gesien het, een of twee lede wat tussen die Nyalas gestaan het en die uiteendryf aksie met die haelgeweer.

MR SEMENYA SC: Did they respond to that at all?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, nee, hulle het net verbybeweeg en hulle respons op die uiteendryf van die haelgeweer was die "striker" wat dan die pistool uitgehaal het en gevuur het op die, of in die rigting van die polisieman.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was there an opportunity for the strikers to stop right there as we see them in this frame if they so elected?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ja, dis waaroor ek getuig het. Ek sal sê daar was.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was there an opportunity for the strikers if they so elected to just put their arms there and proceed unarmed?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: As hulle daar hulle wapens neergesit het, heeltemal stilgestaan het, hande in die lug en oorgegee het sou daar geen tragiese gevolge gewees het nie. Dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: Do you know why that didn't happen?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek

kan net getuig op die dreigemente wat aan ons gemaak is en dat hulle vir ons gesê het hulle, ons gaan op daardie dag doodgaan, en dis die dreigemente self wat hulle die polisielyn beslis wou aanval. Ons weet ook van een van die sprekers - ek dink mnr die Voorsitter het daarna verwys, ek het nie die verwysing by my nie – wat gesê het die persone van die, ek dink die, sy regte woorde, die tuisland of die wat van buitekant af kom gaan op daardie dag dood gaan of nie dood gaan nie, hulle sal, they will finish them off, ek dink was die regte bewoording, so al daardie uitlatings, dit is wat ons tot gevolgtrekking gekom het, hulle wil aanval.

[11:21] MR MPOFU: Okay, at –

CHAIRPERSON: We've gone over that ground a great already as well. There are two things, you can't really tell us from your own knowledge to why they didn't make the decision at that point when they saw the TRT in front of them, to lay down their arms and surrender or lay down their arms and walk forward in an unarmed way, you can speculate, you have an opinion on the matter which you've expressed before but you can't take it further than that, is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, behalwe dat ons die dreigemente wat direk aan my gemaak is self –

CHAIRPERSON: You've testified about that already, that's –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, maar ek bedoel net daardie inligting, dit is –

MR MPOFU: Chairperson, sorry. Chairperson, I'm sorry, I'm sure you did not intend to do it, what I'm going to object to, but the evidence of Mr Magidiwana is that they did not see the TRT line, so let's not, we can't say when they saw the TRT line when there is hard evidence un-contradicted that they did not see it and in fact this witness and the cross-examination by me even confirmed the reasons why they did not see the TRT line, so –

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know what –

MR MPOFU: Maybe let's say if they saw the TRT line.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think the question is put on the basis that, the contention is they could see, one assumes that they did, Mr Magidiwana says they didn't,-

MR MPOFU: Ja, -

CHAIRPERSON: - so the value of that evidence would have to be evaluated later. The mere fact, it is not directly contradicted, as I indicated to Mr Semenya in another context yesterday, it isn't the end of the story because there is a clear authority, Segune versus

–

MR MPOFU: Ja, no, that I accept, Chairperson, -

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, -

MR MPOFU: All I'm saying is that this should not be put as a fact that when they could see the TRT when there is hard evidence that they didn't, they actually didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the hard –

MR MPOFU: Supported by this witness by the way.

CHAIRPERSON: The hardness or softness of the evidence is a matter that can be debated later.

MR MPOFU: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: But Segune versus Banks if the case, I think.

MR MPOFU: Ja, -

CHAIRPERSON: But –

MR MPOFU: - soft evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: But in any way the fact of the matter is that there is evidence as you point out by one of the advancing strikers, that he didn't see, whether that evidence will be accepted is a question, we can't express an opinion at this stage, we will only know at the end of the case. You're correct –

MR MPOFU: And –

CHAIRPERSON: You're correct in saying that the question should be put more objectively.

MR MPOFU: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And not on the basis of clear fact that they could see it and therefore did see it, but anyway.

MR MPOFU: No, Chairperson, -

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sure Mr Semenya will take that point aboard and proceed.

MR MPOFU: Ja, I'm sorry, I'm sorry Chairperson, I'm sorry to do this, I don't want to interrupt Mr Semenya. The extra point is that that evidence of Mr Magidiwana was put by me to this witness and he confirmed it, that they couldn't see because of various things that I put to him here.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR SEMENYA SC: We'll just refresh our memory, did you agree to this proposition?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek kan nie sê dat ek ooit in agreement was, dat ek gesê het hulle kon nie die TRT lyn sien nie. Ons kan gaan na die transcript toe, as u vir my gesê het die Nyala het hulle geblok, miskien in daardie geval maar –

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, there was evidence

about Nyalas blocking the line of sight of the strikers, there is an agreement about that, whether they could see between the Nyalas and so on and then a Nyala moved, Nyala 10 I think it was, was seen on the video moving across and thereafter there was a clear view and there was a lot of cross-examination about that, but anyway, Mr Mpofu has raised the point which we will bear in mind. Mr Semenya, you can proceed in a manner that doesn't provoke further objections along those lines.

MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Brigadier, we are told we're looking at objective evidence now. Who are the men that aligned there, 14 seconds before the TRT line we are told who opened fire?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: If I understand you correctly, referring to the strikers?

MR SEMENYA SC: No, no, no, the people with helmets and uniforms that are in a line there.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Oh, this, nee, dit is die TRT lyn.

MR SEMENYA SC: Is there anything in the frame at least obstructing the line of vision of the advancing strikers?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie, miskien Adjudant-Offisier Kuhn in 'n mate, maar ons kon omtrent daardie hele groep van, ons praat van 10, 16, die voorste

punt van daardie groep kan ons sien.

MR SEMENYA SC: Is there anything obstructing them using this objective evidence in seeing Warrant-Officer Kuhn and the other POP member there?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, hulle moes hulle gesien het volgens my opinie.

MR MPOFU: No, I'm sorry, Chairperson, I mean honestly how are Mr Semenya and Brigadier Calitz ever going to establish that those three who are standing between the two groups that we are talking about were not obscuring them? I mean honestly let's not, we can't do this.

CHAIRPERSON: I think, Mr Mpofu, it is really a matter for argument, he says they should have, they must have seen it according to me, so –

MR MPOFU: No, that's fine, but he can't say from the so called objective evidence of the picture where there are three big men standing between the groups, there is nothing, he used the word "nothing", please Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The person who is in the middle of the picture who has the words, "the strikers over him," if the camera appears to be taken, the photographer appears to be standing behind him and if you look over his head you look through the gap between the two POP members

who were there in front of him. One can see people approaching –

MR MPOFU: Yes, but what if the photographer was standing –

CHAIRPERSON: It is merely –

MR MPOFU: - somewhere else? I mean really, -

CHAIRPERSON: It is really a matter of argument at the end of the day from what, anyone who looks at this clip, not just the witness, can see or not see, so perhaps you can bear that in mind also, Mr Semenya. Today you don't have to ask the brigadier what he sees if what he sees can be seen by anybody and everybody and form a matter, an informed argument at the end of the matter. The fact that he sees things which we all can see, doesn't strengthen his evidence. Equally if he says he sees things which we can't see then his evidence may suffer from that, but it is an objective fact, what one can see, the argument that flows from it, -

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, -

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we should waste too much time on that, if I may so.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, we spent days on end with Mr Gotz doing precisely this in cross-examination and we objected at the time and said if the evidence is

what it is we don't need cross-examination on it to make those arguments, but we spent days on end and I think in fairness –

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, okay, no, the point you take is a good one, but proceed with as much brevity as you have at your command.

MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. Can we go to KKK47? These are the manuals for POP training, are they not?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die tactical options, dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: And just for context, there is a definition for blocking which we handled earlier, you would see it on the third folio. Is that right, Brigadier? Now this tells us that there are different types of blocking.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, dit staan so in die manual.

MR SEMENYA SC: In terms of the blocking as the hypothesis was offered, do you remember that was offered by Mr Chaskalson, it was offered by Mr Gotz and it was also proposed by Mr Budlender, do you recall that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Which of the blocking

would have been appropriate in terms of this manual?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek dink as ons hierdie manual moet gebruik, operational block, dan moet daar 'n totale beplanningsvergadering gewees het en ons moes die inligting gehad het voor die tyd, van watter kant af hulle gaan kom, watter roetes hulle gaan volg en dan eers, u sal sien aan die einde van die blok, as ek reg is, praat hulle van, ek dink dit is die vier Ms, dit is iewers in die dokument wat dan is die menace milieu wat dui op die bedreiging, die resources wat ons nodig het, wat die menace, die means die omgewing self en dan die taak, dit is op die screen. Die menace verwysend na die bedreiging self, so dit sal inderdaad bespreek moes gewees het en dan die means is die resources tot ons beskikking, die milieu is seker die omgewing, die omgewing moes vooraf gegaan het, daar staan conductor rekkie, physical inspection to the area, en dan die laaste een is die mission wat dan die taak is van die dag, die opdrag wat gedoen moet word, so die blok was nie in enige van daardie bespreek nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: And if we go to the diagrams that illustrate the blockings as, for example page 16 of that exhibit, that's the diagram on page 16 of that exhibit, it appears and you can correct me if I'm wrong. It appears to be an illustration of a typical urban

environment, is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, ja.

MR SEMENYA SC: On the facts and in Marikana was this realisable?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Around the koppie?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: But why do you say that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, weereens, ons sou moes geweet het die roete, hierdie is maklik in 'n stedelike gebied wat ons weet dit is 'n optog, ons weet vooraf waar om die punte te wees, on sweet waarnatoe ons hulle wil vat, waar wil ons hulle weghou, so dit moes 'n beplanning gewees het wat ons vooraf kennis gedra het. In hierdie geval was dit glad nie voorsien dat hulle sou om daardie koppie kom tydens die uitrol van daardie draad nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: The manual also deals with the canalising, on that diagram what those arrows indicate.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is juis die rigting waar ons die skare wil heen vat, sou hulle dan kom kan hulle links of regs in daardie rigtings beweeg.

MR SEMENYA SC: On the facts was that achievable around the kraal?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, weereens, as ons vooraf beplan het en ons geweet daarvan, maar op die feite van die dag, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: Given the time that it became apparent to the police that they were going to go around the kraal, was this achievable?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Operasioneel sal dit nie moontlik gewees het om dit in die formaat te doen nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, now the other part of your evidence which was challenged in cross-examination is the fact that you say you did not hear when the TRT line was shooting.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: Just remind us, where again in Papa11 were you seated?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek het gesit in Papa1.

MR SEMENYA SC: In Papa1, sorry?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, Papa1, as ons na die voertuig van agter af kyk, aan die regterkant, die heel agterste sitplek, regs.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and it was put to

you that Colonel McIntosh did hear the shooting. Did he tell you that he has heard the shooting?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: It was also put to you that Nong also would have heard the shooting, and did he tell you that he had heard the shooting?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Did any of the TRT members tell you at that time that they have just heard the shooting and they are bringing it to your attention?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Glad nie op daardie stadium nie, nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Any members in your Nyala that told you that they have heard or seen the shooting and they brought it to your attention?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, dit was glad nie met my gedeel of bespreek nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Any of the commanders of the POP who may have observed the shooting happened, did they talk to you at all?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, dit sal agter wees, Kolonel Mere, Kolonel Makhubela het ook geen rapport gegee aan my nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: At the time that it happened did the JOC contact you to tell you that it is happened?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Where you aware, just to refresh my memory, were you aware that the TRT line was where it ultimately came to stand?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Hulle het wel op beweeg, soos ek nou –

MR SEMENYA SC: No, were you aware at that time that the TRT line is forming what it ultimately did?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: O, nee, mnr die Voorsitter, nee, nie vanwaar hulle daar voor was nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: There is also a suggestion that the proper course of conduct for that operation would have been to do the cordon and search and not the dispersal and the arrest of the strikers, do you remember that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou dit, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: How much of intelligence was available to the police about where the strikers are, I mean where the armed strikers would have been sleeping

through that period?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink van die begin af het ons gesê, die woord wat gebruik was, die intelligensie wat ingekom het van die myn se kant af, is dat dit is faceless mense, ons weet van die 13de se toneel af het ons videos en foto's probeer enlarge en gekyk daarna, hulle kon nie vir ons sê waar die mense vandaan kom, in watter hostel hulle is of dan waar daardie wapens gebêre word nie. In hindsight het ons wel vasgestel dat 'n groepie van hulle by koppie 3 geslaap het, maar daar was nie inligting tot daardie effek gewees nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: Now as we know would a cordon and search have happened on Tuesday, the 14th?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die inligting, nee, wat sê u, het dit gebeur of was daar inligting dat ons –

MR SEMENYA SC: Would cordon and search have been appropriate on the 14th of August?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, om 'n cordon and search te doen moet mens 'n behoorlike beplanning doen en die inligting moet bevestig word. Ons praat van information en intelligence, daar was net inligting op daardie stadium maar geen intelligensie bevestigende, intelligensie van watter hostel en waar watter persone was of waar om dit te doen nie, daarom het hulle besluit op die negotiation fase.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would it have been prudent to do it given the negotiations that were being conducted?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Van die 14de af, nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink ons het daardie trust relationship probeer bewerkstellig en dan deur daardie Cs te werk, soos in die document, om eers kommunikasie te maak en dan daardie verhouding met hulle op te sit.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would it have been prudent to do the cordon and search on the 15th of August?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink die 14de het ons hulle gesê dat ons sal hulle boodskap aan ons oordra aan die mynbestuur en ons het ook vir hulle gesê dat ons sal die volgende oggende terug wees om vir hulle die terugvoer te gee. So dit sou heeltemal dan, daardie hele verhouding wat probeer opgebou is verbreek het, dit sou nie gewerk het nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, the other area of criticism, Brigadier, relates to this, it was suggested that perhaps the police ought to have waited for Mr Zokwana to do his investigation and then to come back to you to give you the feedback as to whether he has been able to help identify the troublesome elements of the strikers, do you remember that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek kan nie

duidelik sê dat ek het getuig oor mnr Zokwana nie, as u miskien weer vir my –

[11:41] MR SEMENYA SC: You remember the evidence relating to Mr Zokwana making an undertaking at most, an undertaking that he will go and find out who the troublesome elements – I'm rephrasing – are?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, ek sal nie sê ek is heeltemal duidelik oor –

CHAIRPERSON: I think what counsel is referring to –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: - daaroor nie.

CHAIRPERSON: - is the evidence that on the Wednesday evening in the so-called debriefing by General Mpembe of Mr Zokwana and later Mr Mathunjwa, during the debriefing, as it's called, of Mr Zokwana General Mpembe asked if the NUM people could inform the police, find out and then inform the police where the weapons of the people on the koppie were at night, and so forth, and Mr Zokwana undertook to do that, to ask his members to make the necessary enquiries and then the information to be given to the police on the clear understanding that the fact that they'd provided the information was to be kept secret. That's the evidence that I think Mr Semenya is referring you to. That was an undertaking given on the Wednesday night, and the criticism was put to you in cross-

examination that instead of proceeding with the tactical option on the Thursday before Zokwana or his people could come back with the information, the – or no, the point put to you was that instead of waiting for that information, it was an error on the part of the police to proceed with the tactical option on the Thursday. That was the point in criticism to which I think Mr Semenya is referring. Is that right, Mr Semenya?

MR SEMENYA SC: It's correct, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: He's asking you to comment on that.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ja, ek sal net kan sê dat ek sou aanneem dat hy dan teruggekom het, sou gekom het na die generale toe, of dan die JOCCOM, en daardie detail daar gedeel het, maar ons weet die besluit dan gemaak is 13:30, so dit, ek kan nie sê op daardie stadium of die inligting gedeel is of terugvoer gegee is en of daar geen terugvoer gekom het nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: So you're not aware about what he did about that undertaking, that is Mr Zokwana?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence is that the decision was taken not so much at 1:30 on the Thursday, but the evening before, that very Wednesday evening when

General Mpembe was talking to Mr Zokwana the decision was taken by the Provincial Commissioner, with the endorsement of certain members of the National Management Forum, but I just mention that to you by way of correction of the statement you made about the decision being made at 1:30 on the Thursday, but that doesn't affect necessarily the main thrust of your answer, I take it.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek kan net getuig waaroor ek bewus was. Ek het in die doel van, deel van hierdie wel bewus geword van die bewering dat dit die vorige aand was. As daar bewyse so is of dit is getuienis, was ek nie bewus daarvan op die dag. Volgens my was dit om 13:30 gemaak en so aan my meegedeel.

MR SEMENYA SC: So as operational commander you are not aware of any feedback that was brought by Mr Zokwana on that endeavour?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: The other area of your evidence which was sought to be challenge related to the briefing of 14:30 the Thursday 16 August 2012. It was suggested to you, it was asked whether any of the POP commanders there expressed a view that perhaps stage 3 should occur at a different time as opposed to 15:30 that was initially agreed. You remember that piece of evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou daardie gedeelte ja, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your evidence, if I'm not incorrect, that no such view was expressed by the commanders, POP commanders in that briefing.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Now was there anything to yourself as well as the POP commanders there to suggest that you ought to halt the implementation of stage 3?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, nie op daardie stadium nie. Die inligting wat ons gehad het is dat hulle sou in alle waarskynlikheid hulle wapens neergesit het daardie oggend, wat tot ons gekommunikeer is dit het nie plaasgevind nie. Die leier elemente weet ons daar was dreigemente gewees van die media se kant af op ons eie persone, die wegbeweeg, so ek het geen positiewe, as ek dit so kan sê, terugvoer gehad om te sê maar mnr Mathunjwa of iemand het na my toe gekom of daar was iets positiefs om dit miskien uit te stel of te sê wag, hier is iets aan die gebeur, of die situasie het verander nie. So daar was geen rede teen daardie besluit nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Where there any –

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Semenya. Mr Burger, you turned your light on. I don't know whether

that's intentional or otherwise.

MR BURGER SC: I'm so sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was there anything at that stage of the briefing, that is 14:30, to suggest to all of you that it is better stage 3 is done on a different day maybe?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, daar was glad nie so iets nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Anything present in your minds why it ought not to go ahead on that day as planned?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, die redes wat gegee was, was dat daardie groep, voortgesette gewapende groep nie voort kan beweeg met daardie wapens onbeheersd nie, en gegewe die dreigemente tot op daardie stadium en dit is die instruksie wat van die JOCCOM af kom, so daar was niks anders in ons, wat ek teen dit kon gehad het op daardie stadium nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Typically in those type of environments how is decision-making done? Do you confer amongst yourself as police and make the best, and make judgment on the best available information to you, or do you have to consult somewhere else, other experts, to see whether or not your operation would be prudent to undertake?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, wat u miskien nou voorstel, dit is wat in die JOCCOM gebeur, so in die JOCCOM vergadering sal al daardie inligting, noem dit intelligensie en persone insit en daar sal almal dan tot 'n besluit kom. As dit operasioneel tot op die grond kom sal dit 'n opdrag wees. Ons het 'n hiërargie in die polisie, en dit is 'n JOCCOM opdrag, so sou ek dit nie uitvoer nie en iets gebeur sou ek definitief aanspreeklik gewees het daarvoor.

MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier, the other aspect is that given the threats that had been uttered to the police, I think the suggestion and the theme of cross-examination there was that the police ought not to have implemented stage 3. You remember that evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja-nee, ek onthou.

MR SEMENYA SC: In ordinary police operations if the police are threatened, do you abort the operation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, glad nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Of any of the threats uttered by Noki, if it is so accepted there, and was that adequate to abort the operation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, dit is juis die rede nog meer om oor te gaan na

die volgende fase.

MR SEMENYA SC: Given the observation that these militant strikers were reluctant to disarm, would that be enough reason to abort a police operation to disarm them?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek sal nie so sê nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Again in relation to the use of barbed wire, previous experience, you have told us, the unrolling or unfurling of barbed wire did not trigger the same conduct that you say happened on the 16th, the Thursday, right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Now as there anything – no, the information that the strikers dislike the idea of barbed wire, was that sufficient for the police to abort the use of barbed wire?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink ek het op, 'n aanduiding gegee dat ons omtrent 10, 12 keer vir hulle die doel van die draad verduidelik het op meer as een geleentheid, so nee, ons, nie om te "abort" nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: How central, or how material was the use of the barbed wire to the operation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit was baie belangrik gewees en dit het daardie skeidslyn gesit en 'n beskermingslyn, kan ons dit so stel, tussen die polisie, die "strikers," asook die media wat daardie dag teenwoordig was.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was the plan executable without the use of the barbed wire?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink dit sou teruggekom het dan as ons nie die "barbed wire" gebruik het nie, sou die enigste ander plan, nie daardie plan, sou nie uitvoerbaar gewees het wat op die dag beskikbaar was nie. Dit sou beteken het ons moes net met Openbare Orde soontoe gegaan het, 'n waarskuwing gegee het en net begin "disperse" het, wat nie uitvoerbaar sou gewees het nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: What would be the risks of doing that without the barbed wire?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, u het dan die hele oop spasie direk na die polisielyn toe, dit sou chaoties gewees het as daar persone dan tussenin beweeg het, gegewe dat die lyne dan sou gebreek gewees het en die gevaar van die media en dan die ander inwoners aan daardie kant.

MR SEMENYA SC: I think it was Mr Mpofu, dealing with a different matter, suggesting that perhaps

the Nyala 4, 5 and 6 ought to have lined up at the, shall I call it the mouth of the corridor before that footpath. You remember that line of cross-examination?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou dit, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: To that theory - I don't want us to repeat what he said about the blocking earlier – would that have had to have been pre-planned for it to be realisable?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Daar sal moet voorligting gegee gewees het vir die voertuie en dan ook vir die om uit te beweeg, die roetes wat dan sou gebruik gewees het want dit sou dit toegemaak het.

MR SEMENYA SC: Where the drivers told?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was it part of your strategy as the operational commander to do that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was that part –

MR MPOFU: Chairperson, it's not a big point, but just so that the record is accurate, I never suggested that Nyala 4 would play that part because Nyala 4 had blocked the kraal. So I just don't want my silence to

be interpreted to be agreeing that I put the contention as formulated by Mr Semenya. But the thrust of what he's saying, that the other vehicles could have blocked what he calls the mouth of the corridor is correct.

MR SEMENYA SC: I stand corrected, yes, Mr Mpofu. Was that though something that was discussed by the commanders of the various Nyalas that they proposed to block?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie waarvan ek bewus was nie, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. We do find though, Brigadier, that in the statement of Colonel Makhubela there is reference to encircling on that day as the plan. Are you able to explain that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink die heel eerste vergadering wat ons gehad het, die – wanneer was dit nou? - die 14de, die oggend, sou, na die plan sou daar aanvanklik, die plan sou gewees het om die koppie te "encircle" en dan gegewe die tyd toe ons dit wou doen, 6 uur die oggend, was daar genoegsame, reeds mense op die koppie gewees en ons het besef ons het nie genoegsame draad om dit te doen nie. Dit kan die een verduideliking wees. Ek sê maar net hoe ek dit sien. En dan die ander een kan wees dat sy groep Nyalas moes so toemaak "to enable" die Openbare Orde Polisiëring om dan uit te beweeg

en dan "encirclement" te doen. So dit is miskien waarna hy kan verwys het.

MR SEMENYA SC: Happily even Mr Budlender says it was not going to be possible to do that on that day –

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know why you say "even Mr Budlender;" that gives him a kind of elevated status which he may not deserve.

MR SEMENYA SC: Well, there was also reference at the same time to the statement of Captain Prinsloo relating to whether there was going to be blocking or encircling. You remember that piece of evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek kan dit so vaagweg onthou, nie in detail nie, maar ek onthou daar was dit bespreek.

MR SEMENYA SC: The thrust of that cross-examination, if I understood it, was to suggest that the briefing may have been unclear as to what was to happen. Now you were at the 14:30 briefing.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was the briefing of a nature that could produce this confusion, if there is a confusion at all?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die

Voorsitter, ek dink Kolonel Makhubela was saam met ons gewees en hy was die bevelvoerder van die draad groep, en die "briefing" was baie duidelik gewees waar die draad uitgegooi word en dan die doel as ons dan uitbeweeg dat ons dan van daar af 'n "dispersion, encircling, disarming and arresting" gaan doen. So die voorligting was baie duidelik gewees en toe ons teruggaan van die voorligting nou af het Kolonel Makhubela, het ons dit ook vir die drywers en "commanders" van elkeen van daardie voertuie dit so verduidelik. So nee, ek dink die voorligting was duidelik.

MR SEMENYA SC: And the time for that briefing, was it adequate, not?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit was 'n beperkte tyd gewees, mnr die Voorsitter, want ek, ons was van 14:30 tot omtrent 3 uur, so ons het na 3 teruggekom by die koppie en dit is in daardie stadium, gegewe 15, 20 minute, wat ons daardie voorligting gegee het aan die voertuie.

MR SEMENYA SC: In that limited time was the execution of the plan sufficiently explained?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja-nee, ek dink dit is in detail bespreek gewees met elke bevelvoerder, wat dit dan moes gaan terug net oordra aan sy seksielede.

MR SEMENYA SC: Just for completeness, it is also suggested that the Lonmin interpreter who was in your Nyala would have heard shots being fired, that is at

scene 1. Did he tell you that he has heard it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, nee, hy het niks vir ons gesê nie. Ek het dit net verneem in sy verklaring hy het gehoor iets teen die voertuig, tref die voertuig, as ek reg onthou.

MR SEMENYA SC: In any other manner alerted you to the fact that shooting had occurred?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: You were also asked about who would be the appropriate person to have called the operation to a halt after scene 1. You remember that evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: Who would have been the person? Just remind me.

[12:01] BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as ek die inligting gehad het en hulle het vir ons gesê, dan sou ek daardie inligting deurgegee het na die JOC toe en dan die CJOC, die "overall commander" met my aanbeveling sal daardie besluit maak.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would it have been competent for the TRT commanders to stop the operation for instance?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Om nie verder – as ek

u reg, nie deel te neem meer nie? Nee, ek dink hulle moet nog steeds my ingelig het en dan sou hulle dan 'n opdrag gekry het.

MR SEMENYA SC: I'm just trying to establish the lines of authority on the field. Would those commanders of the TRT have had the authority to stop the dispersal/arrest operation?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Colonel Makhubela by himself, could he have had the authority to stop the rollout of the operation if he saw scene 1 happen?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Colonel Mere?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ook nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. Now we will know in the further conduct of this Commission that General Mawela was in Mpumalanga somewhere; he had a helicopter somewhere at the place where he was and saw on TV the events of the shooting on eTV, I suspect, and he came to the scene. Did you see him?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, mnr die Voorsitter, ek kan nie getuig oor waar hy was nie, maar ek het hom wel, op toneel 2 by koppie 2 het ek met hom

ontmoet.

MR SEMENYA SC: And the alarm that was raised by the evidence leaders with you is that you would only have come to know of the incident 1 at 16:47, or something like that.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit is toe ek die skietvoorval van mnr Mpumza, as ek reg is, "body C," as ek reg is met die van, wou deurgegee het na Generaal Annandale toe, en dit is toe hy my meegedeel het daar was 'n skietery, 'n voorval by toneel 1.

MR SEMENYA SC: With the flighting of that scene by the television, was that brought to your attention at all whilst you were still on the field?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie terwyl ek op die grond was nie. Ek het dit gesien toe ons terug is by die JOC daardie aand.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm also interested to know when you say General Mawela arrived you saw him at scene 2, is that correct?

MR SEMENYA SC: Mawela.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, Mawela, yes.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die afdelingskommissaris, Luitenant Generaal Mawela.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, hy het saam met

die Provinsiale Kommissaris gearriveer.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand. What I want to know is what time was that?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink in my verklaring, as ek nou onder korreksie, dit is so rondom 5 uur, 17h00 het die tjopper –
CHAIRPERSON: It was after you had already heard about the incident at scene 1 from General Annandale. You already had that knowledge for about a quarter of an hour before Lieutenant General Mawela arrived with the Provincial Commissioner. Is that what you're saying?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, ek het reeds die inligting gehad en ek het ook reeds binne-in die koppie inbeweeg, met Generaal Naidoo gesels, en daarna het die – nie lank daarna nie, so 10 minute daarna het die tjoppers geland. Of die een helikopter, nie twee nie.
MR SEMENYA SC: The other area of criticism is that at the time, or immediately after the shooting at scene 1 you nevertheless proceeded to where you did without looking back at the head of the attacking group, which you clearly saw was in attack. You remember that area of cross-examination that you have seen the front of the group attacking the police line?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: U praat van op toneel

1?
MR SEMENYA SC: At scene 1, yes.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Scene 1.
MR SEMENYA SC: Yes.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou ek was daaroor gevra, ja.
MR SEMENYA SC: And you gave your evidence that when you saw that happen your instructions were to the Nyalas, in Afrikaans, let me just say it in Afrikaans, "Ek het opdrag gegee om tussen hulle te beweeg." Can you explain that for us so that I at least can have an understanding of what tactical move that entails?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ja, dit is nie 'n voorgeskrewe uiteendryf beweging nie. Toe ek gesien het die voorpunt kom en dat hulle gee nie gehoor aan die uiteendryf aksie van die Openbare Orde Polisiëringslede nie het ek besef dat indien hierdie ander groep gaan volg gaan dit chaoties wees, en omdat die "non-lethal" wapens wat ons gebruik het geen effek op hulle gehad het nie, en ek het toe opdrag gegee dat ons moet die Pappa Nyalas vorentoe kan beweeg in die sin van dat ons hulle dan fisies met die voertuie uiteendryf en sodoende hulle – dit is maar die doel om hulle te ontmoedig, dat hulle kan sien hier kom pantser voertuie aangery in hulle rigting, hulle sal dan ontmoedig wees, wat volgens my

suksesvol was want dit is op die stadium waar die persone ook omgedraai het en weggehardloop het in verskillende rigtings.
MR SEMENYA SC: Was it your best judgment at the time that that is what must be done?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ja, op daardie stadium was daar geen ander metode gewees. Die "less lethal," niks het gewerk nie, en dit was miskien daardie poging om die groep so op te breek, wat volgens my dan gewerk het.
MR SEMENYA SC: In fact Mr Budlender put it as high as this; that your evidence that you were unaware of scene 1 is untrue on one leg. Let's deal with that first. Your account, is it the truth, is it not the truth?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek het getuig daaroor. Ek dink dit is bewys deur die CALS dokumente ek het reeds vorentoe beweeg. Ek dink ook die doel van mnr die Voorsitter, ek neem aan Adv Bizos – ag, Adv Mpofu – ek vra om verskoning, ek het u van –
CHAIRPERSON: I never thought that Adv Bizos and Adv Mpofu would be confused with each other.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, nee, nee, ek het –
CHAIRPERSON: But the day has arrived,

and that happened.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, Adv Bizos was definitief nie saam met ons in die voertuig nie, ek glo nie.
MR MPOFU: The resemblance is irresistible, Chair.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja. Ek vra om verskoning vir daardie een.
CHAIRPERSON: I think each of them might feel complimented by the fact that you confuse them with each other. But anyway, let's move on. You've been talking about what happened at the demonstration, are you?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit was met respek gewees, dit was niks daarby bedoel. Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, ek sê net dit is – ek word gevra of ek, oor my getuienis, oor die waarheid. Ek het reeds dan vorentoe beweeg en my redes wat ek gegee het, het ek gedemonstreer toe uself, mnr die Voorsitter, op my – ek het dat u sit waar ek gesit het en die opdragte wat ek geskreeu het en ons het uit die Nyala uit gevuur met die haelgeweer, en al daardie gebeure, ek het agter gesit en ek was besig om daardie goed te skreeu. So dis moontlik dat ander persone dit kon gehoor het aan die agterkant. My visie was glad nie so nie. Ek het gekonsentreer op hierdie groep wat ek moet uiteendryf, my opdragte, en daarna het ek met die

voertuie gepraat en opdragte fisies geskreeu. As u luister na die "transcript" sal u ook hoor my stem is nie normaal rustig soos wat ons nou gesels nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Also it was suggested that that fact illustrates a massive and fundamental failure in the planning. You remember that line of cross-examination?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou vaagweg daar was so 'n bewering gemaak.

MR SEMENYA SC: What's your reaction again to that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek dink indien ek dit nie gedoen het nie en indien ons nie daardie groep op daardie manier opgebreek het nie, sou dit gelei het tot baie meer tragiese gevolge. As die groter groep deurgekom het, ek kan net sidder om te dink wat sou gebeur het. Dit sou, daar sou baie meer tragiese gevolge gewees het. So ek dink die feit dat ek vorentoe beweeg het en die groep opgebreek het en die "dispersion action" op daardie manier gedoen het, het dalk bygedra tot net die 17 waarvan ons vandag gehoor het.

MR SEMENYA SC: The other challenge is that your subordinates ought to have kept you abreast of the information. You remember that line of cross-examination?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Your subordinates were not identified, but let us see at least some of the senior officers there. Do you know whether somebody like Colonel Mere was alive to the fact that you were unsighted of that event?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek dink nie hy kon bewus gewees het dat ek nie daarvan weet nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: Colonel Makhubela, are you aware that he was aware that you are unsighted about the event?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, hy het die "scene" 1 oorgeneem as die senior offisier daar.

MR SEMENYA SC: Any of those senior officers, are you alive, are you aware that they were aware that you are unsighted and elected not to tell you?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek sal nie so ver gaan soos dat dit doelbewus was deur hulle nie. As daar pogings was sal hulle seer sekerlik probeer het op die radio.

MR SEMENYA SC: There was another area of contestation, or debate –

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, seeing you're

moving on to a new point, it's appropriate I think for us to take a comfort break at this point.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]

[12:26] CHAIRPERSON: The commission resumes. Brigadier, you're still under oath. Mr Semenya, you're moving onto your next point.

MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. When we deal with this aspect, Brigadier, you would recall, you were cross-examined around the address you gave to members on the 18th at that parade.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou, dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: Let us try and contextualise this. What was your target audience, who were you talking to?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit was al die operasionele lede wat daardie dag weer aan diens moet rapporteer, Openbare order polisiëring, TRT, STF, NIU, basies al die taktiese en openbare order polisiëringslede. Daar was offisiere by die bevelvoerders. Ek kan sê 'n paar honderd lede.

MR SEMENYA SC: Because the cross-examination went to suggest that that is what you were also communicating to the rest of the public and it would have been rash to make the conclusions and the statements you

were making to the members.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek -

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, I don't remember that line of cross-examination being pursued. Do you have a reference in the record to it?

MR SEMENYA SC: I don't have it, but Mr Budlender was the one to say, that it would have been rash immediately after the events that he in his position could then be telling them that they've done nothing wrong.

MR MPOFU: I think that is correct but whether he was telling them or the public nobody has suggested.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a lengthy cross-examination, there was lengthy cross-examination in respect of the speech that he made. So I can't sure about it but I certainly don't recall the point being made that it was a rash thing to say these things because it was an address to the public and I think if that had been said I'm inclined to think I would have, we would have raised a question about it, because it patently wasn't an address to the public. But I could be wrong on that. But Mr Semenya hasn't made a reference to it. But anyway the short point I take it is the answer given by the witness already, that the speech wasn't intended for the public, in fact when he saw or acted rather, rather authoritarian manner, when he

saw that there was someone making a video of it, he immediately spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Macintosh and did his best not only to stop the recording but obtain a copy of it so that it would, could be destroyed, is that not right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ons het nooit so ver gegaan nie. Dit was net 'n voorstel gewees en nadat ons met die persoon ooreengekom het is die band of die kopie of, die konfiskering het nooit plaasgevind nie.

CHAIRPERSON: But anyway the fact of the matter was you weren't intending to speak to the public and the impression I got from that little passage was you were horrified at the idea that what you were saying was somehow going to be conveyed to the public, is that correct?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, selfs nou waar ek hier sit, want daar's strategiese planne van die polisie bespreek en hoe ons te werk gaan om sekere goed te implementeer so in my oog sou ek dit nie graag wou in die openbaar wou gehad het nie, soos dit aan is nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: It was also in anticipation of the arrival of Mr Malema, that that parade was called for?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit was deel van die operasie van daardie dag, dis ook sy arrivering, dit is

korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: And there was also a thrust of questions that were saying you were schooling everybody there to - the self defence private defence thing, do you recall that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou dit ja.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was that ever your intention?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter. Ek het getuig daaroor. As 'n bevelvoerder met my rang en my posisie was dit net om die mense te motiveer. Dit totale en al samewerking te gee vir hierdie kommissie en dit was van dag een af my doel en ek dink deurgaans het die 26 dae in my getuienis is ook my doel om net 100% samewerking te gee. Dit is wat ons vir die lede gevra het, baie van daardie lede was nie eers op die toneel op die dag nie. So die gedeelte van die gespreek was om hulle in te lig wat wel daar gebeur het.

MR SEMENYA SC: Of those who had shot and who have at least alleged to have fired in self or private defence was there any information open and available to you to cast a doubt on that account?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie op daardie stadium, daai 18de nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: There is also a line of

questioning that went to, want to point to a collusion between the police and Lonmin. Do you remember that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: To that you were pointed to a whole number of factors, the use of CCTV amongst others.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit is korrek, ek het verwys na die goeie samewerking wat daar was, nie die voorstel wat gemaak is dat daar 'n koalisie gevorm is of wat was die woord gewees, ja.

MR SEMENYA SC: Is it ordinary police operation if there is a evidential material of that kind to use it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter. Ek dink ek het verwys na 'n voorval wat ons by Sun City gehad het wat ons dan ook die gesamentlike operasionele sentrum by hulle, gesamentlike operasionele sentrum gestig het en dan gebruik mens die CCTV wat deur hulle beskikbaar gestel word. Hulle het die fasiliteite, die polisie het dit ongelukkig nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: The use of information relayed to you by the Lonmin security was it helpful to the course you were about there or not?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek sou sê in so ver as

mnr Sinclair en mnr Botes aangaan was dit baie, baie helpful, soos u daarna verwys. Dit het ons gehelp in die sin, mnr die Voorsitter, dat met die aankom daar het mnr Sinclair ure gespandeer buiten sy normale werks ure om vir die persone te verduidelik op 'n kaart waar die sleutel punt is, hoe die myn se persele lyk, waar wat is, om die lede te orienteer en dan mnr Botes wat ingesit het in die vergadering self het vir ons baie bydrae gegee oor wat presies gebeur het, misdaad gewys, hoe, waar hulle normale dienste verrig het. So die samewerking was baie goed gewees en dit het baie gehelp.

MR SEMENYA SC: Any standing orders that prohibit such type of contact the police should have any help that they could get?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, glad nie waarvan ek bewus is, definitief nie, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Did any of the Lonmin security personnel do policing work in that collaboration you had with them?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: As ek miskien net duidelikheid kry van policing work?

MR SEMENYA SC: Give instructions to members for instance?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Oh, nee, nee, in daardie sin glad nie. Hulle het ons wel vergesel op

roetes, ek het getuig mnr Sinclair het ons vergesel die eerste dag met beskerming van die Lonmin interpreter en dan ook die helikopter wat hulle beskikbaar gestel het wat ons vergesel het om die roete vir ons te verduidelik. Na die persele toe, maar opdragte te gee en betrokke te raak by die operasie nee, nie waarvan ek bewus is nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Give any instructions to the police?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, hulle is nie bemagtig om dit te doen nie en dit het ook nie gebeur nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: The use of resources like the Coin security helicopter is that against any prescripts that direct how the police should do their work?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek dink die enigste prescripts miskien wat u sal vind is die lugvaart wet wat dan sal bepaal die hoogte waar die helikopter en goed kan vlieg, maar nie laat ons dit nie kan gebruik nie, nee.

MR SEMENYA SC: There is also the line of questions that suggested what ought to have happened at koppie 3, you or somebody ought to have used a megaphone and told those in the koppie that they have been surrounded and they must surrender, do you remember that line of questioning.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou, mnr die

Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: From your own personal observations at the time of your arrival at the koppie was that still doable?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Toe ek gearriveer het by die koppie was alles, kan ek sê verby en met my arrivering daar het ek die persone gesien wat onder arres is en besig is met die arrestasies en daar was beweging op die toneel. So nee ek het geen, niks waargeneem met my arrivering daar wat dit doable kon gemaak het nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: So you cannot actually tell us what the circumstances were as they arrived at koppie 3, can you?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek dink my getuienis was dat ek weet nie of die Papa Nyalas en die persone wat wel daar was wel vir die persone gewaarsku het en gesê kom uit, jy weet met die uiteendryf aksie en so aan. Ek kan nie sê of daar gesê is nie. Ek weet na die tyd op die Ryland video kan ons hoor waar hy skreeu vir die ouens, they want to come out, let them come out en jy weet waar julle sê sit neer julle wapens, sekere van daardie gespreek kon ons hoor op die Ryland video. So ek glo daar was kommunikasie met die groep.

MR SEMENYA SC: From the position of the operational commanders and given where you were at that

time the incident, I mean scene 2 happened what more could you do?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Met die inligting tot my beskikking wat Kolonel Vermaak vir my gegee het was ek heeltemal onder die indruk dat ons is besig met ‘n suksesvolle uiteendrywing. Die Papa Nyalas was daar gewees. Die heeltyd het hy net met die Papa Nyalas met die waterkanon gepraat en op ‘n stadium toe hy vir my sê hulle is encircle het ek opdrag gegee dat hulle moet uitklim en dan sodoende die arrestasies maak. So dit is deel van die uiteendryf proses wat net op een kant gemonitor is en dis dieselfde wat ons aan die, kan ek sê noord westelike kant gedoen het waar dan ook dan groepe opgebreek was en gearresteer is. Nou in hindsight weet ons dat ander dinge gebeur wat ek nie van bewus was nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: And I don't think we are going to go into this one at any length but Mr Mpofu suggests that you ought to be indicted for murder or something. Do you recall that evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou dit, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: - murder I think but an alternative charge in his indictment, it was just murder.

MR SEMENYA SC: Well did you fire any shots at those who were injured and those who passed on?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek het glad nie geen vuurwapen gebruik op daardie dag nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Were you aware that the conduct of your members was in one way or another unlawful if it is so found?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, tot op hierdie stadium een weet ek was self defence, tot op hede het ek nog niks gehoor wat unlawful was nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would you have associated yourself with that type of behaviour?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, beslis nie. As iets tot my kennis gekom het op enige stadium dat iets uit plek uit was, as die operasionele bevelvoerder dan sou ek definitief daaraan aandag gegee het en seker gemaak dat daar stappe geneem.

MR SEMENYA SC: Could you have had shared any common purpose with an unlawful killing of a civilian?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, glad nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would you have such an intention?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, nie in my posisie of in my lyn van werk nie, beslis nie, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: And we have dealt in the totality of the evidence in relation to what the various

experts say and what the police is around this matters.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou dit, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, that would be the re-examination we have of the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Semenya. There's a few questions that I would like to ask you. In your consolidated statement you referred to the meeting at 6 o'clock on the Thursday morning and you referred to the fact that it was necessary for a contingency plan to be drawn up, this was paragraph 76 on page 16, "a decision was taken that we must have a contingency plan in place should the strikers fail to disarm as it was indicated by the AMCU president. The police were to disperse the crowd into smaller groups to encircle them in order to disarm and to effect arrests". I've read that paragraph 76. Now we see the kind of contingency plan that had been drawn up in the past, I think it was referred to yesterday, it was a plan that you were responsible, would be part I think for drawing up. I think it was exhibit SS3.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the kind of contingency plan that you had, you people at the meeting at

6 o'clock on Thursday morning had in mind?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, nee, ek dink daar's meer verwys na gebeurlikheid sou hulle dan nie gehoor gee aan fase 2 nie. Dat daar wel 'n gebeurlikheidsplan in plek is en dit sal miskien dan die volgende fase gewees het.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no I understand that but I mean it would have been a fairly detailed plan of what the following phase would have involved?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit sal daardie van Kolonel Scott wees waarna ek verwys, dis korrek.

CHAIRPERSON: The next point I'm going to ask you, I take it the logical person to draw it up will do the first draft of anyway, the first draft of it would have been Colonel Scott?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: Now when you were at the briefing at 2:30 all that you had was his laptop, there wasn't any piece of paper, there wasn't any hardcopy. There wasn't any detailed statement of what was going to happen. The laptop as far as I can remember had a picture on it which we had as one of the slides but the slide we have has got some writing on it, what phase 1 of the operation would be, phase 2 and phase 3. That wasn't on,

even that wasn't on the laptop, is that correct? There was just a picture of various positions, the koppie, the strikers, their position, the position of various vehicles and then he gave an oral account of what was to happen, is that, that's the evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is 'n kleurvolle uiteensetting van fase 3 as ek dit so kan stel.

CHAIRPERSON: Now were you surprised that he hadn't spent the morning preparing a detailed contingency plan with hardcopies and so forth and he merely relied on this oral exposition of an image on his laptop? Was it not a cause for surprise on your part?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek weet nie surprise of dit miskien verras, of ek dieselfde woorde sou gebruik nie. Gegewe die tyd en die verduideliking wat hy gegee het dat die operasie moet om 15:30 wees en daarom gebruik hy sy laptop en almal wat die commanders wat by die vorige JOCCOM vergaderings was, so almal het 'n idee min of meer gehad.

[12:46] En ek dink in daardie oogpunt het hy dan sy laptop gebruik instead of hard copies. Ek dink nie die tyd het toegelaat daartoe nie, maar miskien was ek onder die indruk dat hy wel dit in die besit het van die JOCCOM en dat dit daar in detail was, maar hy het dit nie vir ons gegee nie, nee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I don't know how a satisfactory explanation of the reference of the time is, because this was agreed at the meeting at six o'clock, the meeting which began at six o'clock, some time from six o'clock onwards and at what time did the meeting end, the six o'clock meeting, more or less?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Sê maar 'n uur en 'n half, 'n uur, min of meer.

CHAIRPERSON: So let's be safe, we'll say it ended at 7:30, there is some evidence that he was preparing, helping to prepare an application for a coordinated search operation and he told us he finished that at 20 minutes past 8, 8:20. So he would have had from 8:20 until 1:30 when the JOCCOM, the second JOCCOM was held, to done what it was agreed would be done, namely to draw up a contingency plan, so surely he would have had enough time to prepare something more comprehensive and more detailed than what you merely saw on his laptop. So surely it does cause one's eyebrows to rise a bit, it is a bit surprising, isn't it, particularly a man like Scott who I think the evidence indicates, he is a very efficient capable officer, would you agree with that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, hy is 'n baie begaafde offisier, ek stem saam met u, daar was genoeg tyd gegewe net wanneer hy die inligting gekry het dat dit sal

miskien oorgaan na die volgende fase toe of, ek weet nie of dit teen, - ons weet nou wat u sê die vorige aand, so ek is –

CHAIRPERSON: That explanation I'm afraid doesn't stand up either because remember it was a contingency plan. He didn't information that they hadn't laid down their arms, that information admittedly only came later because there were delays, remember, before Mathunjwa went and in fact Mathunjwa hadn't even come back from his first visit when the 1:30 meeting started, but the point was, it was the contingency plan. The contingency was if they don't lay down their arms voluntarily we have to have a plan in place, so that one is not going to work. So it is a bit surprising, isn't it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek hoor wat u sê, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you agree?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek stem saam in daardie geval.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now did you ever ask him about it, did you ever say to him, look here, Colonel, there must have been some problem, how come we didn't have a contingency plan such as it is normally drawn up, but we only had to deal with what you showed us in your laptop? Did you ever ask him that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, na die tyd het ons wel daaroor gepraat en toe het hy vir my die slides wat ge-attach is aan die, ek dink dit is SS3, die beplanning, want in die contingency plan staan dat die verdere deployments en die besluite sal dan aan hierdie plan vas geheg word. So hy het vir my sy slides en sy voorbereiding gewys wat hy dan vir die JOCCOM voorgelê het.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, a lot of those apparently were compiled afterwards for the benefit of the Commission, but anyway that's the explanation you say he gave you, you can't take it further than that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, dit is net dit, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Now I would like to ask you something about scene 2. I understood you to say yesterday that if you had known that the people on the koppie were surrounded, you didn't know that General Naidoo had come, he was supposed to be at scene 1 where, he was supposed to come from forward holding area 1 to scene 1 with the paramedics and so on. You didn't know he had arrived at scene 2 and was actually taking part in the action, so you can't be blamed for that, and you also didn't know that Captain Kidd had come with the K9 people, that's right, isn't it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Generaal Naidoo het

met die K9, Kaptein Kidd het met die TRT –

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, sorry, yes, I had it wrong, but you corrected me. You're correct, General Naidoo had the K9 people and Captain Kidd had the TRT people. Captain Kidd was supposed to be at holding area 2 regarding an informal settlement, as I understand it, nearby, is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Met 'n filtering lyn sou die persone dan –

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, -

BRIGADIER CALITZ: - deur beweeg, korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: And General Naidoo was supposed to be doing something else, you didn't know that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek weet wat moet hulle gedoen het, maar ek het nie geweet hulle was –

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, - so you didn't know that the koppie was in fact surrounded?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie met hulle, nee, glad nie, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: And what you said as I recall was, if you had known that it was surrounded you wouldn't have given a warning to the people on the koppie, did I understand you correctly?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is heeltemal

korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, now the next question I want to ask you is, what exactly would you have said in your warning?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as ek uit die lug uit of Kolonel Vermaak vir my meegedeel het dat die persone is tipe van in ge-boks, met ander woorde dat ons geweet dit is TRT of K9, dan sou ek seer sekerlik daardie bevelvoerders gekontak het en probeer vasstel het en dan op daardie manier behoort hulle vir my te gerapporteer het dat daar 'n skietvoorval of 'n skietery aan die gang is.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, I don't want to interrupt you, but you're not answering my question, I asked something different. The question was, if you had known that they were surrounded –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, -

CHAIRPERSON: You said you wouldn't have given them a warning. So what I want to know from you is, what would the warning have contained?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: O, ekskuus, ja, nee, ek kom nog daarby, ek wou net eers gesê het, as ek al die inligting, - mnr die Voorsitter, ek sal dan dadelik die opdrag gegee het en dan ook vir die CJOC, vir die JOC laat weet het dat alle persone wat by daardie koppie is moet

staak indien, soos ek sê daardie inligting aan my gegee is en dat daardie persone moet dekking neem onder, sê nou maar die voertuie of die klippe of wat ook al naby hulle is. Hoe dit operasioneel sal werk, ek sal dan die Nyala voertuie instuur want ek het op hierdie stadium my Papa Nyala voertuie gebruik en dit is die beskermende voertuie, so glad nie die sagte dop of persone op voet nie. So ek sou vir daardie persone almal gesê het net, stop waar julle is, geen aksie en dat die Openbare Orde Polisiëring ingaan en dan vir my situasie rapporte gee en dan myself sou ek ook soontoe beweeg het.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm sorry, I didn't understand you yesterday then. I thought you said that if you had known that the koppie was surrounded you would have given the warning to the people on the koppie. Do you remember Mr Mpofu asked you a question, he had a long speech that he said you would have given by way of a warning, which I thought, and I hope he won't be offended if I say, that was a little extravagant, but did I understand you correctly when you said that if you had known the koppie was surrounded you would have given a warning to the people on the koppie, to the strikers?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is, mnr die Voorsitter, eerstens vir die polisie beamptes, as ek geweet het hulle was daar, sodat die aksie stop en dan sou ek my

Papa Nyalas en myself wat ek nou gesê het sal nader beweeg en outomaties daar sou ons dan gesien het die persone is omsingel en in daardie geval sou daar dan kommunikasie met die persone gewees het en gesê, kom uit vreedsaam.

CHAIRPERSON: So what exactly would the warning that you would have given the strikers, what exactly would that warning have involved, what would you have said?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mm –

CHAIRPERSON: You wouldn't have said everything Mr Mpofu suggested yesterday.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, nee, nee.

CHAIRPERSON: But what would you have said?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit sou in die sin gewees het van deur die interpreter dat die persone is omsingel, kom uit, hulle is onder arres vir die besit van die gevaarlike wapens, die wat nie gaan uitkom nie, die normale waarskuwing wat ons vir hulle sou gegee het miskien voor die dispersion, maar in die sin van hulle is nou klaar opgevolg, hulle is omsingel en dat hulle besig is om arrestasie op hulle uit te voer, so onsself identifiseer aan hulle en dan deur daardie stappe te gaan, om die persone dan uit die, hoe kan ek sê, die bos of agter die klippe uit te kry, as hulle dan vrylik sou uitbeweeg.

Indien nie sou die dispersion action dan miskien net voortgegaan het.

CHAIRPERSON: You see I also understood you to say that you did realise later that they were boxed in, is that right? You used the word "boxed in" yesterday or "in-geboks", I think, -

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is wat ek gesê het –

CHAIRPERSON: - is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: In hindsight het ons gesien dit is –

CHAIRPERSON: No, I understood you to say yesterday that you realised that they were boxed in, this was just before the, you gave an order, - sorry, I mustn't promote him unduly. Colonel Vermaak made a report to you from the helicopter and you then gave an order to the members who were, to whom you were commanding at that point, and I understood you to say that at that point you thought or you realised that the strikers were boxed in. Did I misunderstand that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek dink die woorde wat ek, as ek "boxed in" gebruik het, maar wat hy vir my gesê het, die persone is ge-encircle en hy het in Afrikaans vir my gesê, Brigadier, as die waterkanonne kan wag, die persone is nou ge-encircle, julle kan arrestasies maak,

waarna ek dan vir hierdie mense gesê het en toe het ek geweet volgens my mening was my Openbare Orde Polisiëringsvoertuie dan rondom daardie groep gewees.

CHAIRPERSON: Who effectively surrounded them?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Volgens –

CHAIRPERSON: On your understanding –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Volgens my –

CHAIRPERSON: Your understanding was, let's be clear what we're talking about, you didn't know that the whole koppie was surrounded because you didn't know that Naidoo and Kidd were there, we know that, but you did think, because that was the information you had been given, that the strikers were surrounded, that's right, isn't it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is, hulle is ge-encircle, ja, surrounded.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, you used the word surrounded. So why didn't you then give them a warning?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, onthou, ek was 153 meter weg van die, ten tye van daardie inligting wat aan my gegee is, daarom het ek vir die voertuie 'n opdrag gegee en gesê, klim uit en maak arrestasies. Daar is glad nie vir my meegedeel dat op daardie toneel dit 'n aggressiewe toneel was, dat daar 'n

skietvoorval was waar mense dood was, so nee.

CHAIRPERSON: But the fact of the matter was that before you gave the order to them to disarm and disperse and so on and so on, you could have given the people who you thought were surrounded and boxed in, you could have given them a warning, couldn't you? You could have moved 150 metres forward if you had to and give them a warning. As you said you would have given them a warning if you had known that the whole koppie was surrounded, so nothing prevented you from giving them a warning if they were in fact surrounded, not by Naidoo's men and Kidd's men and the others, but by the people under your command, that you thought they were surrounded by them. So why didn't you at that point give them a warning?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, -

CHAIRPERSON: Was there a reason?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, nee, die enigste wat ek daarvoor kan getuig is, ek weet nie of my voertuie daar self, hulle 'n waarskuwing gegee het nie, die enigste wat ek vir u kan sê, ek was die 150 meter weg. Wat ek vir u gesê het ek sou nader beweeg het is as ek bewus was van die TRT en die K9 wat dan duidelik –

CHAIRPERSON: So –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: - die toneel sou verander het. Soos dit vir my op hierdie stadium was, was

dit 'n gewone uiteendrywing, dit is waarmee ons aan die westekant ook betrokke was en daar het ek dan ook, soos die mense net encircle is gesê, arresteer, so ons het nie weer waarskuwings gegee na dit nie, nee.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, I understand, you see what I'm interested in is, when your people were dispersing and disarming them, regard being had to some of the history and what had gone before and the intelligence that had been obtained and so forth, that these people were unwilling to hand over their arms and would fight to keep their arms and so forth, wouldn't it have been, perhaps this is a hindsight question, but wouldn't it had been sensible before you gave that disarm order, to have given the people a concerned warning, so to try to encourage them to cooperate with the police rather than to put up a fight as they might well have done, with a result in bloodshed?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ja, in hindsight, as ons nou kyk na die spesifieke toneel, dit is 'n moontlikheid. Operasioneel kan ek net vir u getuig, as ons opvolg waar ek verwys het na baie van die Papa blokkerings en die persone groepeer weer en ons kom met die voertuie nader, dan word daar nie weer waarskuwings gegee, dan is dit 'n fisiese proses van arrestasies wat volg, so dit is nie dat dit 'n voorgeskrewe procedure is nie, maar ek stem saam met u, dit is 'n moontlikheid.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, I'm afraid I have a few more questions to ask you, it is now one o'clock, I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you a few more questions at quarter to two, so we'll now take the lunch adjournment until quarter to two.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dankie, mnr die Voorsitter.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]

[14:02] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Brigadier, you're still under oath.

ADRIAAN MARTHINUS CALITZ: Dankie, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that on Monday a series of statements were filed by members of the police service and a number of them were by people who were in one of the Nyalas on Thursday, the 16th. The main one is by Warrant Officer Mamabolo. Now am I correct in thinking that Warrant Officer Mamabolo was in Papa11? Is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek vertrou so, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, might I just state that the witness is not aware of Mamabolo's statement. I don't know where the Chair is going –

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, no, I don't think

there will be a problem. If there is I understand the point you make. Now according to this witness, and indeed the others with him, other statements made by people who were with him in that Nyala, after being at scene 1 he, the Nyala, Nyala 11 then proceeded to, ultimately to koppie 3, and he describes what happened then they got to koppie 3. All I want to know from you at this stage is when Nyala 11, Papa11 rather, Papa11 came to koppie 3, did you see it?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as ek reg is oor Pappa11 is dit die Nyala wat by ons was waar ons die arrestasies gemaak het op 'n noordwestelike hoek en van daar af het hulle gery na die koppie toe. Ek dink dit is die "movement" van Pappa11 wat ek dink een van die advokate, ek is nie seker, met ons deurgegaan het. Dit, daar was so 'n gekleurde dokument wat beskryf het hoe hy inbeweeg tot in die middel van daardie koppie.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Maar nee, ek het hom nie gesien beweeg daar waar hy presies daar weggegaan het nie.

CHAIRPERSON: Now perhaps I should hand you the copy that I have. I will be an exhibit in due course. I suppose it may have to be an exhibit already. What's the latest exhibit? KKK, so it will be KKK61, statement Mamabolo, Warrant Officer Mamabolo. Well,

perhaps I could read just the paragraph, it's paragraph 13. "We received instructions through the radio that Papa11 should go and protect the Gauteng water cannon which was following the protesters and spraying them with water. The protesters were busy running through the open area. We further received instructions through the radio from one of the police choppers that we should get out of the Nyalas and effect arrests. I instructed the crew of the Nyala to get out and we assisted other members to effect arrests. Whilst we were busy effecting arrests the water cannon proceeded further to scene 2. The place where the arrests were effected is reflected in the photo per movement of eTV number 16:13:51 to 16:21 as per document marked movement of Papa11." Anyway, you don't have to worry about that because you know where this particular Nyala was.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dis korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: "After the arrest of the protesters, while they were lying on the ground, we left them with the members in the two other Nyalas." That's correct also, isn't it? "After the arrest of the protesters, while they were lying on the ground, we left them with the members in the two other Nyalas."

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek dink hy verwys daar na die noordwestelike kant waar hy by my was.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it sounds like it.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: "This was after the driver of the Nyala proposed that we proceed to the koppie to protect the water cannon as there was gunfire in that direction. I could also hear the sound made by the firing of live ammunition in the vicinity of the koppie. At that stage I did not know from which direction the live ammunition was fired." So it appears that what Warrant Officer Mamabolo is saying is that while his Nyala was together with your Nyala and a third Nyala at the place at the northwest corner of koppie 3, while people were lying on the ground, the arrested people were lying on the ground, they left because the proposal had been made that they proceed to the koppie to protect the water cannon as there was gunfire in that direction and he said he could also hear the sound made by the firing of live ammunition in the vicinity of the koppie. The question I ask you is did you not hear that firing as well?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, dit is waaroor ek getuig het. Ek het nie op daardie stadium enige "live fire" gehoor. Ek weet nie of hy buitekant die voertuig was of waar was hulle op daardie stadium geposisioneer nie. Ek was maar meerderheid van die

tyd in die voertuig, so nee, ek het dit nie gehoor nie.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand, thank you. Now I'd like –

MS PILLAY: Chair, I'm sorry to interrupt. If I may just indicate that the last exhibit number is KKK60. So it should be KKK60 instead of 61. The supplementary statement of Warrant Officer Mamabolo.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh yes, of course, we had the problem that it turned out it was in already. Yes, thank you very much. So we'll correct that. I haven't marked – it's now been marked exhibit KKK60, six-oh. I'd like to now move on to another topic and that is it appears from exhibit L that the TRT members were briefed, this was after the briefing at 2:30 the commanders went back to brief their sections.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: And it appears from exhibit L, it was referred to previously when I think Mr Mpofu was cross-examining you, that the TRT commanders gave a particular briefing to their members and what was said was that there was specific instruction in respect of self-defence and private defence and that it was not necessary to have an instruction before firing. That's my paraphrase of what was said. You remember that passage? Do you

remember that evidence?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek onthou, mnr die Voorsitter. Ek kan nie die bladsy onthou nie, maar ek onthou waar u na verwys.

CHAIRPERSON: Now all I want to know from you, is that a standard briefing that members of the TRT would receive? It's slide 182 of exhibit L. "Commanders of the teams of TRT who were responsible for supporting the dispersion action of POP personally briefed their own forces with regard to their roles and responsibilities. The placement of the members of the TRT is behind the POP's line, the allocation of koppie 2 for sweeping and searching. The rules of engagement were emphasised, advancing on command, to perform a planned role during the dispersion, clarifying private defence, when to engage without instruction." All I want to know from you is, is it customary when commanders of teams of the TRT brief their forces, as it's put here in the slide, for them to emphasise the rules of engagement and to clarify the rules relating to private defence and when to engage without instruction? Is that a standard kind of briefing, or is it something that happened on this day?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek sal u nie rêrig kan help deurdat ek nie rêrig betrokke is by die taktiese "briefing" van die TRT lede nie, maar wat

ek weet uit die beplanning uit is dat ons onder die term "use of force" skryf ons dan gewoonlik in enige beplanning in opdrag van uiteenvoering en dan ook "self-defence, private defence." So onder die terme "use of force" word daardie terminologie, as ek dit so kan sê, gebruik. So as dit die woorde is wat die TRT "commanders" op daardie stadium gebruik het, het hulle dit miskien net in 'n verdere mate verduidelik. Maar die "use of force" kom gewoonlik in 'n beplanning voor, in enige van ons "OCT plans."

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you say the impression you get from this – or perhaps we'll have to ask them when they come, but as is if this particular instruction in relation to the rules relating to self-defence and private defence and the ability to fire without instruction, that appears to have been given with more detail than is customary.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit wil so voorkom in hierdie dokument, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what I said wasn't recorded. What you say is that the particular briefing as summarised here in slide 182 appears to be more detailed than is customary. Higher than that you can't put it. Is that fair?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit lyk my hulle het

in detail ingegaan wat ek verwys net na "use of force" wat ons gewoonlik in 'n operasionele beplanning skryf.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. And I'd now like to ask you something else. In relation to the instructions you gave just before you left the vicinity of scene 1, what precisely was the instruction you gave? It was paraphrased in Afrikaans at one stage. I take it you gave it in English. Can you remember more or less what your words were?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ek dink die vorige keer toe u my gevra het, ek is nie seker presies die woorde nie, ek het vir u gesê ons is 18 maande later toe ons daar gestaan het, en ek het die mense gesien af kom – praat u van die eerste insident of toe ons ombeweeg het van die begin af?

VOORSITTER: Van die begin af, ja.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Van die begin af, basies gestaan en toe het ons die persone gesien. Ek het eers vir Pappa4 gesê wat voor ons was om die deure toe te maak en vir die persone om in te beweeg omdat die groep afbeweeg daarnatoe. Daarna het ek gesien hulle beweeg in 'n – wat is hulle, in die rigting van Nkaneng se kant toe, die groter groep, en ek het gesê vir die Nyalas om daardie "gap" toe te maak, in other words "Move forward, move forward, close that gap," en toe het ek daar staties

gestaan tot ek aan die bopunt gesien het dat die bopunt, by daardie, sê maar naby die kraal se gedeelte is. Toe het ek vir die "vehicles" gesê, "Engage, engage," waar ek bedoel het hulle moet betrokke raak, en van daar af is daar gesprekvoering gewees met die Pappa Nyalas, "Papa Nyalas, go to the gap, try to block them and disperse," en toe ek sien dit werk nie, op daardie stadium toe ek naderbeweeg by insident 2 het ons verbygery en ek het vir die "vehicles" weer gesê "The Papa Nyalas, follow me so that we can block them, disperse them, disperse them." So dit sal iets wees soos "Move, move, move, move, move forward." So daar is nie spesifieke opdragte gegee oor waar, wie, watter voertuig moet parkeer nie. Omdat die roepseine op die dak is, is dit baie moeilik op daardie stadium om dit so te doen. So met ander woorde die uiteendryf aksie dan sou dan plaasgevind het van waar ons dan voor by die draad gekom het.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood you to say that you gave an instruction that the vehicles were to be used to disperse the people, the strikers. Is that right? It's that instruction that particularly interests me. How did you word that instruction?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, dit sou gewees het toe ek gesien het dat dit groep verby ons gegaan het, sou die woorde gewees het vir my drywer,

"Move forward, move forward." Hy het gesê daar is 'n draad, hy kan nie deurgaan nie, waarop ek vir al die karre gesê het "Move forward and disperse these people. Use the vehicles, drive in between them. Break them up. Break up this group," en met ander woorde dat hulle – en dit is presies wat gebeur het; toe die Pappa Nyalas vorentoe ry het die groepe begin uitmekaar uit hardloop.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this instruction given in particular to one of the senior officers there who was going to be in command, as it were, of that part of the operation after you left to go to koppie 2?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, nee, nie spesifiek nie. Ek het gepraat met die Pappa Nyalas wat dan almal vorentoe beweeg het tot by die, wat ons verwys het na die "dry riverbed," tot daar –

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, I see.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: - tot daar, en toe het ek vasgestel watter voertuie is saam met ons.

CHAIRPERSON: So effectively the people were to be dispersed by having Nyalas driven near them, as it were, between them, is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter. U sal onthou in die begin was daar bewerings gewees dat, of gerugte dat ons het oor van die persone gery, mense was gestamp. Ek dink uit die outopsieverslae

wat Dr Naidoo of Perumal gedoen het, daar is geen merke op geen liggame gewees. So ek dink dit is waar daardie gerugte vandaan gekom het is omdat die voertuie juis tussen hulle ingery het en op so 'n manier hulle opgebreek het en dan "ge-discourage" het om in een groot groep te bly, maar opgebreek het en wat hulle in verskeie rigtings gehardloop het.

CHAIRPERSON: Now was this instruction carried out?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit was inderdaad volgens my uitgevoer, mnr die Voorsitter, want toe ons vorentoe beweeg het ek 'n groot groep gesien. Ons het vandag op die video gesien, ek dink ons het van 30 gepraat wat deurgaan. Die res van daardie mense het gehoor gegee aan die "dispersion action" en het wegbeweeg in 'n westelike asook in 'n, kan ek sê noord, noordwestelike rigting.

CHAIRPERSON: So what you're saying then is the 30 weren't dispersed by this action, but the remainder were. Is that fair?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die 30 wat ons vandag gesien het –

CHAIRPERSON: Well, it's approximation, obviously, but we got to a figure of roughly 30.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, dit is die getal,

min –

CHAIRPERSON: The front 30 –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Min of meer, ja.

CHAIRPERSON: The front group which appears to be about 30 or thereabouts. Is that right?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit, hulle het deurbeweeg, mnr die Voorsitter, ja. Hulle was –

CHAIRPERSON: They weren't dispersed then?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek sal sê onsuksesvol. Daar was pogings gewees. Ons kan dit sien op die video. Daar was "non-lethal action" op hulle gevat deur die persone wat tussen die twee Nyalas deur geskiet het.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, yes, yes, sorry, I put the question badly. I know, I think teargas was fired at them and I think stun grenades. Was any water sprayed on them?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Hulle sê agt sekondes volgens die CALS dokument voor die TRT "volley." Ek het so vinnig net na die dokumente gekyk. Maar –

CHAIRPERSON: So there was water sprayed at them.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Maar ek twyfel of dan die voorpunt, ek kan sien die hele kraal se binnekant is nat.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Asook aan die, by insident 2 waar Pappa4 was is daar ook 'n nat kol wat mens kan daar waarneem. So daar was definitief water gespuit.

CHAIRPERSON: So we're not sure about water, but stun grenades and teargas we do know. That was done in order to disperse them, but this other way of dispersing them by using the vehicles, did that happen as far as they were concerned? Was an attempt made to disperse them, the front 30 or thereabouts, was an attempt made to disperse them by means of the vehicles?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek glo die voertuie wat dan op beweeg het sou dan gevolg het, mnr die Voorsitter, maar duidelik soos ons op die video gesien het, het daardie deel van 30 deurgekom voor daardie voertuie vorentoe beweeg het. Maar die, 90% van die groep, 99% kan ons maar sê het dan wel gereageer daarop.

CHAIRPERSON: Can we say whether an attempt was made – it would appear to have been unsuccessful if it was, but can we say that an attempt was made to disperse them by using vehicles to, as it were, push them along?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: U praat –

CHAIRPERSON: Push them apart perhaps.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: U praat van die

voorste groep, of –

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, front group.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, die voorste groep sou ek sê meer as dit, ons het aanvanklik eers die "stuns" en die rook en dan ook die haelgewere. U moenie vergeet van die persone wat tussen die voertuie gestaan het wat dan die uiteendryf aksie, so –

CHAIRPERSON: The rubber rounds?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter, ja. So daardie "attempts" was definitief gedoen en dan uit 'n desperate poging om hulle op te breek, die voertuie het dan tussen hulle inbeweeg.

CHAIRPERSON: Did those endeavours result in them being pushed in any particular direction?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die groter deel in 'n westelike rigting –

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not busy with "groter deel," I'm busy with the 30.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: O nee, nee, mnr die Voorsitter. Ons sou hulle nie, u weet, in 'n – wat is dit? – 'n suidelike rigting, nee daar was geen druk in 'n suidelike rigting van die voertuie nie.

CHAIRPERSON: They weren't being pushed in the direction of the TRT group?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Definitief nie, mnr

die Voorsitter.
CHAIRPERSON: So essentially it would appear that dispersal attempts in respect of the front group didn't succeed at all.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Die pogings wat op hulle toegepas is, "non-lethal," het nie, geen effek op hulle gehad nie, mnr die Voorsitter, en ons -
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek wil net sê ons weet dit as gevolg van die komberse en die "double layered clothing." Ons het dit getoets na die tyd. So die "non-lethal" het geen effek op hulle gehad nie.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. I have no further questions.
MR SEMENYA SC: Matters arising, Chair?
MR MPOFU: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In the past I've allowed you to ask questions arising and I see Mr Mpofu is putting up his hand too.
MR MPOFU: Yes, Chairperson, I was also going to ask one or two things on matters arising. I think it might be more appropriate that I go before Mr Semenya so that he – literally just two issues, so that he can clean them up, is what we say.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well, though Mr

Semenya is your senior, I'll allow you to ask questions first.
MR MPOFU: Well, he can go first then.
CHAIRPERSON: No, no, no, you can go first. You asked to go first; you can go first.
MR MPOFU: Thank you, Chairperson. Brigadier, I promise you, this is not going to long.
CHAIRPERSON: You made that promise to –
BRIGADIER CALITZ: I heard that before.
MR MPOFU: You've heard that one before, yes.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: But you said two questions, so I'll answer two questions. It's on record.
MR MPOFU: Only two questions, alright. I just wanted, or the Chairperson asked you, the first issue that he dealt with you was in respect to the briefing that was done on the computer screen in that Vito. You remember that?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek.
[14:21] MR MPOFU: Ja, and what you are saying is that the reason that that was adequate in the circumstances was because the time did not allow for a proper detailed briefing, correct?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ja, ek kan u net sê, die vraag aan my was wat het Kolonel Scott vir ons gesê

waarom daar nie 'n plan was nie en ek sê dit is wat hy vir my meegedeel het, is dat daar is nie 'n behoorlike plan nie, nie dat daar nie een was nie, hy het gesê hy brief ons net op die skerm van sy notebook.
MR MPOFU: No, irrespective of what Colonel Scott might or might not have said, your view is that that type of briefing which would be otherwise inadequate was explained on the basis that there was not enough time, correct?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, dit is nie die vraag wat mnr die Voorsitter gevra het nie, u vra 'n totaal different vraag. My antwoord daarop sal wees, nee, die halfuur wat hy daaraan gespandeer het sal ek sê die hele fase 3 is in detail verduidelik.
MR MPOFU: Okay, then you were asked about the issue of the warning that you might have given in respect of, - then you were asked about the issue of the warning that you might have given and I understand that it is speculative, in respect of scene 2. Now your evidence in respect of scene 1 was that you would have given the strikers about 20 to 30 minutes to respond to the warning. Would you be able to say that in respect of the warning that you might have given at scene 2, how much you would have given them to respond, either to own up or come out

and as the chairperson said, I made it more elaborate, you would have said, look, there are helicopters, there is this and that, but whatever the real actual proper warning that you would have given, how long would you have given them? Brigadier?
BRIGADIER CALITZ: No, I see the chairperson was just busy, I was just waiting.
CHAIRPERSON: No, no.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ekskuus, mnr die Voorsitter.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm listening to you, I listened to you even though my colleague, Advocate Tokota was putting a point to me, but now you've got my full attention.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: No.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm interested to hear your answer.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: No, I was respectfully waiting for you to finish –
CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I appreciate it.
BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, ja, weereens die vraag verskil, mnr die Voorsitter het gevra sou ons wel 'n waarskuwing gegee het? Ek het vir hom gesê in normale praktyk is dit nie 'n voorskrif dat indien ons met 'n dispersion action besig is om weer 'n

waarskuwing te gee nie en toe sê mnr die Voorsitter, maar sou daar wel 'n moontlikheid gewees het en ek het gesê daardie moontlikheid kan wel bestaan, so om op daardie proposisie te gaan dat die persone wel daar was, dit hang van omstandighede af. As ek op die koppie self gearriveer het en ek het gesien daar is met die Papa voertuie om hulle, dit hang alles van die omstandighede af, hoe lyk die terrein binne, of daar enige kommunikasie van hulle kant af was, sou daar geensins 'n reaksie wees nie, het ek vir mnr die Voorsitter gesê dan sou ons net voortgegaan het met 'n uiteendryf aksie, met ander woorde fisies dan uitgeklim het, die groep uiteengedryf het met non lethal force en begin arrestasies maak het.

MR MPOFU: Okay.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: So dit hang baie van omstandighede af, ek kan nie nou vir u sê –

MR MPOFU: No, fair enough –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: - 'n spesifieke tyd nie.

MR MPOFU: Fair enough, all I'm saying is that, can we then accept, if you're not prepared to estimate as you would have done in scene 1, can we accept that you would have given them a reasonable period within which to respond to your warning?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Alles hang af, mnr

Mpofu, as –

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I take it you would have given them a reasonable time to respond, what depends on the circumstances is what the reasonable period would be, but if you give a warning you've got to give a reasonable time to people to respond to it, whether the reasonable time is a minute or ten minutes is a different question, but a reasonable time you've got to give. What's the point of giving a warning and then immediately acting before a reasonable time has elapsed, I mean that must be so?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit moet so wees, mnr die Voorsitter, daarom sê ek dit hang af of ons 'n waarskuwing sou gegee het in die omstandighede as ons daar aankom.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand it. The first question is, would you have given a warning, that's hypothetical, but we're now busy with what we can call the second hypothetical, that if you had given the warning how long in those circumstances would you have waited before proceeding with the operation, in other words what would you have regarded as a reasonable time for them to respond to any warning that you may have given? That's Mr Mpofu's question, I think.

MR MPOFU: That's correct, Chair.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, dit is 'n baie moeilike vraag operasioneel om te antwoord, nie dat ek die vraag ontwyk nie, ek sal miskien by 'n tyd kan uitkom, dit hang alles net af van, indien 'n mens opvolg, onthou die persone is klaar uiteengedryf, so jy sit met 'n groep wat emosioneel is, jy sit met 'n groep wat nie rasionaal gaan optree nie, jy sit met 'n groep wat, so jou kommunikasie om weer te probeer terug gaan na stap 1 toe, dit kan nie, so daarom sê ek sodra 'n mens daar aankom sal 'n mens vir die mense gesê het, die polisie is hier, kom uit die dinges uit, julle is onder arres, u weet daardie tipe van en sou daar nie samewerking gewees het nie, so ons sou onmiddellik oorgegaan het met 'n verdere uiteendryf aksie.

As daar dan, soos u dit gestel het in die vorige kere, 'n persoon met 'n wit vlag uitgekom het, onthou daardie stelling wat u gemaak het, glo ek hy as leier sou ons dan oor die public address system en dan vir die persone gesê het, sit neer julle wapens en kom uit en soos hulle uitgekom het so sou daardie persone dan nog steeds gearresteer gewees het onder daardie omstandighede. So gegewe die tyd, dit hang af van die reaksie van die strikers.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that mean that if there was no reaction you would have given them a fairly

short time, but if there has been some kind of reaction you would then wait to see what form the reaction took and how many people were reacting and –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is –

CHAIRPERSON: It is difficult to give –

BRIGADIER CALITZ: In hindsight dit is 'n moontlikheid, mnr die Voorsitter, definitief.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, that seems fair. I think those were your two questions, the correct ones, Mr Mpofu?

MR MPOFU: Yes, thank you very much, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, were you going to ask the same questions or have you got other questions to ask?

MR SEMENYA SC: Other questions, Chair. Regarding the statement of Warrant-Officer Mamabula, he would have been at a certain point at the north-west where the first arrests were made, do you remember that?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, ja.

MR SEMENYA SC: And as the chair says in his statement he said he heard shots being fired at koppie 3?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek.

MR SEMENYA SC: Did he tell you that he

is leaving 1?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, ek het nou vir die eerste keer na die verklaring verneem, so ek was glad nie bewus gewees daarvan nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Neither did he communicate that he has heard the shots?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Dit is korrek, mnr die Voorsitter, ek was nie bewus gewees daarvan nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: With the question of contingency plans, given what you now know and using your own experience, if the plan that you were to execute was reduced to paper would it have changed anything?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nee, mnr die Voorsitter, die voorligting wat gegee is en die uitvoering daarvan is wat ons sien, wat ons verneem het, mnr die Voorsitter het na dit verwys, wat voorberei is vir Exhibit L.

MR SEMENYA SC: If it had been given in paper in more detail would it, given your experience, have changed anything?

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Nie die uitvoering gedeelte nie, wat bykom gewoonlik in 'n plan is die administratiewe sy, die logistiek, die radio kanale, daardie tipe van, so die uitvoering gedeelte was genoegsaam gewees, die tydperk wat dit gegee is, so dit sou nie

regtig 'n verskil maak nie.

MR SEMENYA SC: Those are the questions I have for the witness, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Semenya. I take it that's the end of this witness' evidence?

MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Brigadier, you're excused now from further attendance on the basis that if it is necessary for you to come back to answer some point that has arisen in the meanwhile that you will be prepared to come back, on that basis you are excused.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Ek gee altyd my 110% samewerking, mnr die Voorsitter.

CHAIRPERSON: I've heard that phrase somewhere before.

BRIGADIER CALITZ: Mnr die Voorsitter, as ek dan net mag, baie dankie vir die geleentheid, spesiaal vir die advokate, die manier en die wyse waarop, hoe kan ek sê, dit hanteer is. Ek waardeer dit en met respek daar waar ons verskil het, dit was nie uit, hoe kan ek sê aspris gewees nie, en dan my innige simpatie en mee gevoel vir almal wat verlies gelei het.

[NO FURTHER QUESTIONS - WITNESS EXCUSED]

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Brigadier. Your next witness I gather is Lieutenant-General Mbombo, is she

available?

MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair, can I –

CHAIRPERSON: I understand, you came to see me in Chambers and you informed me that he requests to give evidence in her home language which is Xhosa and so, but she is prepared to receive questions in English. Obviously if she requires assistance in understanding a particular question and it needs to have interpreter to her, then that facility will be afforded to her. So what we're going to have to do is, we're going to have to, we have to return to the mode of sequential interpretation or semi sequential interpretation. So what will happen is, the questions will be asked in English, there is no one I take it that wants to ask questions in any language other than English. The witness will then reply in Xhosa, Mr Mahlangu who is with us will interpret. I take it the interpreter in the other room will interpret the questions from English to Xhosa, so those who wish to follow the questions will have to use their headphones and presumably the sound track they will receive will include the Xhosa answer by the witness.

So in that way we won't spent double the time that we would with a witness who is testifying where there is simultaneous translation but we will spend one and a half of the time that would be spent in that way. Mr

Mahlangu, I take it you don't have to interpret for us in, you don't have to interpret it into, what we say in English into Xhosa, because that would be interpreted by your colleague across the way. What you will do is, you will interpret for us the Xhosa answers of the witness into English, that's my understanding.

MR MAHLANGU: That is, I suppose, how it is going to work.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, do you require, shall we take a short adjournment before your witness comes?

MR SEMENYA SC: I would appreciate it, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, we'll adjourn for five minutes.

MR MPOFU: sorry, -

CHAIRPERSON: Cancel the order for adjournment, Mr Mpofu, you turned on your light, what do you want to say?

MR MPOFU: No, thank you, Chairperson, you know just at a human level, I see that the brigadier is emotional, so I just wanted to say that the words that he had said to my colleagues, I'm sure I'm speaking for all my colleagues to say that we also appreciate your assistance and as you say we all have to perform our professional

duties, you yours and we have to do what we have to do, but none of it was personal, thanks, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll now take the five minute adjournment.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]

[14:42] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Yes, Mr Semenya?

MR SEMENYA SC: I beg leave to call General Mbombo, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, is it appropriate for me to swear her in, or should I ask Mr Mahlangu to do so?

MR SEMENYA SC: You can swear her in, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Lieutenant General, would you stand up, please? Are you prepared to swear that the evidence you give will be correct? If you take the oath will that be binding on your conscience, or would you wish to affirm?

GENERAL MBOMBO: I wish to confirm, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You wish to affirm?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Would you affirm that the evidence you'll give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Please say, "I so affirm."

MIRRIAM NOSAZISO ZUKISWA MBOMBO: I so affirm.

CHAIRPERSON: You may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. General, there is a file before you; I hope you have it. In that file you will find a document marked GGG5. Do you have that?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, Mr Semenya. We didn't put her full names on record. I see she is Mirriam Nosaziso Zukiswa Mbombo. That's correct?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Mr Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: Do you have the document?

GENERAL MBOMBO: I do have it.

MR SEMENYA SC: There is also an unmarked document, but it has in a rectangle first page amplified affidavit. Do you have that one?

GENERAL MBOMBO: I have got it.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interrupt you at this stage? I see most of the documents in this file are already exhibits. There are only two that are described as not yet an exhibit. The first of those is the amplified statement, which is number 2 in the file. Shall we call that exhibit –

MR SEMENYA SC: L.

CHAIRPERSON: LLL1?

MR SEMENYA SC: LLL1, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: And then there's another document which is number 12, which is a letter from, I think he's a Lieutenant Colonel Vermaak, dated the 28th of May 2012. We'll make that one LLL2, shall we?

MR SEMENYA SC: No, that one is an exhibit; that is a minute of the National –

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, no, there are two letters from Lieutenant Colonel Vermaak. The second one, number 12 on your list, it says "Not yet an exhibit." If it is an exhibit already, well then that's fine, but if it isn't an exhibit then we have to mark it. That's all I'm saying. Perhaps Ms Pillay can tell us.

MS PILLAY: Chair, both letters are exhibits.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. So the second letter, the one the 28th of May, what exhibit number is that, so we can write it in, in the relevant column on the front page of the file, of the documents in the file.

MS PILLAY: It's the 22nd of May, is exhibit JJJ137.

CHAIRPERSON: JJJ?

MS PILLAY: 137.

CHAIRPERSON: 137. Yes, that's the

letter dated the 28th of May. The previous one, the letter dated the 12th of December 2012, that's HHH68. Ja, alright, so housekeeping having been attended to, you may proceed to lead the evidence.

MR SEMENYA SC: Bar one, Chair; there is an excerpt, or there should be an excerpt in that bundle of documents of the minute of the National Management Forum. That also is unmarked. If we can mark it LLL –

CHAIRPERSON: I don't see it here. Number 5 is extract of National Management Forum minutes and then it says JJJ177. According to the front sheet in the file document number 5 is described as extract of National Management Forum minute, date of the next meeting 9/10 October 2012, and then according to the right-hand column it's JJJ177.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I think the identification of the document as JJJ177 is incorrect.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, document number 5 in the file has got JJJ177 written at the top.

MR SEMENYA SC: That should be of the 15th of August. We're talking about the next item, which is the item unnumbered.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, that doesn't appear to be in my copy of the file.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I will fix it at

teatime. There is a document you ought to have which is not in that index.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us in the meanwhile agree it will be exhibit LLL2 and you can mark it and then give it to us at teatime.

MR SEMENYA SC: I'm indebted to you.

CHAIRPERSON: And if it's in punched form we can put it in our files.

MR SEMENYA SC: I'm indebted to you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: And we'll call it – no, I see the description of the document then also requires amendment, is it not? So 5 is the document we have, JJJ177, which is extract of National Management Forum minute. The date of that is 15 August 2012.

MR SEMENYA SC: No –

CHAIRPERSON: I'm correct? JJJ177 is the minutes of the meeting held on the Wednesday, the 15th of August, and that's the document we've got, JJJ177. The other document, which we're going to call exhibit LLL2, which we will put in as 5A in the file, that is the document which deals with the date of the next meeting. So we've got to alter the description of the documents on the front sheet. Under the description of the document 5 is extract of National Management Forum minute, we can simply

say 15/8/2012, and then 5A is extract of NMF minute –

MR SEMENYA SC: Date 9/10 of October.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that's right. That will be 5A, right, and that will be exhibit LLL2. So housekeeping is now in order, is it Mr Semenya?

MR SEMENYA SC: I thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's proceed.

MR SEMENYA SC: General, can we start with GGG5? If you go to page 9 of that document you will see it's dated the 19th of November 2012. Do you recognise the signature there?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: On the first page you tell us against paragraph 3 that you joined the police in November of 1980. Is that right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: And that you went through the ranks until you were appointed the Provincial Commissioner for Northern Cape, and that was in November of 2005. Is that right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Chair.

MR SEMENYA SC: And in there, Northern Cape, you served until the July of 2010.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is true.

MR SEMENYA SC: And then you were

appointed beginning the 1st of August of 2010, you were appointed as the Provincial Commissioner for the province of the North West?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: You do set out in this affidavit the events that relate to the tragedy in Marikana covering that period from the 10th to the 16th of August 2012. Is that right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: And you refer to the tragedy of the loss of life and injury to people, as well as damage to property.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Mr Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: Now you tell us, General, that –

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, what you're doing is you're turning your microphone off when you start to talk and you have it on when you're not talking. Now as I understand it, it's supposed to be the other way around. You're supposed to have your microphone on when you're talking; you don't have to have it on when you're not talking. Is that correct, Mr Mahlangu?

MR MAHLANGU: That is -

GENERAL MBOMBO: I just wanted to check,

Mr Chairperson, when it's on is it red or is it –

CHAIRPERSON: When it's on, it's red.

GENERAL MBOMBO: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: And when it's not on there's no colour at all.

MR SEMENYA SC: I'm just trying to understand the technology, Chair. I think if the interpreter is going to be having his mike on, the General doesn't have to switch hers on and off; she's just speaking in Xhosa.

CHAIRPERSON: I have been told by my colleague Adv Tokota that if she doesn't have her microphone on there may be problem for the interpreter at the other end, who's across the courtyard, who is interpreting the English material into Xhosa for the benefit of those who are here, and also what she says in Xhosa must find its way into the headphones of the people who are listening to hear the Xhosa soundtrack. So that's why Mr Tokota made the suggestion which I repeated.

MR SEMENYA SC: I'm indebted, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: If we're wrong on that we must be told because we've never had this arrangement before, but we must get it right for the benefit not only of a proper record, but also so that those people who are here who prefer to hear the proceedings in Xhosa hear what,

her actual words.
MR SEMENYA SC: General, we'll also have you speak in Xhosa with your mike on. On the 11th of August 2012 you tell us you were on sick leave at that time. Is that right, General?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Chair.
MR SEMENYA SC: And that you received a call from an employee or a person who is in the employ of Lonmin, advising you that some miners there have started an illegal strike. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so.
MR SEMENYA SC: Do you now know who the person is who gave you a call?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I do, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: Give us the name.
GENERAL MBOMBO: Mr Blaauw.
MR SEMENYA SC: Do you know what position Mr Blaauw holds in Lonmin employment?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I am not sure of his position.
MR SEMENYA SC: But he then tells you that that unprotected strike resulted in some people being shot and that it appears that the strikers might continue with their violent actions. Is that what he says to you?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: What do you tell him?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I said to him I am going to talk to General Naidoo, who was then the person acting at that time, for General Naidoo to offer, to give him the necessary help.
MR SEMENYA SC: And we now know that General Naidoo was acting as the Provincial Commissioner during your sick leave.
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct.
MR SEMENYA SC: What is his otherwise position within the North West province police?
GENERAL MBOMBO: General Naidoo is my deputy. He helps me in components such as communication and organisational development and inspection. He is known as the operations officer.
MR SEMENYA SC: Having had that conversation with Mr Blaauw, did you continue to carry out your undertaking, that is you'll speak to General Naidoo?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I did so, Mr Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: What do you say to General Naidoo?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I asked him to be of assistance to the Marikana station in order to see to it that what was happening is brought to an end.

MR SEMENYA SC: What about the Marikana Police Station? What resources are you referring to there?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I was referring to the Marikana, the crime prevention members there, the crime prevention police were the people that had to be helped at that time.
MR SEMENYA SC: And his response to you, you tell us, is that he had already contacted the Visible Policing, that's in Rustenburg?
GENERAL MBOMBO: He said so to me, yes, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: What does he say with reference to Brigadier Calitz?
GENERAL MBOMBO: That he had also been in contact with Brigadier Calitz whereby, wherein he requested him to send members of the police, of the POP.
MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and the following day, being the 12th, you received another call from an unknown person who sounded to be in a hysterical state.
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: Do you know who this person is now?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I do know now.
MR SEMENYA SC: Give us the name.
GENERAL MBOMBO: Mr Blaauw.

MR SEMENYA SC: And in that call Mr Blaauw then tells you that two security guards in the employment of Lonmin have been brutally murdered by the strikers, and that mine property has been damaged as well. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Mr Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: What you then do next is to contact General Naidoo, correct?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I did, yes Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: And you advise him to contact the South African Police Service Head Office with a view to getting more resources and manpower so that the unfolding situation can be effectively dealt with. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: And later that very day General Naidoo comes back to you and tells you that he has followed your instruction and that members from various operational response service units were being called up.
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: You then give instructions to Brigadier Calitz that he must set up a joint operation centre at Marikana. Is that right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so.
MR SEMENYA SC: You do so because, and as a result of the seriousness of the situation that is developing there. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: Yes, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: And also because of that you then decided to come back from your sick leave and to go assist General Naidoo, correct?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, yes, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that very day, you tell us, that you telephone Major General Mpembe who at the time, or still is the Deputy Provincial Commissioner. He's your 2IC.
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: At that time General Mpembe is on leave, was he not?
[15:01] GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.
MR MPOFU: Chairperson, I'm sorry, I really don't want to interrupt, but I will. I'm afraid I don't understand what the point of putting – I would ordinarily be objecting against the leading questions, but I won't because obviously Mr Semenya is simply reading from the statement, but I'm not sure if there's any purpose in Mr Semenya reading the statement which is already part of

the record, for the witness to just say yes, yes, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, there are a lot of people who are present in the chamber listening who haven't got the record, the document in front of them. There are lots of people, I take it, watching this on YouTube who haven't got the document in front of them. So he's putting – there's no question of leading questions because the points he's putting at the moment I don't think are controversial –
MR MPOFU: No, no, that's it –
CHAIRPERSON: But this is why you don't object.
MR MPOFU: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: But it's important that the people who are interested in what happens here, both because they're present, also because they're watching through YouTube for example, it's important that they should know what's being said and there's no other way of doing it, I'm afraid. It's better that he does it in English, speed things up from the point of view of the translation, because for the reasons that we did before, so I think there's no avoiding what's happening. He's also, I think, putting facts on record that he thinks is important the public should be aware of, but I take it that when we get to the more controversial matters then the –

MR MPOFU: Mode of questioning –
CHAIRPERSON: - Lieutenant General will give her evidence in the normal way and then we will then hear the translation from Xhosa into English.
MR MPOFU: Thanks, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So I think that's the way it's proceeding and I don't see a problem with it. Mr Semenya, you may proceed.
MR BURGER SC: Chair, speaking for Lonmin, we have no objection to my learned friend simply putting to the witness what she had said. It sounds strange on the ear that she acknowledges that she signed a statement and my learned friend then sentence by sentence asks her whether that's what she'd said. So if –
CHAIRPERSON: No, I understand that, but you see the point I raised was the people here who come all the way from Pondoland to witness and hear what's happening, they don't know what's in the statement and the people who are watching on the world wide web through YouTube don't know either, so I'm afraid – I don't propose to allow Mr Semenya to go through the whole statement, but I think some of this preliminary material can best be dealt with in the way that he's dealing with it. I share your concern that we must use the time we have as profitably as we can, but I think that the other considerations have some

relevance, so I think we must proceed for the moment.
MR SEMENYA SC: General, you were at a point where you told us, or you were telling us that you then once more got in touch with General Naidoo arising out of the hysterical telephone call that you got from Mr Blaauw. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct.
MR SEMENYA SC: And the whole purpose was to really get more manpower resources to deal effectively with the unfolding situation.
GENERAL MBOMBO: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: What does General Naidoo then tell you in response?
GENERAL MBOMBO: He mentioned that he had been in contact, he tried to be in contact with our office, head office, asking for assistance there.
MR SEMENYA SC: And we were at a point in your statement where you got in touch with Major General Mpembe and that he too was on leave. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: What do you say to him?
GENERAL MBOMBO: I asked him that we please hurry to Lonmin the following day, though he was

about to come back on leave the following Monday.

MR SEMENYA SC: What was his response to you?

GENERAL MBOMBO: He mentioned that he had also heard of the problem at Lonmin.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, does it matter that it is the time that it is now, or we should just proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm in your hands. If you would find it convenient for me to take the tea adjournment at this stage, I'll do so. We'll take the tea adjournment now.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES] [15:25] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Lieutenant General, you're still bound by the affirmation that you made.

MIRRIAM NOSAZISO ZUKISWA MBOMBO: Affirms.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya.

EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC (CONTD.): Thank you, Chair. On the 13th you drive to Marikana together with General Mpembe and General Naidoo.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: And you then meet with

the local POP members who you find in Marikana there.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: As a body of people you go and you get to Lonmin Mine with a view to discuss with the management there.

GENERAL MBOMBO: That's right, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: The delegation you find representing the Lonmin management is, as you tell us, led by Mr Mark Munroe. Is that right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: I say so, Mr Chairperson, because that's how he introduced himself.

MR SEMENYA SC: And tells you that he is the head of mining in Lonmin.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who also was part of the Lonmin delegation there?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Yes, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: Tell us.

GENERAL MBOMBO: Mr Barnard Mokwena -

MR SEMENYA SC: Just have your mike on.

GENERAL MBOMBO: There was Mr Barnard Mokwena present, Mr Kgotle, there was a Mr Kwadi, Mr Sinclair. Possibly there were others which I don't remember.

MR SEMENYA SC: You later get to learn that Mr Sinclair I think is head of security in Lonmin.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Mr Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: He is the one who then gives you a briefing or a report about the situation that had transpired up to that time, right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: He tells you about the violent incidents of the previous days.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so.

MR SEMENYA SC: This would have been a report involving and including the unfortunate killing of the security personnel the day, the Sunday.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in your statement that you requested a full briefing of the, amongst others the causes for those outcomes. Is that right?

GENERAL MBOMBO: To Mr Sinclair, yes it is so.

MR SEMENYA SC: What does Mr Sinclair tell all of you were the causes for this strike at Lonmin?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Mr Sinclair only told us

about what had happened there which went up to the killing of the guards. We did not discuss with him the causes, what actually led to the unrest there.

MR SEMENYA SC: Did you get to know though that information about the causes for the unrest?

GENERAL MBOMBO: After we had come and we had met the management at Lonmin. That's where that explanation was given to us.

MR SEMENYA SC: What were you told?

GENERAL MBOMBO: We were told that from Friday the 10th of August that there were people that were marching, that started marching, who marched and came to Lonmin. We then asked, we were told that their problem was not known, that management did not know what their problem was.

MR SEMENYA SC: No, Mr Interpreter, I think you got that wrong a little.

MR MAHLANGU: I'm sorry.

GENERAL MBOMBO: What their problem was, that it was not known what their problem was.

MR SEMENYA SC: Was it known who were the marchers?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Because even the people that were marching were not known. One other thing was that they had not submitted any document laying out their

complaints.

MR SEMENYA SC: Yes?

GENERAL MBOMBO: We went on in the meeting, enquiring; we asked, "If it is so then why are they marching to you?" We were told that some of the people who were marching were dismissed by the company Lonmin.

MR MAHLANGU: Or I'm sorry, Sir; that they could be some of the people that had been dismissed.

GENERAL MBOMBO: We then questioned them as to, "If you say these are not your workers, where are your workers?" That was a question we put to them. They said, it was said it was possible that some of their workers could be part of those, but the people that actually organised this march are those that they had mentioned who are not known. They did not know who the leaders were or the organisers, people from whom they could ask what the actual problem is. That is where the word "faceless" came up.

We then proceeded asking – this was in the meeting, we asked them according to them what do they think could be the cause of all this. They said maybe it's a problem that started some times ago where the organisation, the National Union of Mineworkers, where the organisation dismissed or chased away some of its members, that those

members that were dismissed, that those people that were dismissed from the National Union of Mineworkers started their own union called AMCU. Then they said this AMCU, that AMCU has started recruiting and they are doing a lot of recruitment in their company, which has caused that NUM gets worried about this because of the loss of membership.

We then asked and they explained to us that there are some other unions, such as UASA. There was another mentioned, which I unfortunately don't remember, but they kept on saying that the fact is for AMCU where it is recruiting more from the NUM. We then asked them, we questioned them about, "You people are saying AMCU is making a lot of recruitment over here," and we then asked them which is the union that is now recognised. They then explained to us that NUM still enjoys more members. They also explained to us that they have an agreement with NUM which is still valid for two years, that this agreement was in connection with the salaries of the workers. They said in terms of this agreement the discussions would only be in October of 2013.

We kept on questioning them, telling them this is not – we are not satisfied with these explanations, that as far as we know that trade unions have got a right to recruit. We asked them what was the problem, what is the cause of people behaving in this manner. We got the

explanation again that one other thing is the management, that the management has made an agreement with – a decision that some money would be given to the people working underground, known as the RDOs. They said what was done which possibly could have had an influence on this is that this decision, or this agreement that was made, was made between them and the RDOs themselves without involving the unions.

We then said if there is a union in the work or in the company, according to our thinking, or as far as we know that if any discussions are being made pertaining to money, salaries of the workers, that this should be made in such a way where the unions could be involved or have an input in that discussion. They then told us, Chairperson, that they as management had decided that this was a gift that they were offering their workers. According to them this was to be paid at the end of the week during which we were there. At the end the complaint was that this allowance was only given to those people working underground and those working on the surface would not get anything.

We agreed together with them that a way had to be found in which this problem could be solved, the matter between the NUM and AMCU, so that an agreement should be or that things that have to be done to the workers should be

done peacefully. They told us, Mr Chairperson, that they could not bring these two organisations together because the NUM had mentioned publicly, in the public, that they cannot sit together with AMCU. We promised that on our side that we would make all endeavours, we'll try to get both organisations together so that we could talk to them together and together with management, Lonmin management encourage them to talk about this problem. At the end we agreed that we as the police would do whatever it is that we are to do to bring about peace, but they as management have to try their level best as a company to try and get a solution.

MR SEMENYA SC: Who on the part of Lonmin is giving you this information?

GENERAL MBOMBO: The meeting in which we were, Mr Chairperson, was chaired by Mr Mokwena. Most of our discussion was between Mr Mokwena, Mr Kgotle, and Mr Kwadi. They are the people that were giving us these explanations.

MR SEMENYA SC: Against paragraph 9.6 of your statement you do tell us that Lonmin requested you to remain in their precinct in order to assist in preventing further damage to the property.

GENERAL MBOMBO: Correct, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: Is this an unusual

request?
GENERAL MBOMBO: No, it's usual, Sir.
MR SEMENYA SC: What was your response to that request?
[15:45] GENERAL MBOMBO: We agreed with them after they had said to us they would show us those places.
MR SEMENYA SC: After having that meeting with the Lonmin people you then went back to the JOC. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: You were given further details at the JOC and I want to know by who was this further briefing given.
GENERAL MBOMBO: We were given this by Brigadier Calitz and Colonel Merafe.
MR SEMENYA SC: And in addition you were being told what additional resources have come to assist. Is that right?
GENERAL MBOMBO: Correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: You are also in that session shown some live footage, I presume this would have related to – to which events did this relate to?
GENERAL MBOMBO: We were shown a footage whilst we were there, Chairperson, of people who were

marching along a road where there is a railway line.
MR SEMENYA SC: And just so that we step back, this is live footage that you're watching now?
GENERAL MBOMBO: Correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: And what do you see there?
GENERAL MBOMBO: We saw men who had knobkieries, spears, pangas. We could not see clearly other things they had.
MR SEMENYA SC: What are they doing next to the railway line?
GENERAL MBOMBO: They were walking.
MR SEMENYA SC: And then as the Provincial Commissioner looking at that, do you give any instructions?
GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson. I deemed it necessary that I give an instruction.
MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that one of the instructions you gave was that that gathering of people who were armed must be dispersed. Who do you tell this to?
GENERAL MBOMBO: That's an instruction that I gave, it was General Mpembe that I instructed that the people we are seeing over there who are armed in this

manner and that the situation as has been explained to us, I said "I now ask you, put you here to work together with Brigadier Calitz in this matter." Those conditions I gave in terms of the OB-entry that I made at the time, this was to General Mpembe.
MR SEMENYA SC: It was part of your instruction that those weapons must be confiscated?
GENERAL MBOMBO: Correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: And those who can be arrested, should be arrested too?
GENERAL MBOMBO: Correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: And that there must be further deployment to key areas, key strategic areas there?
GENERAL MBOMBO: Correct, Chairperson, and this was also requested by Lonmin.
MR SEMENYA SC: You do say though to General Mpembe that the members must act professionally and they must ensure that peace prevails.
GENERAL MBOMBO: I did, Chairperson. That was my aim.
MR SEMENYA SC: Can I invite you to look at the occurrence book, which is exhibit FFF25, and in particular – alright, I think they will post it on the screen. If you look to the big screen you will see item number 37. If I read it to you, General, there it is

recorded in the OB, "JOC visit," this is now 12:45 the OB reads, "and is shown the different points of the gathering. The planning has been adjusted to disperse the gatherings. All police officials on duty to conduct searches and confiscate all dangerous weapons. All those that can be identified on the footage should be picked up and deployments to key strategic areas should be enhanced. In terms of our policing on crowd management all members to conduct themselves within the limits of this policy unless the situation dictates otherwise. Ensure that peace prevails," and the OB is signed Lieutenant General Mbombo. Is that what you are referring to?
GENERAL MBOMBO: This is correct, Chairperson.
MR SEMENYA SC: Just for completeness, why did you find it necessary to inform the police that they ought to act professionally and to ensure that peace prevails?
GENERAL MBOMBO: At all times, Mr Chairperson, when we send police out on duty it is my duty as a person in charge to remind them about the responsibility that is on their shoulders as they are conducting their job.
MR SEMENYA SC: How does General Mpembe respond to this instruction?

GENERAL MBOMBO: General Mpembe went to do what was supposed to be done.

MR SEMENYA SC: And you then left for Potchefstroom?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is correct, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: Can I interrupt us here, General; perhaps it would help explain some elements of these events. Your professional background within the police service, in what area is it, or has it been?

GENERAL MBOMBO: It has been more on the side of the finances.

MR SEMENYA SC: And the National Commissioner former, Judge Fivaz, he was also from the police service. He had a police service career, did he not? Did he not, Judge Fivaz?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Yes, it is so, Mr Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: In the main what was his career path within the police service?

GENERAL MBOMBO: At the time that he was appointed as the National Head of the Police he came from the side of the Efficiency Services.

MR SEMENYA SC: Is that side different from Operational Response Services?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Yes.

MR SEMENYA SC: And talking about the other Provincial Commissioners in the country now, do they all come – but yourself – from Operational Response Services as a career line?

GENERAL MBOMBO: At the moment, as of now the eight Provincial Commissioners, that's including myself, there's only one Provincial Commissioner who has got sufficient knowledge of the ORS.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, so you then give the instruction that the people be intercepted, they be disarmed, and General Mpembe leaves. We're back there, General.

GENERAL MBOMBO: It is so, Sir.

MR SEMENYA SC: And you leave for Potchefstroom.

GENERAL MBOMBO: Yes.

MR SEMENYA SC: Just to give you a heads-up, as they use the expression, some criticism is levelled that having given this type of instruction you would then leave for Potchefstroom and not oversee to the carrying out of that instruction. Normally, and in the past, do you give these type of instructions and then get involved operationally?

GENERAL MBOMBO: No, it doesn't happen

that way, Mr Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: How does it happen?

GENERAL MBOMBO: Having given the authority to General Mpembe to be in charge of the operation, I by so doing give him all the rights, the full right to be in charge of that operation, knowing him to be a person that is knowledgeable, that he has complete knowledge of seeing to the success of that operation. Another thing; when I appointed him, I knew that there were some others there who had extensive knowledge.

MR SEMENYA SC: Who are those?

GENERAL MBOMBO: One of them is Brigadier Calitz, Colonel Merafe, and others.

MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and we have heard that the POP experience of the individuals that you mention, and then you go to Potchefstroom. Where in Potchefstroom do you go?

GENERAL MBOMBO: I went to the office from where I operate my work, Mr Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: We're going to be dealing in greater detail with this, Chair. Would this be an appropriate stage?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think so. We will adjourn now until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNED]

A
aan 21140:18 21150:16 21160:8 21170:18 21174:23 21175:9 21176:8 21180:18 21185:1,24 21193:7 21195:23 21196:25 21199:13,13 21202:13 21203:21 21207:22 21211:17 21211:22 21216:16 21217:19 21218:23 21221:17 21223:20 21228:18 21229:12 21232:4 21236:3,5 21238:12 21239:1 21240:23 21242:22 21244:1 21253:1 21255:15 21257:2 21260:25
aanbeveling 21212:20
aanbeweeg 21141:4 21149:10
aand 21202:11 21214:16 21235:2
aandag 21230:14
aanduiding 21206:20
aangaan 21226:1
aangedui 21158:16
aangery 21216:24
aankom 21226:3 21264:15 21265:9
aanneem 21201:13
aanspreeklik 21205:9
aantal 21144:6
aanval 21155:11 21185:4,12
aanvanklik 21209:18 21258:4
ability 21251:15
able 21139:14 21163:18 21164:3,4 21175:2 21182:1 21199:22 21209:14 21261:23
aboard 21188:10
abolished 21138:13
abort 21205:17,23 21206:4,17,23
abreast 21219:23
accept 21127:14 21128:17 21130:2,6 21157:3 21162:18 21187:2 21263:21,22
accepted 21137:18 21156:23 21187:23 21205:22
accidents 21152:10
account 21142:11 21217:14 21224:22 21233:4
accuracy 21138:18
accurate 21143:25 21208:23
accurately 21136:25
achievable 21171:13 21195:2,8
achieve 21171:18,21 21176:13,14
acknowledges 21285:12
act 21297:17 21298:17
acted 21136:24 21222:25
acting 21264:9 21280:3 21280:7
action 21134:3 21157:23 21174:24 21181:3 21219:20 21236:22 21241:1 21250:9 21255:15,19 21256:12 21262:25
actions 21279:24
actual 21262:3 21279:1 21291:18
add 21132:23 21145:16 21145:24
added 21182:12
adding 21144:1 21145:20
addition 21295:17
additional 21151:6 21295:18
address 21221:9 21222:17,20 21265:18
adequate 21205:23 21211:12 21260:21
adjourn 21270:14 21301:24
ADJOURNED 21301:25
adjournment 21173:4 21173:8,12 21245:4 21270:10,18 21271:4 21287:10,11
ADJOURNS 21173:13 21221:3 21245:8 21271:5 21287:13
Adjudant 21150:18,23 21150:25
Adjudant-Offisier 21189:24
adjusted 21298:3
adjustment 21131:21
administratiewe 21267:23
admission 21164:21
admittedly 21235:7
ADRIAAN 21173:16 21245:11
Adv 21217:19,20,21,22 21218:2 21278:12
advance 21130:17 21170:21
advanced 21151:13
advancing 21150:4 21151:14 21156:18 21187:22 21189:22 21250:14
advise 21171:23 21282:11
advising 21279:9
Advocate 21262:12
Advokaat 21154:18 21155:2
advokate 21246:14 21268:18
af 21185:8 21193:6 21195:23 21198:3,5,6 21199:4 21203:17 21204:16 21211:5,7 21224:13 21246:12 21252:14,15,16,17 21253:4 21263:5,7,8 21263:16,25 21264:13 21265:4,22
afbeweeg 21252:21
afdelingskommissaris 21214:23
affect 21145:6 21202:6
affidavit 21272:17 21277:6
affirm 21271:18,20,23 21271:25 21272:2
affirmation 21287:15
Affirms 21287:18
afforded 21269:9
afgespeel 21156:9 21157:13
afraid 21130:7 21138:5 21235:4 21245:1,3 21283:20 21284:19 21285:20
African 21282:12
Afrikaans 21216:9,10 21241:23 21252:7
afspeel 21162:23
aftrek 21135:21
afvuur 21134:10
ag 21217:19
aggenome 21161:4
aggressiewe 21242:25
ago 21291:23
agree 21130:11 21141:10 21151:5,24 21155:19 21182:9 21188:19 21234:22 21235:17 21275:4
agreed 21156:1 21202:25 21234:3,15 21293:22 21294:9 21295:5
agreeing 21151:10 21209:1
agreement 21188:21 21189:2 21292:16,17 21292:19 21293:2,6 21293:24
agrees 21152:1
agt 21141:23 21256:18
agter 21135:20 21140:18 21142:7 21153:21 21154:1 21163:2,4 21179:20 21195:23 21196:23 21218:21 21240:24
agtergebly 21153:11 21169:16
agterkant 21135:18 21218:23
agterste 21195:24
agtertoe 21140:16
ahead 21182:20 21204:11
aim 21297:20
aksie 21154:5 21160:9 21163:7,8 21178:11 21184:3 21216:16 21228:18 21239:9,25 21253:15 21258:7 21263:11 21265:14
aksies 21154:7
al 21159:19 21163:4 21167:23 21170:11 21185:10 21205:3 21218:20 21221:16 21221:19 21224:12 21238:22 21239:3 21254:2
alarm 21214:2
alerted 21212:7
alias 21153:4
aligned 21189:12
alive 21179:15 21220:6 21220:17
alle 21203:13 21238:25
alleged 21224:20
alles 21228:6 21263:7 21263:25 21265:4
allocated 21145:7
allocation 21250:12
allow 21260:1,22 21285:21
allowance 21293:19
allowed 21127:9 21259:17
almal 21205:5 21233:17,19 21239:8 21254:14 21268:22
alreeds 21129:12,18 21160:9 21174:12
alright 21128:2 21132:11 21139:19 21146:17 21153:10 21188:17 21192:4 21204:3 21213:17 21238:2 21245:1 21260:14 21270:14 21274:2 21297:23
alter 21275:23
alternative 21229:23
altyd 21158:14 21159:20 21160:2 21268:12
AMCU 21231:14 21292:3,3,4,10,12 21293:24 21294:4
amendment 21275:13
ammunition 21248:8 21248:10,18
amount 21182:19
amper 21135:16,19
amplified 21272:16,22
ander 21134:13 21135:19,22 21141:18 21158:16 21159:21,22,22 21163:9 21175:14 21178:10 21207:10 21207:22 21209:23 21216:17 21217:7 21218:22 21229:14 21238:7 21253:15 21254:5 21263:11
anders 21204:17
angle 21155:1
angles 21165:6
Annandale 21214:8 21215:9
answer 21144:15 21145:8 21202:7 21222:23 21260:13 21262:17 21268:9 21269:21
answering 21238:14
answers 21167:8 21270:5
anticipate 21170:20
anticipation 21223:22
antwoord 21155:4 21178:4 21261:13 21265:2
anybody 21142:16 21191:13
anymore 21164:13
anyway 21147:22,24 21148:3 21188:7 21189:6 21218:11 21222:22 21223:11 21232:14 21236:10 21247:14
apart 21152:13 21257:24
apparent 21165:16,17 21195:7
apparently 21182:18 21236:9
appear 21139:3 21183:2 21257:19 21259:3 21274:23
appears 21136:13 21137:14 21190:23 21190:24 21193:24 21193:25 21248:10 21249:12,18 21251:16,22 21256:5 21279:23
application 21234:11
appointed 21276:18 21277:1,2 21299:22 21301:9
appreciate 21127:17 21262:20 21270:12 21270:24
appreciation 21127:20
approach 21170:21
approached 21165:6
approaching 21181:7

21181:11,15,19 21191:2
appropriate 21132:5 21193:1 21198:17 21212:11 21221:1 21259:22 21271:10 21301:22
approximation 21255:23
area 21149:24 21167:16 21193:17 21199:18 21202:19 21215:18,23 21220:23 21236:19 21237:5 21247:5 21299:10
areas 21297:13,13 21298:7
aren't 21131:14 21138:10
argue 21148:6
argument 21148:13 21190:14 21191:9,14 21191:18
arguments 21192:2
arisen 21268:10
arising 21259:15,18,21 21286:4
armed 21197:25 21296:21,25
armoured 21162:8,12
arms 21184:17 21185:18,19 21235:7 21235:12 21244:10 21244:10
arrangement 21278:22
arres 21228:7 21240:17 21265:11
arrest 21197:19 21247:18,21
arrestasie 21240:22
arrestasies 21228:8 21229:10 21241:25 21242:24 21244:23 21246:11 21263:13
arrested 21248:14 21297:10,10
arresteer 21244:3
arresting 21211:6
arrests 21231:16 21247:8,9,10,11 21266:19
arrival 21223:22 21228:3
arrived 21214:18 21215:10 21217:25 21228:12 21236:21
arrivering 21223:25 21228:7,10
arrows 21194:21
ascertain 21183:5
asked 21152:13 21169:13 21200:16 21202:22 21212:10 21238:15 21239:16 21260:5,15 21261:16 21261:18 21269:13 21280:23 21286:24 21290:13 21291:4,21 21292:7,11,13,24
asking 21145:12 21149:19 21164:6,13 21164:20 21166:12 21171:17 21201:10 21286:17 21291:20
asks 21285:14
asof 21135:20 21140:14 21141:4
asook 21207:4 21255:16 21257:2
aspect 21182:24 21183:16 21205:11 21221:8
aspects 21183:16
aspris 21268:20
asseblief 21159:13
assessment 21183:23
assist 21283:8 21294:22 21295:18
assistance 21183:1 21269:7 21270:24 21280:24 21286:17
assisted 21247:9
associated 21230:9
assume 21133:3 21166:7,10
assumes 21186:19
assuming 21166:10
assumption 21163:23
attack 21215:22
attacking 21215:21,24
attempt 21140:7,20,21 21141:12,13 21183:5 21257:9,10,19,20
attempted 21143:25 21162:20 21166:5
attempts 21258:10 21259:3
attendance 21268:8
attended 21274:3
attention 21146:21 21158:3 21182:23 21196:12,17 21214:13 21262:14
audience 21221:14
auditorium 21132:17
August 21198:17 21199:10 21202:21 21274:21 21275:15 21275:19 21277:1,7 21279:3 21290:11
authoritarian 21222:25
authority 21186:25 21213:5,6,11 21301:4
automatic 21162:10
available 21182:19 21197:24 21204:22 21224:21 21269:1
avenue 21166:17
avoiding 21284:22
aware 21170:4,9 21179:9 21180:1 21197:6,7,11 21201:19 21202:15 21220:11,11,17,17 21230:3 21245:23 21284:24

B

back 21130:25 21132:24 21136:4,5 21137:8,8,11 21141:7 21142:13 21143:5 21147:21 21156:24 21160:13 21173:1 21177:16,23 21199:21 21201:3 21215:21 21235:9 21249:14 21268:9,11 21282:19 21283:7 21287:1 21295:8 21296:3 21300:12
background 21299:9
bad 21165:4
badly 21256:15
baie 21141:14 21142:25 21155:4 21156:9 21157:8 21161:20 21176:11 21207:1 21211:3,6 21219:15,17 21224:16 21226:1,1,8 21226:10,11 21234:23 21244:20 21253:14 21263:15 21265:2 21268:17
balls 21138:10,11,18,21 21138:25
band 21223:9
Banks 21187:15
Bar 21274:5
barbed 21206:9,10,17 21206:18,25 21207:7 21207:9,17
Barnard 21288:20,22
based 21157:1
basic 21165:6
basically 21141:3 21170:3
basies 21221:19 21252:18
basis 21159:9 21186:18 21188:5 21261:8 21268:8,11
beamptes 21239:24
bear 21189:7 21191:11
bearing 21160:15
bedoel 21157:10 21161:13 21168:4 21186:3 21218:14 21253:3
bedreiging 21193:10 21193:13
beg 21131:3 21133:24 21271:8
begaafde 21234:24
began 21234:4
beginning 21131:3 21277:1
begryp 21161:13
behalwe 21167:24 21185:24
behaving 21292:25
behaviour 21230:10
behoorlike 21176:6 21198:20 21261:2
behoort 21238:10
belangrik 21207:1
belangrike 21168:18
belemmer 21150:18
bemagtig 21227:10
beman 21158:15
benefit 21236:9 21278:16,23
bepaal 21227:16
beperkte 21211:13
beplan 21161:22 21163:5 21174:6 21195:4
beplande 21156:3
beplanning 21172:2,11 21172:11 21194:16 21198:20 21236:4 21251:1,2,9 21252:2
beplanningsvergader... 21193:5
beseer 21144:13
besef 21209:21 21216:17
besig 21135:12 21169:16 21218:21 21228:8 21229:5 21240:21 21262:25
besit 21233:23 21240:17
beskermende 21239:6
beskerming 21227:2
beskermingslyn 21207:3
beskikbaar 21207:12 21225:20 21227:3
beskikking 21193:15 21229:4
beskryf 21246:15
beslis 21169:7,25 21171:21 21175:25 21185:4 21230:12,23
beslissend 21162:4
besluit 21156:9 21159:1 21162:24 21180:23 21198:25 21201:16 21203:22 21205:5 21212:21
besluite 21168:18 21236:5
bespreek 21141:19 21169:8 21170:18 21175:25 21178:19 21179:11 21193:14 21193:20 21196:19 21210:15 21211:21 21223:18
besprekingspunt 21168:18
best 21204:21,22 21217:4 21223:3 21285:22 21294:11
bestaan 21263:3
beteken 21176:7 21207:12
betrokke 21227:5 21244:2 21250:24 21253:4
better 21141:6 21145:20 21204:6 21284:19
bevelvoerder 21154:3 21158:25,25 21162:23 21211:2,21 21224:10 21230:14
bevelvoerders 21153:20 21154:7 21155:5,15 21158:24 21167:24 21176:8 21221:20 21238:9
bevestig 21198:20
bevestigende 21198:23
beweeg 21134:7 21135:18 21150:22 21150:25 21152:21 21153:23 21156:8,8 21161:4 21162:4 21163:13 21178:12 21179:22 21180:12 21194:25 21197:10 21204:14 21207:21 21208:12 21209:25 21216:10,21 21217:18 21218:17 21219:19 21237:11 21239:11 21240:1 21243:21 21246:19 21252:20,21 21254:14 21255:12 21257:13,16
beweging 21216:14 21228:8
bewering 21202:11 21219:9
bewerings 21254:23
bewerkstellig 21199:6
bewoording 21185:10
bewus 21145:3 21169:20 21170:11 21177:13 21179:13 21202:9,10,12 21209:9 21220:9 21226:16 21227:6 21229:15 21243:21 21267:4,8
bewys 21157:3,10 21217:17
bewyse 21202:11
bietjie 21141:25
big 21190:18 21208:22 21297:24
binding 21271:17
binne 21157:11 21263:8
binnekant 21256:24

binne-in 21215:14
bis 21181:5
bit 21136:4 21234:19 21234:20 21235:14
Bizos 21217:19,22 21218:2
Blaauw 21279:16,18 21280:17 21281:25 21282:2 21286:6
bladsy 21144:4 21150:13 21154:24 21155:3,12 21250:3
blamed 21236:22
block 21154:11,20 21155:3,8,10,14,19 21155:20,22 21156:17,19 21157:7 21157:22 21159:9 21160:4,18 21161:16 21162:18,19 21164:2 21164:21,25 21165:12,13,14,15,16 21165:16,17 21166:21 21193:4 21209:8 21253:6,9
blocked 21166:20 21208:25 21209:3
blocking 21140:25 21173:22 21174:15 21174:18 21176:3,6 21189:1 21192:13,16 21192:19,25 21208:7 21210:11
blockings 21193:22
blocks 21166:5
blok 21154:25 21158:14 21160:6 21161:22,23 21162:22 21163:5,6,8 21171:10,10 21174:21 21193:8,19
blokkerings 21244:21
bloodshed 21244:16
blown-up 21176:23
blue 21128:15
bly 21255:5
body 21145:11 21214:7 21288:3
boldly 21163:24
boodskap 21199:13
book 21297:22
bopunt 21253:1,1
bordering 21175:11
bos 21240:24
Botes 21226:1,7
bottom 21149:17
bound 21287:15
boxed 21241:4,5,13,19 21241:22 21243:5
break 21173:9 21221:2 21254:4,4
breek 21217:9 21258:11
brevity 21192:6
brief 21249:15 21250:17 21261:3
briefed 21249:13 21250:9
briefing 21167:14,18 21167:22 21168:2 21171:14 21172:9 21178:16 21202:21 21203:5 21204:5 21210:18,19,22 21211:3,12 21232:19 21249:14,21 21250:6 21250:21,25 21251:21 21260:16 21260:23 21261:7 21289:6,18 21295:14
Brigadier's 21140:23
bring 21137:21 21294:2,10
bringing 21196:12
broken 21142:11,21
brought 21170:9 21196:17 21202:16 21214:12 21280:25
brutally 21282:3
Budlender 21192:22 21210:3,7 21217:11 21222:7
buffer 21161:9
buitekant 21161:12 21174:23 21185:8 21248:24
buiten 21226:4
buk 21140:16
bullets 21138:8,14,19
bunches 21136:15
bunching 21137:7,7,16
bundle 21274:6
Burger 21167:2 21203:25 21204:2 21285:9
busy 21146:22 21147:19 21166:13 21247:5,10 21258:17 21258:18 21262:7 21264:18
bydrae 21226:8
bygedra 21219:20
bykom 21267:22
byvoeg 21148:24 21149:5

C

C 21214:7
calculation 21183:8
Calitz's 21145:15
call 21148:15 21152:25 21158:24 21165:14 21208:2 21264:19 21271:8 21272:23 21275:11,20 21279:8 21279:13 21281:18 21282:1 21286:5
called 21165:16 21178:15 21190:17 21200:15 21212:11 21223:23 21282:21 21292:3
calls 21209:4
CALS 21152:21 21217:17 21256:19
camera 21132:24 21142:12,14 21190:23
cameraman 21142:13
canalising 21194:21
Cancel 21270:17
cannon 21177:9 21247:3,10 21248:6 21248:16
canons 21162:9
can't 21130:14,15 21142:16 21143:12 21146:24 21164:7 21185:15,21 21186:9 21187:23 21190:11 21190:16 21191:17 21222:15 21236:11 21236:22 21251:23
capable 21234:22
Cape 21276:19,23
Captain 21210:10 21236:23 21237:4,5
career 21299:15,20 21300:5
carefully 21134:16
carried 21174:8 21255:9
carry 21127:3 21280:17
carrying 21165:25 21166:19 21300:21
case 21129:24 21137:1 21138:20 21187:16 21187:25
Casspir 21156:21 21161:8 21165:12 21172:3,23
Casspirs 21130:5 21174:17
cast 21224:22
cause 21127:13 21132:18 21138:14 21233:12 21234:19 21291:22 21292:25
caused 21132:14 21136:16 21137:7 21292:5
causes 21137:16 21289:19,24 21290:2 21290:5
CCTV 21225:6,19
cell 21127:4
central 21206:24
centre 21282:25
certain 21202:3 21266:18
certainly 21136:13 21222:16
chair 21128:6 21147:2 21147:10 21159:15 21166:21 21167:2,6 21173:10,19 21191:20,23 21192:7 21201:9 21218:6 21221:7 21231:4 21245:22,24 21249:4 21259:15 21264:25 21266:12,16,21 21268:3,6 21269:2 21270:13 21271:9,13 21272:5 21273:2,15 21274:5,16,25 21275:10 21276:6,21 21278:7,20 21279:6 21285:9 21287:6,21 21301:21
chaired 21294:16
challenge 21202:20 21219:22
challenged 21154:15 21163:24 21195:13
chamber 21127:9,12,13 21127:16,21,23 21132:19 21133:3 21284:3
chambers 21127:24 21269:4
change 21130:18
changed 21164:5 21267:12,20
channel 21133:20,23 21134:2 21155:22 21178:15
channelling 21134:3 21167:12,17 21168:10,25 21169:11,19,21 21170:15 21179:10
chaoties 21207:20 21216:18
charge 21127:19 21152:13,23 21153:7 21229:23 21298:21 21301:4,6
chased 21291:25
Chaskalson 21132:9 21154:19 21155:2,14 21156:16 21158:23 21192:21
check 21277:25
choice 21177:17
choppers 21247:7
circumstances 21132:6 21228:12 21260:21 21264:4,20
City 21225:17
civilian 21230:17
CJOC 21212:20 21238:24
clarification 21166:3
clarify 21181:23 21250:19
clarifying 21250:15
clarity 21183:15
clean 21259:23
cleaners 21127:14
cleaning 21127:10
clear 21148:17,18 21152:7 21154:14 21155:24 21186:25 21188:6 21189:5 21200:21 21242:10
clearly 21131:9 21215:22 21296:8
climb 21144:20
clip 21131:3 21132:4 21132:10,14 21133:7 21133:11 21137:24 21138:1 21139:9,12 21139:13,18,18 21156:6 21191:10
close 21252:25
closer 21146:25 21147:21 21148:20
closing 21180:1
clothing 21259:11
cloud 21128:15
Coin 21227:12
coincidence 21171:3
collaboration 21226:18
colleague 21262:12 21270:4 21278:12
colleagues 21270:23,24
collusion 21225:1
Colonel 21154:12 21163:17 21164:4 21169:13 21170:3 21196:1 21209:12 21213:10,15 21220:5 21220:10 21223:2 21232:15 21235:21 21241:15 21261:6 21273:5,10 21295:16 21301:13
colour 21278:5
column 21147:18,19,21 21150:4 21273:19 21274:15
come 21136:14 21165:22 21166:22 21170:14 21199:21 21201:3 21214:4 21228:20,20 21235:9 21235:22 21236:18 21236:19,23 21251:13 21261:25 21268:9,11 21283:7 21285:16 21287:1 21290:6 21295:18 21300:4
comes 21137:25 21270:11 21282:19
comfort 21221:2
coming 21131:8 21136:22
command 21192:6 21243:12 21250:14 21254:10
commander 21164:11 21175:22 21176:13 21178:21 21179:15 21180:16,23 21202:15 21208:18 21212:20
commanders 21164:10

21167:21 21179:2 21196:20 21202:23 21203:5,5,9 21209:7 21211:9 21212:23 21213:6 21228:25 21233:18 21249:14 21249:20 21250:7,17 21251:6
commanding 21241:17
commence 21133:14
commences 21133:7
comment 21176:22 21201:10
commentary 21151:6,7
commission 21127:2 21146:16 21169:18 21173:13,13,14 21213:18 21221:3,3,4 21236:10 21245:8,8,9 21271:5,5,6,23 21287:13,13,14 21301:25
Commissioner 21128:7 21182:25 21183:5,6 21202:2 21215:11 21276:19 21277:2 21280:7 21283:12 21296:14 21299:14 21300:8
Commissioners 21300:3,7
common 21230:17
communicate 21267:6
communicating 21221:24
communication 21280:13
company 21291:6 21292:5 21293:10 21294:11
compares 21152:5
comparison 21164:14
competent 21212:23
compiled 21145:8 21236:9
complaint 21293:18
complaints 21291:1
complete 21301:7
completely 21146:6 21158:1,3
completeness 21211:23 21298:15
complimented 21218:10
comply 21127:17,20
components 21280:13
comprehensive 21234:17
comprising 21136:12
computer 21170:9 21260:17
concern 21285:24
concerned 21127:14 21133:5 21244:14 21257:9
concession 21152:2
conclusions 21221:25
concrete 21148:16
conditions 21297:3
conduct 21168:15 21197:17 21206:11 21213:18 21230:4 21298:4,9
conducted 21199:3
conducting 21298:23
conductor 21193:17
confer 21204:20
configuration 21128:13 21128:23 21152:4
confirm 21271:19
confirmation 21151:23
confirmed 21186:12 21188:15
confiscate 21298:5
confiscated 21297:7
confuse 21218:10
confused 21217:22
confusion 21210:23,24
connection 21292:18
conscience 21271:17
consequence 21152:9
consider 21164:17
considerations 21285:25
consistent 21174:3
consolidated 21231:8
constituted 21134:22 21135:6
constitutes 21152:9
consult 21204:23
contact 21197:2 21226:13 21281:15 21282:9,12 21286:16 21286:16
contacted 21281:8
contained 21238:20
CONTD 21173:18 21287:20
contemplated 21170:9
contention 21129:22 21151:13 21186:18 21209:1
contestation 21220:24
context 21186:24 21192:12
contextualise 21221:14
contingency 21231:11 21231:13,18,25 21233:10 21234:16 21235:6,11,11,23 21236:4 21267:10
continue 21169:14 21279:23 21280:17
continued 21137:11
continues 21140:21 21143:4
contradicted 21186:23
controversial 21284:9 21284:25
convenient 21173:3 21287:10
conversation 21280:17
conveyed 21223:15
cooperate 21244:15
coordinated 21234:12
coordinating 21154:13
coordination 21152:7 21152:10
copies 21233:21
copy 21223:3 21246:22 21274:24
cordon 21197:18 21198:13,16,19 21199:10
corner 21128:16 21129:3,7,7,20 21130:5,19 21139:5 21139:22 21149:18 21156:20 21161:17 21248:13
correct 21146:25 21162:20 21163:25 21171:8 21187:25 21188:2 21193:24 21201:9 21209:4 21214:19 21222:10 21223:15 21233:1 21237:3 21245:17 21247:21 21249:10 21260:23 21261:9 21264:25 21266:9 21271:16 21272:10 21275:17 21277:9,23 21280:9 21282:9,16 21282:22 21283:8,17 21286:7,11,21 21287:23 21288:2,14 21289:15 21294:24 21295:10,20 21296:4 21296:16 21297:8,11 21297:14 21298:13 21299:5
corrected 21209:5 21237:3
correction 21202:4
correctly 21148:2 21151:18 21171:2 21189:15 21237:24 21239:20
corridor 21134:22 21135:6 21140:9,21 21140:22 21142:22 21143:3 21144:1 21145:19 21148:8,8 21148:12 21152:24 21155:23 21178:15 21179:5,9 21208:2 21209:4
couldn't 21188:15 21243:6
council 21127:10,18
counsel 21200:9
count 21142:16
country 21300:3
couple 21139:4
course 21129:25 21131:22 21136:18 21144:20 21147:18 21164:20 21197:17 21225:24 21246:23 21249:8
courtyard 21278:14
cover 21136:21
covered 21144:8 21182:4
covering 21277:7
create 21156:17 21161:16
created 21133:20
creates 21127:10
crew 21247:8
crime 21281:4,4
criticism 21199:19 21200:25 21201:7 21215:19 21300:19
cross 21200:25 21205:12 21210:16 21219:6,24 21221:22 21222:13
cross-examination 21137:5 21166:22 21167:8 21171:6 21182:17 21186:11 21189:6 21191:24 21192:1 21195:13 21208:3 21215:23 21222:4,14
cross-examine 21166:24 21167:1
cross-examined 21221:9
cross-examining 21249:20
crouch 21141:4
crowd 21133:11,13,18 21174:19 21176:25 21177:11 21231:15 21298:8
Cs 21199:6
cul-de-sac 21166:14
customary 21250:17 21251:17,23

D

daagliks 21160:4
daai 21128:23 21224:24
daaraan 21230:14 21261:13
daarby 21141:17 21218:14 21238:22
daardeur 21175:16
daarmee 21141:8 21169:16
daarna 21140:11 21141:16 21155:2,12 21157:5 21162:15 21170:24 21185:5 21198:7 21215:15,16 21215:16 21218:25 21226:2 21252:21
daarnatoe 21252:21
daarom 21142:24 21157:22 21174:21 21174:22 21198:24 21233:17 21242:22 21264:13 21265:9
daaroor 21134:4 21156:2 21177:14 21200:11 21216:6 21217:17 21224:10 21236:2
daarop 21257:17 21261:13
daartoe 21233:22
daarvan 21145:4 21170:13 21171:16 21172:7 21179:13 21195:4 21202:12 21220:9 21267:4,8,15
daarvoor 21145:4 21154:2 21162:5 21205:9 21243:18
daar's 21134:2 21223:17 21232:3
dadelik 21238:23
dae 21224:14
dag 21143:10 21155:13 21160:5 21185:2,8 21193:19 21195:5 21202:12 21207:4,11 21221:17 21223:25 21224:13,16 21227:2 21230:2
dak 21253:13
dalk 21219:20
damage 21277:12 21294:23
damaged 21282:4
dance 21152:1,1
dangerous 21298:5
dankie 21128:4 21141:9 21149:10 21173:16 21245:6,11 21268:17
date 21274:13 21275:15,22 21276:2
dated 21273:5 21274:1 21274:2 21276:10
day 21167:6 21168:15 21169:5 21171:8 21172:15,19 21191:9 21204:7,11 21209:13 21210:5 21217:25 21250:22 21281:18 21282:18 21283:10 21286:25 21289:14
days 21191:23 21192:2 21289:10
dead 21144:25 21166:15
deal 21129:23 21130:13,14 21132:22 21158:5 21167:9,10 21173:6 21181:1 21217:13 21221:8 21235:24 21286:9
dealing 21128:9 21131:19 21171:5

21173:22 21181:3 21207:25 21285:23 21301:20
deals 21194:20 21275:22
dealt 21130:8 21182:6 21182:21 21230:24 21260:16 21282:14 21285:22
death 21132:15
debate 21156:22 21220:24
debated 21187:13
debating 21133:9 21151:22
debriefing 21200:13,15
deceased 21144:5
December 21274:2
decided 21136:20 21283:7 21293:15
decision 21153:16 21185:17 21201:24 21202:1,5 21231:12 21293:2,6
decision-making 21204:20
deel 21172:1,7,10 21179:21 21202:10 21213:1 21223:24 21229:10 21257:15 21258:15,18
deemed 21296:17
default 21169:12
defence 21224:4,4,21 21230:7 21249:23,23 21250:15,20 21251:4 21251:15,15
definitief 21154:8 21176:9 21205:8 21218:3 21226:16 21230:14 21257:4 21258:10,25 21266:7
definition 21165:1 21192:13
degrees 21130:19
dekking 21239:2
delays 21235:8
delegation 21288:7,17
deliberate 21153:15
demonstrate 21137:24
demonstration 21218:12
demonstreer 21160:1 21161:12
denies 21164:9
deny 21165:15
depends 21264:3
depict 21171:6
depicted 21149:15 21150:9
depicting 21170:15
deployment 21297:13
deployments 21236:5 21298:7
depth 21182:8
deputy 21280:13 21283:12
describe 21136:25
described 21155:19 21272:21 21274:12
describes 21246:6
description 21275:12 21275:23,24
deserve 21210:8
design 21169:12,12
desperate 21258:11
destinations 21177:17
destroyed 21223:4
detail 21201:15 21210:14 21211:21 21233:24 21251:17 21252:1 21261:14 21267:19 21301:21
detailed 21232:8,21 21233:9 21234:18 21251:22 21260:22
details 21295:13
deur 21133:23 21134:9 21149:4,6 21150:12 21153:20 21154:7 21157:15,17 21160:11 21161:6,7,7 21162:4 21163:13 21175:8 21199:6 21217:17 21220:20 21225:19 21237:11 21240:16,23 21256:12,13
deurbeweeg 21142:5 21256:7
deurdat 21250:24
deure 21252:19
deurgaan 21254:2 21255:14
deurgaans 21224:13
deurgedruk 21178:10
deurgegaan 21141:19 21154:18 21246:14
deurgegee 21212:19 21214:8
deurgekom 21154:6 21219:16 21257:15
deurkom 21160:12
developing 21283:4
development 21280:14
diagram 21158:2 21193:23 21194:21
diagrams 21157:25 21193:22
dictates 21298:10
dictionary 21137:21,22
didn't 21127:15 21143:18 21165:17 21182:9 21184:24 21185:16 21186:19 21187:7,8,22 21235:6 21235:22 21236:17 21236:20,23 21237:14,17 21239:12 21242:10 21242:11,19 21243:13 21259:4 21272:9
died 21144:24 21145:11,24
diens 21221:17
dienste 21226:10
dieselfde 21150:12 21151:1 21160:22 21161:1,8 21162:3 21229:12 21233:14
differ 21137:1,5 21151:6
difference 21129:21,22
different 21148:18 21192:16 21202:24 21204:6 21207:25 21238:15 21261:12 21264:7 21298:2 21299:24
differently 21180:20
difficult 21129:25 21130:3,10,12,17 21131:9 21266:5
difficulties 21149:15
difficulty 21130:8 21147:20 21183:15
ding 21154:22
dinge 21229:14
dinges 21265:11
dink 21135:9,12 21141:23,24 21153:24 21154:6 21155:25 21156:6,7 21157:4,5,14,15 21159:2 21160:22 21176:16 21177:1,25 21178:8 21179:19 21180:12,13 21185:5 21185:7,10 21193:3,9 21198:3 21199:5,12 21206:20 21207:9 21209:16 21211:1,10 21211:20 21213:1 21215:5 21217:17,18 21219:13,16,18 21220:8 21224:13 21225:16 21227:15 21228:15 21232:3 21233:20,21 21236:3 21241:21 21246:12 21246:13 21247:24 21252:11 21254:25 21255:2,13
direct 21180:21 21227:13
directing 21154:13
direction 21130:19 21248:7,9,17 21258:14,24
directly 21186:23
direk 21155:9 21185:24 21207:19
dis 21129:12 21142:6 21168:7 21171:9,11 21172:7 21179:11 21184:15 21185:3 21218:22 21223:25 21229:11 21232:11 21247:16
disagreeing 21151:7,12
disagreement 21150:8
disagreements 21149:15
disagrees 21151:15
disarm 21174:9,19 21206:3,5 21231:14 21231:16 21243:3 21244:13
disarmed 21300:12
disarming 21211:5 21244:7
discuss 21130:21 21288:4 21290:2
discussed 21167:18 21168:16 21169:1,6 21178:16 21209:6
discussion 21168:10 21293:14 21294:17
discussions 21172:14 21292:19 21293:11
dislike 21206:16
dismissed 21291:6,9,25 21292:1,2
dispersal 21142:9,20 21197:19 21259:3
dispersal/arrest 21213:7
disperse 21153:24 21155:4 21160:7 21174:9,18 21175:2 21179:1 21180:5 21207:14 21231:15 21243:4 21253:6,10 21253:10,20 21254:3 21257:7,10,11,21 21298:3
dispersed 21254:20 21255:19 21256:8 21296:21
dispersing 21244:6 21257:8
dispersion 21155:9,16 21157:23 21159:5 21174:22,24 21211:5 21219:19 21240:20 21241:1 21250:9,15 21255:15 21262:25
disposal 21156:17 21162:11
dispute 21142:8,19
distance 21183:5
distances 21183:1
distinctive 21135:5
distress 21132:18
disturbing 21127:5
doable 21228:4,10
document 21160:16 21199:7 21247:13 21272:6,13,16 21273:4 21274:12,17 21274:18 21275:1,12 21275:13,19,20,22,24 21276:9 21284:4,6 21290:25
documents 21159:10 21272:20 21273:20 21274:7 21275:23
doel 21160:7 21180:4 21202:10 21206:21 21211:4 21216:23 21217:19 21224:13 21224:14
doelbewus 21220:20
doen 21158:20 21160:1 21195:10 21198:19 21198:20,24 21209:20,22 21210:1 21211:6 21227:10 21253:15
doesn't 21140:24 21142:18 21145:6,23 21189:8 21191:15 21202:6 21235:5 21274:23 21278:9,12 21300:25
doing 21131:2 21139:11,12 21162:17 21183:23 21191:24 21207:17 21237:14 21277:18 21284:19 21292:4 21296:10 21301:5
dokument 21150:11 21193:9 21246:15 21251:19 21256:19
dokumente 21152:21 21217:18 21256:20
don't 21127:22 21129:19 21131:13 21138:20 21142:8,15 21142:19 21146:12 21148:19 21151:16 21152:1 21155:17 21156:24 21162:6,18 21164:6,12 21165:5 21165:20,24 21166:11,18,24 21181:18 21182:5,21 21188:12 21191:12 21191:21 21192:1 21203:25 21208:6,25 21210:6 21222:3,6 21234:1 21235:12 21238:13 21245:24 21245:25 21247:14 21270:1,2 21274:9 21277:22 21283:20 21283:21 21284:8,11 21285:7,18,20,20 21288:24 21292:9
dood 21185:8,9 21243:1
doodgaan 21185:3
dop 21239:7
double 21259:10 21269:22
doubt 21224:22
Dr 21255:1
draad 21175:16

21194:19 21206:21 21209:22 21211:2,3 21253:16 21254:2
draadkar 21153:13 21163:9
draai 21128:24 21143:1 21178:12
draft 21232:14,14
drafts 21170:12,15
draw 21158:3 21232:13 21234:16
drawing 21146:21 21231:20
drawn 21156:23 21182:23 21231:11 21231:18 21235:23
draws 21157:25
dreigemente 21185:1,3 21185:24 21203:16 21204:15
drie 21135:16
drie-lyn 21175:15
drive 21170:3 21254:4 21287:21
driven 21254:20
driver 21171:18,24 21172:14,19 21248:4
drivers 21178:21 21179:8 21208:14
druk 21134:13 21135:15,22 21258:21
dry 21254:15
drywer 21253:25
drywers 21211:8
due 21246:22
dui 21193:10
duidelik 21135:13 21141:15 21155:4 21157:9 21181:16 21200:1,8 21211:3,6 21211:10 21243:22 21257:14
duidelikheid 21226:21
duties 21271:1
duty 21298:4,20,20
dwaas 21156:10

E

ear 21285:12
earlier 21129:2 21130:1 21139:5 21142:17 21152:5 21164:2 21192:14 21208:7
earphone 21131:8
earphones 21131:11,13 21132:21 21133:4
ears 21131:11,11
Earth 21183:8
easier 21147:22
eating 21127:9,12,22 21127:24
een 21129:10 21134:3 21141:25 21155:25 21161:3 21162:14 21163:3 21184:2 21185:4 21193:18 21206:22 21209:22 21209:24 21215:17 21218:8 21224:13 21229:11 21230:7 21246:13 21255:5 21261:3
eers 21135:19 21155:3 21170:24 21193:7 21199:7 21224:16 21238:22 21252:19 21258:4
eerste 21141:21 21150:15,21 21209:16 21227:2 21252:14 21267:3
eerstens 21239:24
effect 21137:6 21160:19 21164:25 21231:16 21247:8,9
effected 21247:12
effecting 21247:10
effectively 21242:4 21254:19 21282:14 21286:9
effek 21198:11 21216:19 21259:6,12
effektiewe 21180:4
Efficiency 21299:23
efficient 21234:21
eie 21129:15 21203:17
eight 21300:7
einde 21193:8
either 21134:17 21137:15 21143:17 21165:4 21169:10 21235:5 21261:25 21285:20
ekskuus 21135:9,11 21144:4 21178:3 21238:21 21262:9
eksperts 21141:23
elaborate 21262:1
elapsed 21264:10
elected 21183:20 21184:13,17 21220:18
elemente 21203:16
elements 21199:23 21200:6 21299:8
elevated 21210:7
elke 21154:3 21158:25 21162:23 21211:21
elkeen 21211:9
emosioneel 21265:6
emotional 21270:22
emphasise 21250:19
emphasised 21250:13
employ 21279:8
employee 21279:8
employment 21279:18 21282:3
enable 21209:25
encircle 21209:19 21229:9 21231:16 21242:17 21244:3
encirclement 21210:1
encircling 21209:13 21210:12 21211:5
encourage 21244:14 21294:8
endeavour 21202:16
endeavoured 21136:25
endeavours 21258:13 21294:5
ended 21147:13 21234:10
endorsement 21202:2
engage 21250:15,20 21253:3,3
engagement 21250:13 21250:19
English 21137:19 21252:8 21269:6,13 21269:15,18 21270:2 21270:6 21278:15 21284:20 21285:4
enhanced 21298:7
enige 21151:2 21169:21 21174:1 21193:20 21230:12 21248:23 21251:2,9 21263:8
enigsins 21140:18
enigste 21207:10 21227:15 21243:17 21243:19
enjoys 21292:15
enlarge 21198:6
enquiries 21200:20
enquiring 21291:4
ensovoorts 21149:8
ensure 21297:18 21298:10,17
entails 21216:12
enters 21148:10
environment 21194:1
environments 21204:20
Equally 21191:16
error 21201:5
escaped 21146:6 21147:8
escaping 21148:2
essentially 21137:17 21259:2
establish 21179:25 21190:9 21213:5
established 21144:21
estimate 21263:22
eTV 21213:21 21247:12
evaluated 21186:22
evening 21200:13 21201:25,25
event 21149:23 21174:7 21220:7,12
events 21213:21 21222:8 21277:6 21295:23 21299:9
everybody 21127:3,17 21176:3 21191:13 21224:4
evidence 21127:3 21137:24 21146:12 21146:14 21147:3,6 21149:2,7 21151:18 21154:12,14 21155:18 21156:6 21158:23 21167:7,8 21170:2 21171:2 21177:10 21182:16 21186:7,10,22 21187:7,13,19,21,23 21188:14,25 21189:11 21190:3,17 21191:16,17,25 21195:13 21200:3,12 21200:23 21201:23 21202:20,25 21203:3 21205:14 21210:12 21212:13 21214:3 21216:8 21217:12 21229:19 21230:25 21233:5 21234:10,21 21250:1 21261:20 21268:5 21269:5 21271:16,23 21274:4 21285:3
evidential 21225:13
exactly 21137:9 21139:4 21162:19 21183:15 21238:3 21240:5,7
examination 21182:17 21201:1 21205:13 21210:17 21219:7,25 21221:23 21222:14 21272:4 21287:20
example 21143:19 21193:22 21284:17
excerpt 21274:6,6
excess 21146:22
excused 21268:8,11,23
executable 21207:6
execute 21267:11
execution 21211:19
exercises 21183:11
exhibit 21128:10 21144:4,5 21145:8 21149:12 21157:25 21160:14 21176:22 21181:2,4 21193:23 21193:24 21231:21 21246:22,23,24 21249:5,11,13,18 21250:7 21267:16 21272:22,24 21273:8 21273:11,12,13,18,22 21275:4,20 21276:4 21297:22
exhibits 21272:21 21273:16
expansive 21167:9
expect 21163:16
expected 21168:15 21169:22
experience 21206:9 21267:11,19 21301:15
experts 21204:23 21231:1
explain 21209:14 21216:11 21299:8
explained 21164:3,4 21211:19 21261:8 21292:7,15,16 21297:1
explanation 21234:2 21235:4 21236:10 21290:8 21293:1
explanations 21292:22 21294:19
explore 21169:10,12
exposition 21233:11
express 21187:24
expressed 21174:14 21185:21 21202:23 21203:4
expression 21138:19 21300:19
extensive 21301:10
extent 21142:18
extra 21182:23 21188:13
extract 21274:10,12 21275:14,25 21276:1
extravagant 21239:19
eyebrows 21234:19
eyes 21138:6

F

faceless 21198:5 21291:19
facility 21269:9
fact 21127:13 21130:21 21132:25 21137:7 21142:12,12 21143:2 21144:21,24 21147:12 21152:20 21163:22 21172:13 21179:15 21186:11 21186:22 21187:6,20 21188:6 21191:15,18 21195:14 21200:22 21212:7 21217:11 21218:10 21219:5 21220:6 21222:24 21223:11 21231:10 21235:9 21237:18 21243:2,11 21292:10
factors 21225:6
facts 21148:4,6 21165:7 21194:3 21195:1 21284:23
fail 21140:24 21231:13
fails 21140:21 21141:12
failure 21219:6
fair 21251:24 21255:20 21263:17,20 21266:8
fairly 21167:9 21182:6 21232:8 21265:25
fairness 21192:3

far 21145:9 21166:15 21168:1 21232:22 21257:9 21292:23 21293:10
fase 21198:25 21206:1 21232:4,6 21233:7 21235:1 21261:14
fasiliteite 21225:20
fatal 21143:17
fatally 21145:1,17,24 21145:25
feared 21136:19
feasible 21160:18
feat 21176:14
feedback 21199:22 21202:15
feel 21132:17 21218:10
feit 21219:18
feite 21145:3 21195:5
feitlik 21157:12 21161:1
fence 21152:19 21175:11,15
FFF25 21297:22
field 21213:5 21214:13
fight 21244:10,15
figure 21255:24
file 21272:5,6,20,23 21273:20,20 21274:12,19,24 21275:21
filed 21245:14
files 21275:8
filtering 21237:8
final 21128:10,10 21160:14 21183:10
finalise 21173:20
finances 21299:12
find 21137:20 21143:12 21143:13 21173:4 21200:5,17 21209:11 21272:6 21278:17 21287:10 21288:1,7 21298:16
finds 21140:7
fine 21190:16 21273:12
finish 21147:24 21185:9 21262:19
finished 21234:12
fire 21132:24 21133:1 21139:21 21147:4 21181:6 21189:13 21229:24 21248:23 21251:15
firearms 21144:6
fired 21130:22 21133:17 21135:3 21136:10,11,12,19 21138:20,21 21211:25 21224:20 21248:10 21256:15 21266:22
fires 21128:15 21133:8
firing 21162:9 21248:7 21248:18,20 21249:24
first 21133:10,12 21167:11 21169:12 21217:14 21232:14 21232:14 21235:10 21260:2,3,5,5,5,15 21264:17 21266:19 21272:16,22 21276:13
fisies 21155:6 21216:22 21219:1 21263:11
fisiese 21244:23
fitting 21167:10
Fivaz 21299:14,16
five 21130:22 21142:15 21142:17 21145:17 21270:15 21271:3
fix 21274:25
flighting 21214:11
flow 21161:17
flows 21191:19
focus 21139:3,10,22
focussed 21142:13
folio 21192:14
follow 21139:13 21171:1 21253:9 21269:18
followed 21282:20
following 21149:11 21158:9 21159:11 21166:4 21232:9 21247:4 21281:17 21286:25 21287:1
food 21127:9,12,22,24
footage 21295:22,24 21296:3 21298:6
footpath 21208:2
force 21251:2,4,8 21252:1 21263:12
forces 21148:15,20 21250:10,18
foreground 21138:7
forgotten 21146:20
form 21161:16 21174:16 21179:5 21191:13 21266:2 21275:7
formaat 21195:10
formasie 21128:23 21153:19,25 21161:22,23 21171:10 21175:4,14 21175:14 21178:24
formation 21152:9 21153:15,16 21162:19 21172:15 21172:20 21174:8 21175:2,6,17 21178:17,22
formed 21174:17 21179:9
former 21299:14
forming 21197:12
formulated 21209:2
forth 21200:18 21233:10 21244:9,11
Forum 21202:3 21274:7,10,13 21275:14,25
forward 21133:20 21137:8,11 21142:19 21167:16 21185:19 21236:19 21243:7 21252:24,25 21253:11 21254:1,1,3
foto 21129:17 21177:2
fotos 21128:21
foto's 21198:6
found 21230:5 21293:23
four 21133:9 21139:20 21142:15,15
frame 21134:5,5 21184:13 21189:21
Friday 21290:11
friend 21285:10,13
front 21128:18 21130:18 21133:13 21135:4 21136:9 21147:7,19 21148:1 21182:20 21183:19 21185:18 21191:1 21215:23 21256:2,4 21257:10 21258:2 21259:3 21273:20 21274:11 21275:24 21284:4,6
full 21142:18 21262:13 21272:9 21289:18 21301:5
fully 21182:6,21
fundamental 21219:5
funnel 21148:8,9,10,12 21148:13 21178:16
further 21137:8,23 21145:13 21147:20 21148:19 21156:18 21163:19 21164:7,24 21166:19 21185:21 21189:8 21213:18 21236:11 21247:6,11 21259:14 21268:8,23 21294:23 21295:12 21295:14 21297:13
future 21127:16

G

gaan 21135:23 21140:16 21141:18 21141:20,24,24 21150:12,19 21153:23,24 21154:1 21154:22,24 21155:3 21155:16 21156:4,11 21157:5,11,16 21158:20 21159:5,21 21160:1,6,7,7 21161:3,21 21174:24 21175:9 21179:1 21180:24 21185:2,8,8 21185:9 21188:22 21193:6,7 21205:25 21211:6,22 21216:18 21216:18 21220:20 21223:18 21240:18 21240:23 21263:4 21265:7,8
gang 21238:12
gap 21136:9 21190:25 21252:24,25 21253:6
gapings 21158:21 21159:25
gather 21268:25
gathering 21296:20 21298:2
gatherings 21298:3
Gauteng 21247:3
ge 21141:3 21242:16
gearresteer 21229:14 21265:21
gearriveer 21158:24 21215:1 21228:5 21263:5
gebeur 21153:24 21154:2 21163:3 21198:15 21203:21 21205:3,8 21219:17 21224:18 21226:9 21227:10 21229:15 21254:6
gebeure 21218:21
gebeurlikheid 21232:3
gebeurlikheidsplan 21232:5
gebied 21156:4 21194:13
geblok 21179:20 21188:23
gebreek 21207:21
gebrief 21167:25
gebruik 21138:24 21142:3 21157:20 21160:5 21163:7,8,9 21171:11 21193:3 21198:3 21207:10 21208:12 21216:19 21225:19 21227:18 21230:2 21233:15,17 21233:21 21239:6 21241:22 21251:5,7
gebêre 21198:9
gedeel 21196:19 21201:15,17
gedeelte 21141:21 21203:2 21224:17 21253:2 21267:22,24
gedemonstreer 21218:17
gedoen 21174:12 21193:19 21219:13 21219:20 21229:13 21237:16 21255:1 21258:11
gedood 21144:13
gedra 21194:17
gedruk 21142:7
gee 21141:24 21158:13 21160:8 21161:1 21176:7,18 21199:15 21216:15 21224:12 21224:15 21227:5 21232:4 21239:10 21263:1 21268:12
geen 21135:15 21140:18 21142:1 21150:21 21184:21 21196:24 21198:22 21201:18 21203:18 21203:22 21216:19 21217:7 21228:9 21230:1 21239:9 21255:1,2 21258:21 21259:6,12
geensins 21263:9
gegaan 21193:16 21207:13 21223:7 21253:25
gegee 21150:12 21153:19,20 21154:9 21154:25 21159:3,5 21162:3 21196:25 21201:18 21204:13 21206:20 21207:13 21208:11 21211:17 21216:10,20 21218:17 21226:8 21229:4,9 21230:14 21233:16,25 21238:24 21239:1 21240:19 21242:22 21242:23 21243:19 21244:4,23 21253:12 21255:14 21262:23 21264:14 21267:14 21267:25
gegewe 21204:15 21207:21 21209:19 21211:16 21233:15 21234:25 21265:22
gehad 21128:1 21171:16 21193:6 21203:13,18 21204:17 21209:16 21212:18 21215:14 21216:20 21223:20 21225:17 21233:19 21259:7,12
gehardloop 21255:6
geheg 21236:6
gehelp 21226:2,11
gehoor 21160:8 21162:3 21170:13 21212:4 21216:16 21218:23 21219:21 21230:8 21232:4 21248:23 21249:1 21255:14
gehurk 21140:14
gekleurde 21246:15
gekoets 21140:15 21141:4
gekom 21129:14 21154:21 21176:17 21185:11 21201:14 21201:18 21203:19

21230:12 21253:16 21255:3
gekommunikeer 21203:15
gekonsentreer 21218:24
gekontak 21238:9
gekoördineerd 21154:8
gekry 21171:22 21213:3 21234:25
gekyk 21155:12 21198:6 21256:20
gelaat 21134:2
geland 21215:17
geleentheid 21206:22 21268:17
gelei 21219:15 21268:22
gelos 21163:10
gemaak 21148:25 21157:6 21163:7,8,9 21185:1,24 21201:16 21202:13 21219:9 21225:10 21228:10 21230:15 21246:11 21265:17
gemonitor 21229:11
geneem 21168:19 21230:15
Generaal 21214:8,23 21215:15 21236:25
generale 21201:14
genoeg 21234:24
genoegsaam 21267:24
genoegsame 21209:20 21209:21
gentleman 21145:7
geplaas 21156:5
geposisioneer 21248:25
gepraat 21155:1 21157:15 21162:13 21219:1 21229:8 21236:2 21254:13 21255:13
gerapporteer 21238:11
gereageer 21178:10 21257:17
gerugte 21254:24 21255:3
gerus 21160:25
gery 21246:12 21254:25
gesamentlike 21225:17 21225:18
gesels 21215:15 21219:3
gesien 21135:18 21156:12 21178:1,5 21179:21 21184:1 21190:6 21214:15 21216:15 21228:7 21240:2 21241:11 21246:19 21252:13 21252:18,21 21253:1 21253:24 21255:12 21255:13,22 21257:14 21263:6
gesit 21160:3 21175:15 21195:19 21207:2 21218:19,21
geskiet 21256:13
geskreeu 21218:19 21219:1
geslaap 21198:10
gespandeer 21226:4 21261:14
gespeel 21156:7
gespreek 21224:17 21228:22
gesprekvoering 21253:5
gespring 21149:4
gespuit 21257:4
gestaan 21151:1 21184:2 21252:13,18 21253:1 21258:6
gestamp 21254:25
gestel 21225:20 21227:3 21265:15
gestem 21156:2
gestig 21225:19
gestop 21154:4,5
gesê 21129:11,17 21148:25 21153:20 21154:23 21157:6,8 21157:11 21159:1,13 21159:19 21160:6 21163:3 21168:8 21174:21 21177:13 21178:24,25 21179:1 21179:20,22 21185:2 21185:6 21188:21,23 21198:3 21199:12,14 21212:3,18 21228:17 21228:18 21238:22 21239:8 21240:1,4 21241:7,22,24 21242:1,23 21243:21 21244:3 21252:12,19 21252:23 21253:3,9 21254:1,3 21260:25 21261:3 21262:24 21263:2,10 21265:10 21265:19
getal 21135:23 21141:24 21255:25
getalle 21143:8
getoets 21259:11
getting 21148:3,20 21282:13
getuienis 21135:13 21157:14 21158:22 21202:12 21218:16 21224:14 21228:15
getuig 21134:4 21154:8 21154:24 21155:11 21157:22 21160:25 21162:22 21163:2 21175:8 21177:14 21179:19 21184:15 21185:1 21200:1 21202:9 21213:24 21217:17 21224:10 21227:1 21243:18 21244:20 21248:22
gevaar 21155:7,15 21207:22
gevaarlik 21155:6 21156:10,12 21159:4 21161:25,25 21162:7 21174:25
gevaarlike 21240:18
geval 21188:24 21194:17 21235:19 21240:3
gevat 21176:11 21256:12
gevind 21170:18
gevoel 21268:21
gevolg 21155:10 21178:9 21257:13 21259:10
gevolge 21162:3 21184:21 21219:15 21219:18
gevolgtrekking 21185:11
gevorm 21225:10
gevra 21155:2 21216:6 21218:15 21224:15 21252:11 21261:12 21262:23
gevuur 21134:9 21184:9 21218:20
gewaarsku 21228:17
gewapende 21204:13
gewees 21128:22 21149:9 21155:4 21156:10,12 21157:7 21157:21 21158:22 21158:24 21161:23 21161:23 21162:1 21168:18 21169:8 21172:1,7 21175:15 21179:13 21184:22 21193:5,14 21194:16 21195:10 21198:11 21203:16 21205:9 21207:2,11,14,20,21 21208:11,13 21209:18,21 21211:2 21211:3,7,14,21 21217:7 21218:14 21219:18 21220:9 21223:8 21225:11 21226:11 21229:7 21232:6 21240:4,16 21242:3 21253:5,24 21253:25 21254:24 21255:2 21256:11 21263:2 21265:12,21 21267:4,8,25 21268:21
geweet 21161:21 21194:12 21195:4 21237:16 21238:8 21239:24 21242:2
gewerk 21174:21 21178:7 21199:17 21217:8,10
gewone 21244:1
gewoonlik 21251:2,9 21252:2 21267:22
geword 21202:10
gewys 21128:21,22 21129:15,17 21150:19 21180:12 21226:9 21236:7
ge-attach 21236:3
ge-boks 21238:7
ge-challenge 21154:17
ge-discourage 21255:5
ge-encircle 21241:23 21241:25
ge-force 21142:3
ge-push 21140:17
ge-spray 21177:13
GGG5 21272:7 21276:9
gift 21293:15
gister 21128:21 21129:14 21141:19 21150:11,20 21154:18
give 21146:13 21199:22 21226:22 21227:7 21242:19 21243:7,14 21264:5,5,8 21266:5 21269:5 21271:16,23 21275:5 21279:15 21280:4 21281:24 21282:23 21285:3 21296:14,17 21300:10,18,23 21301:5
given 21132:7 21155:18 21163:20 21164:9 21169:10,18 21171:2 21182:16 21195:6 21199:2 21200:21,24 21205:11 21206:2 21222:23 21228:25 21237:23 21238:19 21239:15,17,21 21240:6 21242:14 21243:4,6,8 21244:13 21251:16 21254:8 21261:17,19,21,24,25 21262:4,4 21263:23 21264:3,17,19,23 21265:25 21267:10 21267:18,19 21290:8 21293:3,19 21295:12 21295:14,15 21300:20 21301:3
gives 21210:7 21289:6
giving 21151:5 21167:7 21167:7 21243:10 21264:9 21294:14,18
glad 21134:4,6,7,12 21135:21 21154:23 21155:8 21156:1,14 21159:5 21162:22 21167:19 21168:12 21171:16 21174:5 21179:6 21189:23 21194:17 21196:13 21196:18 21204:8 21205:20 21218:23 21224:23 21226:15 21226:25 21230:1,19 21237:20 21239:7 21242:24 21267:3
glo 21154:4 21168:18 21169:15 21218:3 21228:23 21257:12 21265:17
go 21136:4,5,13 21151:17 21155:17 21155:23 21156:24 21160:13,15 21166:16,16 21173:19 21179:16 21180:2 21181:2 21182:13 21192:8 21193:21 21195:7 21200:5 21204:11 21229:17 21247:3 21253:6 21254:11 21259:22 21260:3,4,5 21260:5 21276:9 21283:8 21285:21 21288:4 21301:16,17
goed 21133:23 21160:3 21218:22 21223:19 21226:10 21227:17
goeie 21128:5 21225:9
going 21132:22 21134:20 21138:6 21141:7 21148:13,19 21152:18 21155:23 21166:13 21173:5,7 21175:6,11 21177:16 21177:18,23 21183:9 21186:7 21190:9 21195:7 21210:4,11 21223:15 21229:17 21232:12,21 21235:13 21245:3,24 21254:10 21259:21 21260:7 21266:13 21269:10,10 21270:8 21275:20 21278:8 21280:2 21301:20
good 21128:6,7 21138:6 21165:4 21192:5
Google 21183:8
Gotz 21128:6,9,25 21129:19,24 21130:8 21130:20 21131:12 21132:3,9,23 21133:7 21133:16,24 21134:16,18 21135:1 21135:14 21137:4,12 21137:18,23 21138:12,16,21 21139:2,17,20 21140:5,19 21141:10

21141:14 21142:8 21143:2,23 21144:19 21145:14 21147:18 21147:22 21148:5,22 21149:10,11,20 21150:2,6 21151:4,21 21152:3 21154:10 21155:17 21156:15 21157:1,24 21158:6 21159:7,13 21160:13 21161:14 21162:6,16 21163:14 21164:19 21165:2,19,23 21166:2,8,21 21171:5 21182:9,11 21191:24 21192:21
Gotz's 21144:16
graag 21223:19
grade 21154:21 21155:1
grateful 21146:21
great 21185:15
greater 21301:21
grenades 21256:16 21257:6
groep 21134:12 21135:21,22 21142:2 21158:25 21160:10 21162:4 21189:25 21190:1 21204:13,14 21209:24 21211:2 21216:18 21217:9 21218:24 21219:14 21219:16,19 21228:23 21242:3 21252:20,23 21253:24 21255:5,12 21257:16 21258:1,3 21263:12 21265:6,6,7
groepe 21229:13 21254:7
groepeer 21244:21
groepie 21142:1,5,5,25 21178:6,9 21198:10
grond 21160:1 21205:6 21214:15
groot 21142:4,6 21178:6,8 21255:5,12
groter 21178:7 21179:20 21219:16 21252:23 21258:15 21258:17
ground 21142:14 21182:13 21185:14 21247:19,22 21248:14,15
group 21128:18 21130:4,22 21139:3 21142:21 21146:18 21148:11 21180:2 21182:7 21215:22,24 21254:5 21256:4 21258:2,24 21259:4
groups 21142:11 21190:10,18 21231:15
guards 21282:2 21290:2
gun 21135:4
gunfire 21132:4,8,14 21132:14,18 21248:6 21248:17
gunshot 21133:19
gusto 21138:8

H

hadn't 21129:5 21152:18 21233:9 21235:6,9
haelgeweer 21184:3,8 21218:20
haelgewere 21258:5
half 21173:2 21234:8 21269:25
halfuur 21261:13
halt 21203:10 21212:12
halwe 21135:16
hand 21139:7,8 21244:10 21246:21 21259:19
hande 21184:20
handled 21192:13
hands 21173:8 21287:9
hang 21263:4,7,15,25 21264:13 21265:4,22
hanteer 21268:19
happen 21174:4 21184:24 21210:18 21213:12 21216:8 21232:22 21233:4 21257:8 21269:12 21300:25 21301:2
happened 21171:3 21174:9,16,18 21175:18 21177:6 21196:21 21197:2,3 21198:13 21206:11 21218:1,12 21227:20 21229:1 21246:6 21250:22 21290:1
happening 21280:25 21284:22 21285:18
happens 21133:17 21179:25 21284:15
happenstance 21171:3
Happily 21210:3
happy 21149:21 21166:2
hard 21146:12,13 21147:3 21170:3 21186:10 21187:7,9 21233:21
hardcopies 21233:10
hardcopy 21232:20
hardloop 21134:7 21135:14 21157:17 21254:7
hardness 21187:12
hasn't 21222:22
haven't 21127:7,23 21130:8 21131:7,8,10 21131:14,16 21139:11 21182:24 21249:10 21284:3,6
head 21190:25 21215:21 21282:12 21286:17 21288:13 21289:2 21299:22
headphones 21131:7 21269:19 21278:17
heads 21131:16 21300:18
hear 21131:9,10,12,23 21132:12,14,21 21135:4 21195:14 21196:1 21248:7,18 21248:20 21262:16 21278:18,25,25 21285:4,17
heard 21132:12 21133:3 21196:2,6,7 21196:11,16 21211:25 21212:1 21215:8 21260:9,10 21266:22 21267:6 21268:14 21287:5 21301:14
hede 21230:7
heel 21195:23 21209:16
heeltemal 21151:19 21155:10 21176:19 21184:20 21199:16 21200:8 21229:5 21237:25
heeltyd 21229:7
heen 21194:24
held 21234:15 21275:18
hele 21142:6 21154:22 21160:7 21189:25 21199:16 21207:19 21256:24 21261:14
helicopter 21213:19 21227:12 21241:16
helicopters 21262:2
helikopter 21215:17 21227:3,17
helmet 21139:6,24
helmets 21189:17
help 21165:21 21199:23 21226:14 21250:24 21280:5 21299:8
helped 21281:5
helpful 21131:25 21225:23 21226:2
helping 21234:11
helps 21280:13
Hemraj 21166:20 21182:25 21183:6
he's 21148:18 21201:10 21209:2 21273:5 21283:13 21284:6,8 21284:22 21285:23
HHH68 21274:2
hier 21153:24,25 21154:2 21156:6 21157:13 21161:3 21162:22 21163:12 21176:10 21203:21 21216:24 21223:17 21265:10
hierdie 21128:21 21134:5 21141:20,22 21152:22 21157:16 21160:3,22 21161:21 21163:6 21173:25 21175:13 21177:8 21178:9 21193:3 21194:12,17 21202:10 21216:17 21218:24 21224:12 21230:6 21236:5 21239:5 21242:1 21243:25 21251:19
high 21217:12
higher 21145:11 21251:23
highlighted 21129:6
hindsight 21161:20 21163:11 21198:9 21229:14 21241:10 21244:12,18 21266:6
history 21244:7
hiërargie 21205:7
hoe 21157:19 21161:12 21178:8 21209:23 21223:18 21226:6,9 21239:4 21240:24 21246:15 21263:7 21268:18,20
hoek 21161:9,21 21246:11
hoeke 21158:15
hoekom 21160:5,11 21163:1 21179:21
holding 21167:16 21236:19 21237:5
holds 21279:18
hom 21140:15,18,18 21154:4,17 21155:4 21155:14 21157:6 21158:25 21162:23 21170:18 21174:1 21213:25,25 21246:18 21262:23
home 21269:5
honderd 21221:21
honestly 21190:8,11
hoogte 21227:16
hoor 21219:2 21228:19 21228:22 21235:15
hope 21137:2 21239:18 21272:5
horrified 21223:14
hospital 21144:23,25
host 21147:3
hostel 21198:8,23
hour 21215:10
housekeeping 21274:3 21276:5
human 21270:21
hurry 21286:25
hy 21140:14,16,17,17 21141:2,3,4 21142:3 21150:17,18,22,24,25 21151:1 21153:12 21154:5 21157:6 21159:4 21162:23 21169:15,16 21171:10,15,16,21 21172:1 21177:13 21201:13 21210:1 21211:2 21212:2,4 21213:24 21214:9,25 21220:8,14 21228:19 21229:7,8 21233:16 21233:17,20,23,24 21234:23,25 21236:2 21236:6,7 21241:22 21241:23 21246:15 21246:19 21247:24 21247:25 21248:24 21254:1,2 21261:1,3 21261:3,13 21265:17
hypothesis 21173:22,23 21192:20
hypothetical 21264:18 21264:19
hysterical 21281:19 21286:5
hê 21174:23

I

idea 21136:21 21206:16 21223:14
idee 21233:19
identification 21274:17
identified 21220:4 21298:6
identifiseer 21240:22
identify 21199:23
iemand 21153:19 21203:19
iets 21141:4 21148:24 21180:13 21203:20 21203:21 21204:9 21205:8 21212:4 21230:12,13 21253:10
iewers 21163:10 21193:9
ignore 21146:7
illegal 21279:10
illustrate 21166:4 21193:22
illustrates 21219:5
illustration 21193:25
image 21233:11
immediately 21143:12 21215:19 21222:8 21223:2 21264:9
implementation 21203:10
implemented 21205:14
implementeer 21223:19
important 21284:14,17 21284:23
imposed 21127:10,15

21127:18,21
impossible 21128:18 21129:8 21140:8 21148:11
impression 21223:13 21251:12
improved 21165:5
inadequate 21261:8
inbeweeg 21215:15 21246:16 21258:12
incident 21177:6 21179:14,25 21214:4 21215:8 21229:1
incidents 21289:10
inclined 21222:18
include 21269:20
includes 21143:11
including 21128:19 21289:13 21300:7
incorrect 21203:4 21274:17
indebted 21275:6,9 21278:20
inderdaad 21193:14 21255:10
index 21275:2
indicate 21127:8 21139:13 21155:21 21194:22 21249:5
indicated 21186:23 21231:14
indicates 21234:21
indicating 21182:10
indicative 21152:6
indicted 21229:18
indictment 21229:23
indien 21155:5 21160:7 21163:2,7 21216:17 21219:13,13 21239:1 21241:1 21262:24 21265:4
individual 21164:10
individuals 21301:15
individuele 21154:7
indruk 21229:5 21233:23
influence 21293:5
inform 21171:18 21176:3 21200:16,17 21298:16
informal 21237:6
information 21143:21 21172:19 21198:21 21200:20,22 21201:3 21201:4 21204:22 21206:16 21219:24 21224:21 21225:22 21235:6,7 21242:13 21290:5 21294:14
informed 21172:20 21191:14 21269:4
ingaan 21239:9
ingegaan 21252:1
ingekom 21155:1 21198:4
ingelig 21213:2
ingeneem 21179:2
ingery 21255:4
ingesit 21226:7
initially 21202:25
injured 21143:7,19,20 21143:21 21145:21 21229:25
injuries 21143:17
injury 21138:15 21277:11
inligting 21186:4 21193:5 21198:11,14 21198:15,20,22 21201:17 21203:12 21205:4 21212:18,19 21215:14 21229:3 21234:25 21238:23 21239:1 21242:22
inneem 21135:20
innige 21268:21
input 21181:1 21293:14
insident 21160:9 21174:11 21177:7,8 21180:4,11 21252:14 21253:8 21257:3
insit 21158:22 21205:4
inskrywings 21157:4
inspection 21183:9,10 21183:11,14 21193:17 21280:14
instance 21212:24 21226:23
instantly 21176:14
instructed 21247:8 21296:24
instruction 21153:17 21154:11 21164:9,16 21164:21 21249:22 21249:24 21250:16 21250:21 21251:14 21251:16 21252:6 21253:19,21,22 21254:8 21255:8 21282:20 21296:18 21296:23 21297:7 21298:25 21300:11 21300:20,22
instructions 21179:5 21180:21 21216:8 21226:22 21227:7 21247:2,6 21252:5 21282:24 21296:15 21296:20 21300:23
instructive 21164:15
instruksie 21204:16
instuur 21239:5
intelligence 21197:23 21198:21 21244:8
intelligensie 21198:4 21198:22,23 21205:4
intend 21186:6
intended 21222:24
intending 21223:12
intention 21224:8 21230:21
intentional 21204:1
intercepted 21300:11
interest 21138:18
interested 21214:17 21244:6 21262:16 21284:15
interests 21253:21
Interferes 21131:18
interpret 21269:16,17 21270:1,2,5
interpretation 21269:11,12
interpreted 21209:1 21270:3
interpreter 21211:24 21227:2 21240:16 21269:8,17 21278:8 21278:13 21290:16
interpreting 21278:15
interrupt 21166:9 21188:13 21238:14 21249:5 21272:19 21283:20 21299:7
interrupts 21161:17
intervention 21147:1
introduced 21288:11
investigation 21199:21
invite 21176:21 21297:21
involved 21232:9 21240:7 21293:13 21300:23
involving 21289:13 21293:7
inwoners 21207:22
in-geboks 21241:6
iron 21144:7
irresistible 21218:6
irrespective 21261:5
isn't 21134:20 21137:21 21146:5 21186:24 21234:20 21235:14 21236:24 21242:15 21247:21 21273:13
issue 21260:16 21261:17,18
issued 21153:17
issues 21173:21 21259:23
item 21274:21,22 21297:24
it's 21139:20 21143:9 21143:21 21146:2 21149:24 21150:3,7 21173:2,3 21182:15 21182:16 21200:15 21201:9 21208:22 21221:1 21247:1 21249:11 21250:7,18 21253:21 21255:23 21260:13 21273:21 21274:15 21275:7 21276:10 21277:20 21278:1,2,2,4 21284:14,17,19 21285:7 21291:22 21295:2
I'd 21127:17 21138:8 21146:20 21183:7 21249:3,11 21252:3
I'll 21260:1,13 21287:11
I've 21136:25 21151:10 21231:17 21259:17 21268:14
i.e 21174:16

J

ja 21138:1 21143:14 21147:14 21161:20 21162:13 21165:23 21167:23 21168:7 21169:7,25 21170:13 21171:21 21175:3 21177:1,4 21179:11 21181:8,16 21183:21 21184:15 21186:3,20 21187:2,14,17 21188:11,25 21194:2 21195:22 21200:7 21201:13 21203:2 21213:23 21214:6,25 21216:6,14 21217:7 21218:7 21224:6 21225:8,11,15 21237:10 21238:17 21238:21 21242:17 21242:18 21243:17 21244:5,18 21252:16 21254:16 21255:25 21256:3,7 21257:1 21258:3,10 21260:20 21260:24 21262:22 21266:8,20 21274:2
JANUARY 21127:1
jare 21160:24
Ja-nee 21175:24 21205:15 21211:20
JJJ 21273:23
JJJ137 21273:22
JJJ177 21274:11,15,17 21274:19 21275:14 21275:17,19
JJJ194.16 21131:2
JJJ194.17 21131:4
job 21298:23
JOC 21197:2 21212:19 21214:16 21238:24 21295:8,13 21298:1
JOCCOM 21168:4,16 21168:20 21169:13 21201:15 21204:16 21205:2,3,7 21233:18 21233:23 21234:14 21234:14 21236:7
joined 21276:14
joint 21282:25
jou 21155:6 21265:7
Judge 21299:14,16
judgment 21204:22 21217:4
juis 21194:23 21205:25 21255:3
julle 21159:3 21228:21 21228:21 21239:8 21241:25 21265:11 21265:19
July 21276:23
jumped 21146:19 21147:7
jy 21159:19 21228:17 21228:21 21265:5,6,7

K

kaart 21226:5
kanale 21267:23
kans 21128:1
kant 21135:19 21175:9 21193:6 21198:4 21203:17 21207:23 21229:11,12 21247:25 21252:22 21263:8
Kaptein 21237:1
karre 21159:23 21254:2
keep 21244:10
keer 21150:15,21 21160:6 21161:22 21162:14 21179:1 21206:21 21252:11 21267:3
kennis 21194:16 21230:12
kept 21200:22 21219:23 21292:10 21292:21
kere 21265:16
key 21297:13,13 21298:7
Kgotle 21288:23 21294:17
Kidd 21236:23 21237:1 21237:4,5 21242:12
Kidd's 21243:11
killed 21143:6,17,17 21144:2 21145:24
killing 21230:17 21289:13 21290:1
kind 21164:2,25 21210:7 21225:13 21231:17,24 21250:21 21266:1
KKK 21246:24
KKK47 21157:25 21192:8
KKK51 21176:22
KKK52 21128:10 21149:12 21160:14 21160:14 21171:4 21173:21 21181:2
KKK60 21249:6,6,11
KKK61 21246:24
klaar 21177:7 21240:20 21265:5
klap 21134:8 21135:17
klein 21142:25

kleurvolle 21233:6
klim 21155:7 21159:3 21242:23
klippe 21239:3 21240:25
knew 21301:9
knives 21144:7
knobkieries 21296:8
knopkieries 21144:7
knowing 21301:6
knowledge 21168:9 21185:16 21215:9 21300:9 21301:8,10
knowledgeable 21301:7
known 21236:16 21237:22 21238:16 21239:14,21 21243:9 21280:14 21290:14 21290:20,21,24 21291:16 21293:4
koalisie 21225:10
koets 21140:17
kol 21257:3
Kolonel 21153:9,12 21160:24 21167:24 21177:2 21196:24,24 21211:1,8 21229:4 21232:11 21238:6 21260:25
kom 21141:18 21142:6 21156:5 21160:25 21161:2,3,6,7,21 21163:2 21175:16 21185:8 21193:6 21194:18,24 21198:8 21204:16 21205:5,6 21216:15,24 21228:17 21238:22 21240:4,17 21244:21 21251:8 21252:14 21265:11,19
komberse 21259:10
Kommissaris 21215:1
kommissie 21145:3 21224:12
kommunikasie 21199:7 21228:23 21240:3 21263:8 21265:8
kon 21129:18 21134:10 21142:7 21149:1,1,6 21150:20 21157:7 21160:11 21161:23 21163:8 21175:8 21177:14 21179:19 21188:21 21189:24 21198:7 21204:17 21218:23 21220:9 21228:10,22
konfiskering 21223:9
koordineer 21157:10
kopie 21223:9
koppie 21194:7,18 21198:10 21200:18 21209:19,21 21211:15 21213:25 21215:15 21227:21 21227:22 21228:3,6 21228:13 21233:2 21236:17 21237:18 21237:23 21238:25 21239:14,15,21,22 21242:11 21243:9 21246:5,6,8,12,16 21248:5,8,13,16,19 21250:12 21254:11 21263:5 21266:22
korrek 21151:19 21167:15 21168:23 21171:11 21172:4,7 21181:8,13 21182:2 21183:21 21184:22 21192:11,17,23 21194:2 21195:16 21202:17 21203:6 21206:13 21210:20 21212:14 21215:13 21220:1 21221:12 21224:1 21225:8,15 21231:22 21232:11 21232:16 21237:11 21238:1 21247:16 21248:2 21249:16 21254:22 21258:9 21260:19 21266:20 21266:24 21267:7
korreksie 21180:14 21215:5
korrespondeer 21150:13
kraal 21128:16 21129:3,5,8,13,13,16 21129:18 21130:5 21134:23 21135:6 21139:5,23 21146:19 21147:8 21149:2,4,6 21149:8 21154:21 21156:20 21157:17 21159:21,24 21161:7 21161:7,18 21175:6,9 21175:9 21179:16,17 21180:2 21195:2,8 21208:25 21253:2 21256:24
kruisietjies 21158:16
kry 21134:12 21226:21 21240:25
Kuhn 21150:19,23,25 21189:24 21190:4
Kwadi 21288:23 21294:18
kyk 21134:11 21140:11 21140:11 21141:16 21154:24 21160:7 21177:25 21178:4 21195:23 21244:18
K9 21236:23 21237:1,4 21238:8 21243:22

L

L 21144:4,5,10 21145:8 21249:13,19 21250:7 21267:17 21272:25
laaste 21193:18
laat 21134:12 21227:17 21238:24
lack 21183:15
laid 21235:7
langer 21176:11
langs 21157:12,14 21163:4
language 21269:5,14
lank 21215:16
lapsed 21132:20
laptop 21232:19,22 21233:1,11,17,21 21234:18 21235:24
latest 21246:24
lay 21185:18,18 21235:12
layered 21259:10
laying 21290:25
lead 21180:2 21274:4
leaders 21156:6 21170:3 21214:3 21291:17
leading 21182:14 21283:22 21284:7
learn 21289:1
learned 21285:10,13
leave 21132:19 21133:5 21166:2 21271:8 21279:4 21280:8 21283:7,16 21286:20 21287:1 21300:15,21
leaves 21300:12
leaving 21127:13 21267:1
led 21288:8 21290:3
lede 21155:7 21156:11 21156:13 21159:3 21162:14 21174:23 21176:9 21184:2 21221:17,21 21224:15,16 21226:7 21250:25
left 21133:2 21139:7,7 21163:17 21164:10 21247:19,22 21248:15 21252:5 21254:11 21299:3
left-hand 21139:24
leg 21217:13
legs 21145:10
leier 21203:15 21265:17
length 21229:17
lengthy 21222:13,14
lesing 21158:13,13
lethal 21216:19 21217:8 21259:12 21263:12
letter 21273:4,18 21274:1,1
letters 21273:10,15
let's 21134:15,20 21138:5 21139:25 21147:23 21150:2,6 21151:9 21152:2 21153:21 21157:24 21160:13 21186:8,15 21190:11 21217:13 21218:11 21234:9 21242:10 21276:7
level 21270:21 21294:11
levelled 21300:19
lewens 21156:11 21161:25 21162:7
Lieutenant 21215:10 21223:2 21271:14 21273:5,10 21285:2 21287:15 21298:11
Lieutenant-General 21268:25
life 21277:11
lig 21224:18
liggame 21255:2
light 21148:5 21163:19 21203:25 21270:18
limited 21211:18
limits 21298:9
line 21130:18 21133:1 21151:14,22 21156:22,23 21160:20 21166:1,13 21166:15,16,20 21167:13 21168:11 21169:1,11,19 21170:16 21179:10 21181:6,7 21183:3 21186:8,9,12,16 21189:1,12,17,21 21195:14 21197:7,12 21208:3 21215:24 21219:6,24 21222:4 21224:25 21227:19 21227:23 21250:12 21296:1,11 21300:5
lined 21208:1
lines 21189:9 21213:5
linie 21156:11
linkerkante 21154:6
links 21149:1 21194:25
list 21273:11
listened 21262:12
listening 21131:14,23 21133:4 21262:11 21278:18 21284:3
literally 21259:23
little 21223:13 21239:19 21290:17
live 21248:8,9,18,23 21295:22 21296:3
LLL 21274:8
LLL1 21273:1,2
LLL2 21273:6 21275:4 21275:20 21276:4
local 21288:1
located 21156:21
logical 21232:13
logistiek 21267:23
long 21239:16 21260:7 21262:4 21264:20
longer 21182:11
Lonmin 21166:25 21211:24 21225:2,23 21226:17 21227:2 21279:9,18 21282:3 21285:10 21286:25 21287:5 21288:4,8,13 21288:17 21289:2,24 21290:7,13 21291:7 21294:7,13,21 21295:8 21297:15
look 21134:15,17,20 21137:2 21149:13 21157:24 21158:6 21159:10 21165:10 21165:12 21171:4 21177:15 21182:14 21190:24,25 21235:21 21262:2 21297:21,24
looked 21139:15
looking 21129:1,4 21136:24 21147:1 21189:11 21215:21 21296:14
looks 21147:25 21163:20 21164:1 21165:11,16 21191:9
loop 21135:14
loss 21277:11 21292:6
lot 21163:15 21189:5 21236:8 21284:2 21292:4,13
lots 21284:5
loved 21132:16
lug 21184:21 21238:6
lugvaart 21227:16
luister 21219:1
Luitenant 21153:9 21160:23 21167:24 21214:23
Luitenant-Kolonel 21160:23 21162:25 21162:25
lunch 21245:4
lying 21247:19,22 21248:13,14
lyk 21161:12 21226:6 21251:25 21263:7
lyn 21153:13 21155:6,7 21155:7 21157:19 21188:22 21189:19 21230:23 21237:8
lyne 21207:21

M

maak 21155:6,7 21157:20 21159:1 21162:23 21177:21 21199:7 21212:21 21229:10 21241:25 21242:23 21252:20 21252:24 21263:13 21268:1
maande 21252:12
maar 21135:18

21140:10,15 21141:15,25 21143:9 21149:5,6,9 21150:19 21153:12,22 21154:17 21158:13 21160:10 21162:4 21163:8,11 21178:25 21186:3 21188:24 21189:24 21195:5 21198:10,22 21201:15 21203:19 21209:23 21210:14 21213:24 21216:23 21227:5,17 21233:22 21233:24 21234:7 21237:16 21239:2 21240:20 21241:22 21244:25 21246:18 21248:25 21250:3,25 21251:8 21253:2 21255:5 21256:20,23 21257:14,16,17 21263:1
Macintosh 21223:2
mag 21268:17
Magidiwana 21143:19 21186:8,19 21188:14
Mahlangu 21269:16 21270:1,7 21271:11 21277:23,24 21290:18 21291:8
main 21202:6 21245:16 21299:19
Major 21283:11 21286:19
Makhubela 21153:12 21196:24 21209:12 21211:1,8 21213:10 21220:10
making 21131:9 21200:4 21222:1 21223:1 21292:13
maklik 21142:25 21175:16 21194:13
Malema 21223:22
Mamabolo 21245:17 21245:18 21246:25 21246:25 21248:11 21249:7
Mamabolo's 21245:23
Mamabula 21266:17
man 21234:20
management 21202:3 21274:7,10,13 21275:14,25 21288:5 21288:8 21290:7,14 21293:1,2,15 21294:7 21294:7,10 21298:8
manier 21219:14,20 21238:10 21255:4 21268:18
manner 21189:8 21212:6 21222:25 21292:25 21297:1
manpower 21282:13 21286:9
manual 21156:3 21160:17 21165:13 21192:18 21193:1,3 21194:20
manuals 21155:21 21192:8
mapped 21170:7
march 21291:15
marched 21290:12
marchers 21290:22
marching 21290:12,12 21290:24 21291:5,6 21296:1
Marikana 21194:4 21277:6 21280:24 21281:1,4 21282:25 21287:21 21288:1
mark 21273:13 21274:8 21275:4 21288:9
marked 21128:15 21247:13 21249:11 21249:11 21272:6
MARTHINUS 21173:16 21245:11
mass 21142:18,21
massa 21142:6 21178:8
massadruk 21142:2
massive 21219:5
mate 21189:24 21251:8
materiaal 21129:15 21135:12
material 21150:7 21177:5 21206:25 21225:13 21278:15 21285:22
Mathunjwa 21200:14 21203:19 21235:8,9
matter 21172:13 21182:6,24 21185:20 21187:13,21 21190:14 21191:8,14 21191:14 21207:25 21223:12 21243:2 21287:6 21293:23 21297:3
matters 21231:1 21259:15,21 21284:25
Mawela 21213:19 21214:18,20,21,23 21215:10
McIntosh 21196:1
Mdze 21144:22
mean 21137:14 21144:20 21145:22 21165:10 21190:8,11 21191:6 21197:25 21229:1 21232:8 21264:10 21265:24
meaning 21164:25
means 21181:19 21193:11,14 21257:11
measure 21183:14
measurement 21183:13
measurements 21183:13
media 21170:6 21203:16 21207:4,22
mee 21268:21
meegedeel 21202:13 21214:9 21238:6 21242:24 21261:2
meer 21141:22,24 21205:25 21206:22 21213:1 21219:15,17 21232:3 21233:19 21234:8 21256:3 21258:4
meerderheid 21178:7 21248:25
meet 21287:25
meeting 21168:5,16,21 21169:13 21231:9,25 21234:3,4,5,6 21235:10 21274:13 21275:18,22 21291:4 21291:21 21294:15 21295:7
megaphone 21227:21
mekaar 21153:21 21154:1 21157:12,14 21157:15 21158:19 21159:23
member 21190:4
members 21138:7 21177:18 21181:10 21190:25 21196:11 21196:15 21200:19 21202:3 21221:9 21222:1 21226:23 21230:4 21241:17 21245:14 21247:9,20 21247:23 21249:13 21249:21 21250:6,11 21281:4,16 21282:20 21288:1 21291:25 21292:1,15 21297:17 21298:8
membership 21292:6
memory 21188:19 21197:7
men 21189:12 21190:18 21243:11 21243:11 21296:7
menace 21193:10,11,13
Meneer 21141:9
mening 21242:2
mens 21198:19 21225:19 21257:3 21265:4,9,10
mense 21134:7 21135:14,23 21141:25 21149:3 21154:6 21160:6 21161:2 21198:5,7 21209:20 21224:11 21242:1 21243:1 21244:3 21252:13 21254:25 21255:14 21265:10
mention 21202:4 21301:16
mentioned 21286:15 21287:4 21291:16 21292:9 21294:3
Merafe 21295:16 21301:13
mere 21153:9 21160:23 21162:25 21163:18 21164:4 21167:24 21186:22 21196:24 21213:15 21220:6
merely 21191:5 21233:10 21234:18
merke 21255:1
meter 21135:17,17 21242:21 21243:20
metode 21217:7
metres 21243:7
microphone 21277:18 21277:21 21278:13
middel 21246:16
middle 21190:22
mid-afternoon 21168:2
mike 21278:8 21279:3 21288:21
milieu 21193:10,15
militant 21206:3
militante 21160:10
min 21176:19 21233:19 21234:8 21256:1,3
mind 21143:13 21160:16 21189:7 21191:11 21232:1
minded 21179:4
minds 21204:11
mine 21282:4 21288:4
miners 21279:9
Mineworkers 21291:24 21292:2
minimum 21181:25
mining 21288:13
minute 21132:20 21152:5 21211:16 21215:16 21264:7 21271:4 21273:8 21274:7,13 21275:15 21275:25 21276:1
minutes 21234:13 21261:22 21264:7 21270:15 21274:10 21275:18
minuut 21156:7 21176:10 21180:13
Mirriam 21272:1,9 21287:17
mis 21177:2
misdaad 21226:9
miskien 21138:24 21140:11 21141:16 21148:24,24 21161:12 21162:3 21177:25 21188:23 21189:23 21200:2 21203:20 21205:2 21210:1 21217:8 21226:20 21227:15 21232:5 21233:14,22 21235:1 21240:19 21241:1 21251:7 21265:3
mission 21193:18
misunderstand 21241:20
Mm 21240:9
mode 21269:11 21285:1
modes 21134:3
moeilik 21161:20 21175:3 21253:14
moeilike 21265:2
moenie 21258:5
moes 21156:9 21163:6 21163:8 21171:10,21 21175:14 21190:5 21193:5,14,16 21194:12,16 21207:12 21209:24 21211:22
moet 21152:22 21155:3 21157:5,20 21158:22 21176:6,7,9 21193:3 21193:4,19 21198:19 21198:20 21208:10 21213:1 21216:20 21218:25 21221:17 21229:9 21233:16 21237:15 21238:25 21239:2 21253:4,13 21264:12
Mokwena 21288:20,23 21294:16,17
moment 21135:3 21138:2 21142:9,19 21165:11 21166:1,12 21182:19,24 21284:8 21286:1 21300:6
moments 21133:17
Monday 21245:13 21287:1
money 21293:3,12
moontlik 21128:22,24 21149:9 21157:21 21195:10 21218:22
moontlikhede 21163:11
moontlikheid 21244:19 21244:25 21263:2,3 21266:7
morning 21128:7,7,8 21231:9 21232:1 21233:9 21301:24
motion 21140:3
motiveer 21224:11
mouth 21208:2 21209:4
move 21137:15 21147:24 21148:21 21152:2 21159:17 21183:19 21216:12 21218:11 21249:12 21252:24,24

21253:11,11,11,11,11 21254:1,1,3
moved 21129:7 21142:19 21164:1 21165:18,21,21 21189:3 21243:7
movement 21246:13 21247:12,13
moves 21130:4 21142:13
moving 21137:11 21160:20 21164:17 21165:9 21189:4 21221:1,6
Mpembe 21200:14,16 21202:1 21283:11,16 21286:20 21287:22 21296:24 21297:5,17 21298:24 21299:1 21300:12 21301:4
Mpofu 21131:18 21132:1,2 21146:9,11 21146:14,15,18 21148:25 21181:18 21181:22 21183:12 21183:14 21185:13 21186:5,15,20 21187:2,5,10,14,17 21187:19 21188:1,4,8 21188:11 21189:6 21190:7,13,16 21191:3,6 21207:24 21208:22 21209:6 21217:20,22 21218:5 21222:10 21229:17 21239:16 21240:11 21249:19 21259:16 21259:18,20 21260:3 21260:6,10,14,20 21261:5,16 21263:14 21263:17,20 21264:1 21264:25 21266:10 21266:11 21270:16 21270:18,20 21283:19 21284:10 21284:13 21285:1,5
Mpofu's 21147:1 21264:24
Mpumalanga 21213:19
Mpumza 21214:7
Munroe 21288:9
murder 21229:18,22,23
murdered 21282:3
mustn't 21241:14
myn 21198:4 21226:6
mynbestuur 21199:13

N

naby 21155:8 21239:3 21253:2
nadat 21135:17 21148:24 21223:8
nader 21240:1 21243:21 21244:22
naderbeweeg 21253:7
Naidoo 21215:15 21236:18,25 21237:4 21237:13 21242:12 21255:1 21280:3,4,7 21280:12,18,22 21282:9,19 21283:8 21286:4,13 21287:22
Naidoo's 21243:11
name 21279:15 21281:24
names 21272:9
narrow 21148:9,10
nat 21256:25 21257:3
National 21202:3 21273:8 21274:7,10 21274:13 21275:14 21275:25 21291:24 21292:2 21299:13,22
nature 21155:20 21210:23
near 21147:7,19,23 21148:1 21254:20
nearby 21237:7
necessarily 21202:6
necessary 21133:4 21175:23 21176:4 21182:15 21200:20 21231:10 21249:23 21268:9 21280:5 21296:17 21298:16
need 21151:17 21173:4 21192:1
needed 21145:16 21176:15
needs 21269:8
neem 21150:16 21156:9 21213:1 21217:19 21239:2
neer 21228:21 21265:19
neergesit 21184:20 21203:14
negotiation 21198:25
negotiations 21199:2
Neither 21267:5
net 21134:4 21140:10 21141:3,17 21143:10 21148:24 21149:5,5 21153:13,23 21155:1 21155:13,25 21157:17 21159:5 21160:6,8 21163:8,13 21174:21 21175:15 21177:21 21178:1,4 21184:7 21185:1 21186:3 21198:22 21201:13 21202:9 21207:12,14 21209:23 21211:22 21212:3 21218:15 21219:16,21 21223:7 21224:11,14 21226:20 21229:7,11 21234:25 21236:12 21238:22 21239:8 21241:1 21244:3,19 21251:7 21252:1 21256:20 21259:9 21260:24 21261:4 21263:10 21265:4 21268:17
neuse 21158:19
never 21143:13 21166:8 21208:23 21217:21 21278:22
nevertheless 21215:20
new 21182:12,22 21221:1
niemand 21140:18
night 21200:18,25
niks 21163:12 21178:11 21204:17 21212:2 21217:8 21218:14 21228:9 21230:8
NIU 21221:18
Nkaneng 21252:22
NMF 21276:1
nodig 21193:11
noem 21171:10 21205:4
nog 21128:1 21129:13 21134:7,10 21141:23 21158:21 21159:24 21159:25 21160:11 21161:25 21162:14 21174:10 21175:8 21205:25 21213:2 21230:8 21238:22 21265:20
noise 21132:21
Noki 21128:19 21129:2 21130:4,18 21131:2 21205:22
nommertjie 21158:17
non 21216:18 21259:11 21263:12
Nong 21196:6
non-lethal 21256:12 21259:6
nooit 21170:18 21178:19 21179:11 21223:7,9
noord 21229:12 21255:16
noordwestelike 21246:11 21247:25 21255:16
normaal 21219:2
normal 21138:2 21285:3
normale 21226:4,9 21240:19 21262:24
normally 21235:23 21300:22
north 21128:16 21129:7 21277:3 21280:11
Northern 21276:19,22
northwest 21248:13
north-west 21156:20 21266:18
Nosaziso 21272:1,10 21287:17
notebook 21261:4
nou 21129:13 21140:15 21140:16 21141:20 21143:8,14 21148:24 21150:24 21158:13 21158:22 21161:2 21172:11 21178:1,5 21197:10 21205:2 21209:17 21211:7 21215:5 21219:3 21223:17 21229:14 21235:2 21239:2 21240:1,20 21241:25 21244:18 21263:16 21267:2
November 21276:10,15 21276:19
no-one 21141:6
NUM 21200:16 21292:5,11,15,16 21293:24 21294:3
number 21132:15 21142:16 21143:25 21144:1,19,25 21145:6,12,16,18,20 21145:25 21146:1,22 21147:25 21149:18 21156:16 21225:6 21245:15 21247:13 21249:6 21272:23 21273:4,11,18 21274:10,12,18 21297:25
numbered 21158:7
numbers 21146:25
Nyala 21150:15,22 21158:17 21159:19 21159:22 21160:18 21161:10,12 21164:10,11 21170:21 21171:19 21174:12 21179:20 21180:1 21188:23 21189:3,3 21196:15 21208:1,24,24 21211:25 21218:20 21239:4,6 21246:4,5 21246:5,7,10 21247:8 21247:15 21248:5,11 21248:12,12
Nyalas 21133:25 21134:23 21153:2 21158:19 21162:7 21174:17 21178:14 21178:17 21179:9 21180:8 21181:14 21183:19 21184:2 21189:1,3 21209:7,24 21216:9,21 21228:16 21229:6,7 21240:1 21245:16 21247:7,20 21247:23 21252:23 21253:5,5,9 21254:6 21254:13,20 21256:13

O

O 21153:1 21197:14 21238:21 21258:19
oath 21128:3 21173:15 21221:5 21245:10 21271:16
OB 21298:1,1,11
object 21186:7 21284:12
objected 21191:25
objecting 21283:22
objection 21285:10
objections 21189:9
objective 21189:11 21190:3,17 21191:18
objectively 21188:3
oblige 21181:23
obscuring 21190:11
observation 21206:2
observations 21228:3
observed 21196:21
obstruct 21150:22
obstructing 21189:21 21190:3
obstruksie 21150:21
obtain 21181:1 21223:3
obtained 21244:9
obvious 21135:2,7 21161:15
obviously 21135:13 21147:20 21255:24 21269:7 21283:23
OB-entry 21297:4
occur 21202:24
occurred 21212:7
occurrence 21297:22
occurs 21163:19
OCT 21251:9
October 21274:14 21276:2 21292:20
oefening 21158:20
offended 21239:18
offer 21280:4
offered 21192:20,21,21
offering 21293:16
office 21282:12 21286:16,17 21301:18
officer 21234:22 21245:17,18 21246:25 21248:11 21249:7 21280:15
officers 21220:5,17 21254:9
officials 21298:4
offisier 21150:19,23 21220:15 21234:24
offisiere 21162:24 21221:20
oggend 21203:14 21209:17,20
oggende 21199:14
Oh 21171:20 21189:18 21226:24 21237:2 21249:8 21256:14

21274:23
okay 21132:1 21146:13 21146:17 21170:2 21172:25 21176:21 21180:25 21185:13 21187:4 21192:4 21195:12,25 21199:18 21209:11 21261:16 21263:14 21278:3 21281:17 21300:10 21301:14
ombeweeg 21154:3 21177:8 21179:21 21252:15
omdat 21216:18 21252:20 21253:13 21255:3
omdraai 21129:18 21142:7 21149:6
omgedraai 21134:10 21141:3 21217:2
omgewing 21193:12,16 21193:16
omsingel 21240:3,17,21
omstandighede 21157:13 21160:4 21263:5,7,16 21264:14 21265:21
omtrent 21189:24 21206:21 21211:15
onbeheersd 21204:14
once 21130:19 21135:25 21136:10 21136:11 21286:4
onder 21180:14 21215:5 21228:7 21229:5 21233:22 21239:2 21240:17 21251:1,4 21265:11 21265:21
ondervinding 21160:24
onduidelikheid 21151:3
ones 21132:16 21145:10 21266:9
one's 21234:19
ongelukkig 21225:21
onmiddellik 21265:13
onmoontlik 21157:12 21161:1
onsself 21240:22
onsuksesvol 21256:10
onthou 21197:21 21203:1 21205:15 21208:4 21210:14,14 21212:5 21216:5 21219:8 21221:11 21224:6 21225:3 21227:25 21229:20 21231:2 21242:21 21250:2,3,4 21254:23 21265:5,16
ontmoedig 21216:23,25
ontmoet 21214:1
ontwyk 21265:3
onwards 21234:5
oog 21223:19
oogpunt 21233:20
ooit 21188:21
ook 21134:1 21141:3,8 21149:5,6,9 21153:11 21156:25 21157:2 21163:13 21172:7,12 21172:24 21178:5 21180:4 21181:13 21185:4 21196:24 21199:14 21208:11 21211:8 21213:16 21215:14 21217:2,18 21219:2 21223:25 21224:14 21225:17 21227:3,10 21229:13 21238:24 21239:3,11 21244:2,2 21251:3 21257:3 21258:5
oomblik 21150:18
oop 21163:10 21207:19
oor 21154:22 21155:1 21155:16 21159:5 21161:9 21168:19 21200:1,8 21205:25 21213:24 21218:15 21218:16 21226:8 21246:10 21253:12 21254:24 21265:18
oordra 21176:9 21199:13 21211:22
ooreengekom 21223:8
oorgaan 21155:9 21235:1
oorgegaan 21141:21 21157:23 21265:13
oorgegee 21170:18 21184:21
oorgeneem 21220:14
opdrag 21153:23 21154:9 21159:3,4 21193:19 21205:6,7 21213:2 21216:10,20 21229:9 21238:24 21242:23 21251:3
opdragte 21180:5,18 21218:19,25 21219:1 21227:5 21253:12
open 21128:15 21133:1 21133:8 21224:21 21247:5
openbaar 21223:20
openbare 21156:10 21157:20 21158:14 21160:2,25 21161:24 21162:1 21174:23 21181:12 21183:25 21207:13 21209:25 21216:16 21221:18 21221:19 21239:9 21242:2
opened 21189:13
opening 21132:24
opens 21139:21 21181:6
operasie 21156:3 21223:25 21227:6 21233:16
operasioneel 21195:9 21205:5 21239:4 21244:19 21265:2
operasionele 21138:24 21157:13 21159:6 21221:17 21225:18 21225:18 21230:13 21252:2
operate 21301:19
operation 21170:20 21174:4 21197:18 21204:24 21205:18 21205:23 21206:4,25 21212:12,23 21213:7 21213:12 21225:13 21232:25 21234:12 21254:11 21264:21 21282:25 21301:5,6,8
operational 21168:15 21175:22 21176:12 21178:20 21179:15 21180:15 21193:4 21202:14 21208:18 21228:25 21282:21 21299:25 21300:4
operationally 21171:13 21300:24
operations 21205:17 21280:15
operators 21134:18
opgebou 21199:16
opgebreek 21142:25 21219:14,19 21229:13 21255:4,6
opgestel 21156:3
opgetel 21149:8
opgevolg 21240:21
opinie 21190:6
opinion 21185:20 21187:24
opmerking 21148:25
opportunity 21149:13 21177:16 21183:18 21184:11,16
opposed 21202:24
opposing 21148:15,20
opposite 21159:15
opsie 21149:5,9 21163:9
option 21201:2,6
options 21192:10
optog 21194:13
optogte 21160:4
optree 21265:7
opvolg 21155:13 21244:20 21265:5
oral 21233:4,11
Orde 21156:10 21157:20 21158:14 21160:2,25 21161:24 21162:1 21174:23 21181:12 21183:25 21207:13 21209:25 21216:16 21239:9 21242:2
order 21156:17 21171:20 21174:4 21221:18,19 21231:16 21241:14 21241:16 21243:3 21244:13 21257:7 21270:17 21276:5 21280:24 21294:22
orders 21226:12
ordinarily 21283:22
ordinary 21205:16 21225:12
organisation 21291:23 21291:24
organisational 21280:14
organisations 21294:2 21294:6
organised 21291:15
organisers 21291:17
orienteer 21226:7
originally 21144:22
ORS 21300:9
ouens 21228:20
ought 21171:7 21179:9 21199:20 21203:10 21204:11 21205:13 21208:1 21219:23 21227:20,21 21229:18 21275:1 21298:17
outcomes 21289:19
outomaties 21240:2
outopsieverslae 21254:25
outstanding 21173:20
overall 21212:20
oversee 21300:21
o'clock 21168:21 21169:13 21234:3,4,5 21234:6 21245:2 21301:24
o'clock 21231:9 21232:1

P

paar 21152:22 21157:11 21176:18 21221:20
paces 21183:12,14
page 21128:12,12 21159:11 21181:2,4 21193:22,23 21231:12 21272:16 21273:20 21276:9,13
pages 21128:10,10
paid 21293:17
pain 21132:18
paneel 21141:16
pangas 21144:7 21296:8
pantser 21216:24
Papa 21133:24 21135:6 21228:15 21229:6,7 21239:5 21240:1 21244:21 21253:5,9 21263:6
Papa1 21149:23 21150:2,6 21195:20 21195:21,22
Papa10 21160:23
Papa11 21159:2 21173:24 21180:20 21195:18 21245:18 21246:8,8 21247:2,14
Papa2 21161:6,7,16 21171:13 21172:14
Papa4 21161:4,5,8,16 21171:24 21172:19
Papa5 21160:23 21161:16 21162:24
paper 21232:20 21267:12,19
Pappa 21153:2 21216:21 21253:5 21254:6,13
Pappa1 21152:16
Pappa10 21153:8
Pappa11 21246:10,13
Pappa19 21150:16
Pappa2 21175:9
Pappa4 21252:19 21257:3
parade 21221:10 21223:22
paragraph 21231:11 21231:17 21247:1,1 21276:14 21294:20
paramedics 21236:20
paraphrase 21249:24
paraphrased 21252:7
pardon 21131:3 21133:24
park 21153:21
parkeer 21154:1 21159:19,21,22 21180:23,24 21253:13
parker 21157:12
part 21136:15 21153:6 21169:4,23 21177:18 21195:12 21201:5 21208:17,21,24 21231:20 21233:12 21236:21 21254:10 21283:25 21288:17 21291:14 21294:13 21297:6
particular 21155:20,23 21172:15 21247:15 21249:21 21251:13 21251:21 21254:9 21258:14 21269:8 21297:23
particularly 21234:20 21253:21
passage 21223:13 21249:25
passed 21130:4 21229:25
patently 21222:20

path 21299:20
pattern 21152:7
peace 21294:10 21297:18 21298:10 21298:17
peacefully 21294:1
pen 21141:21
perfect 21154:19 21155:19
perfecting 21169:14
perfectly 21135:2 21160:18 21161:14
perfekte 21154:25
perform 21250:14 21270:25
performed 21183:11
period 21151:13 21182:11 21198:1 21263:23 21264:4 21277:7
persele 21226:6 21227:5
persist 21165:17
persisted 21147:16
person 21133:5 21136:12 21140:6 21143:4,5 21171:13 21190:21 21212:11 21212:16 21232:13 21279:8,13 21280:3 21281:19,22 21298:21 21301:7
personal 21228:2 21271:2
personally 21250:9
persone 21135:16,18 21141:22 21156:4,8 21157:8,16 21159:20 21160:24 21161:5,6 21161:21 21179:1 21185:6 21198:24 21203:17 21205:4 21207:20 21217:1 21218:22 21226:5 21228:7,16,16 21237:9 21238:7,25 21239:2,7,8 21240:2 21240:4,16,24 21241:23,25 21244:21 21252:18 21252:20 21254:24 21256:13 21258:6 21263:4 21265:5,19 21265:20
personeel 21158:21
personnel 21226:18 21289:14
persons 21136:8
persoon 21134:10 21135:20 21140:12 21140:13,14 21223:8 21265:16
pertaining 21293:11
pertinent 21159:2
Perumal 21255:1
phase 21232:9,24,25,25
Phatsha 21146:15,23
Phatsha's 21147:6
phones 21127:4
photo 21181:25 21247:12
photograph 21129:5 21149:24,24 21177:19 21183:2,18
photographer 21190:23 21191:4
photographs 21129:1,3
phrase 21268:14
physical 21193:17
picked 21298:6
picture 21165:13 21190:17,22 21232:22 21233:2
piece 21137:24 21202:25 21210:12 21232:20
Pillay 21249:4 21273:14,15,21,24
pipe 21148:10
pistool 21184:8
Pitsi 21160:24 21162:25
plaas 21140:16
plaasgevind 21154:4,5 21160:9 21177:8 21178:7 21203:15 21223:10 21253:16
plaasvind 21151:2 21155:8
place 21213:20 21231:13 21235:13 21247:11 21248:12
placed 21156:19
placement 21250:11
places 21295:6
plan 21169:14,17,21,23 21174:9,10,18 21207:6,10,11 21209:13,18,18 21211:19 21231:11 21231:13,18,19,25 21232:8 21233:10 21234:16 21235:6,11 21235:13,23 21236:4 21236:6 21261:1,2 21267:11,22
planne 21223:17
planned 21204:11 21250:14
planning 21169:5 21170:20 21219:6 21298:3
plans 21170:8 21251:10 21267:10
play 21131:2 21133:10 21134:14 21138:2 21139:9,12,25 21140:3 21208:24
please 21127:4,16 21131:11 21136:1,5 21139:12 21190:19 21271:15,25 21286:25
plek 21151:1 21176:6 21176:19 21230:13 21232:5
plus 21141:23 21142:17 21146:5
poging 21217:9 21258:11
pogings 21220:21 21256:11 21259:5
point 21127:7 21128:17 21129:2 21130:25 21131:2 21133:9,18 21137:6,25 21139:6 21139:22,23 21140:23,25 21141:6 21142:9,20 21145:13 21146:4 21147:23,24 21148:4,15,21 21151:22 21152:18 21163:15 21164:6,13 21164:18,24,24 21165:3,4,4,24,25 21166:10,19 21173:6 21180:8 21182:18,21 21185:17 21187:21 21188:10,13 21189:7 21192:5 21201:3,6 21208:23 21221:1,2,6 21222:16,22 21225:1 21232:12 21235:10 21241:18,18 21243:14 21246:2 21262:13 21264:9 21266:18 21268:9 21283:21 21284:20 21285:16 21286:3,18
pointed 21225:5
pointing 21145:19
points 21142:14 21148:2 21284:8 21298:2
police 21165:13 21169:5,23 21170:20 21177:18,23 21180:1 21181:11,14 21183:3 21183:3,24 21195:7 21197:24 21199:20 21200:16,17,21 21201:5 21204:21 21205:12,13,16,17 21206:4,17 21215:24 21225:2,12 21226:13 21227:8,13 21231:1 21231:15 21244:15 21245:14 21247:7 21276:14 21280:11 21281:2,5,16 21282:12 21294:9 21298:4,16,20 21299:10,15,15,20,22
policeman 21139:7,24
policing 21174:4 21226:18,21 21281:9 21298:8
policy 21298:9
polisie 21162:7 21178:11 21205:7 21207:3 21223:18 21225:21 21239:24 21265:10
polisielyn 21185:4 21207:19
polisieman 21184:10
polisiëring 21209:25 21221:18 21239:9
polisiëringslede 21158:15 21160:3 21161:24 21162:1 21181:13 21184:1 21216:17 21221:19
Polisiëringspersone 21157:20
Polisiëringsvoertuie 21242:3
Pondoland 21285:17
POP 21136:20 21167:22 21181:11 21190:4,25 21192:8 21196:21 21202:22 21203:5,9 21250:9 21281:16 21288:1 21301:15
POPS 21138:7 21183:2
POP's 21250:11
posisie 21155:5 21156:5 21180:22 21224:11 21230:22
posisies 21163:1 21179:2
positiefs 21203:20
positiewe 21203:18
position 21128:13 21139:4,9 21148:17 21149:25 21150:1 21151:11,11 21152:5 21152:8 21163:24 21164:4,14 21171:24 21222:8 21228:24 21233:3,3 21279:17 21279:20 21280:11
positions 21148:16 21149:22 21233:2
possibilities 21136:18
possible 21136:17,23 21210:4 21291:13
possibly 21133:19 21135:3 21164:11 21288:24 21293:5
post 21297:23
Potchefstroom 21299:4 21300:16,21 21301:16,17
praat 21128:20 21134:6 21189:25 21193:8 21198:21 21215:25 21252:14 21257:23,25
prakties 21159:25
praktiese 21158:20
praktyk 21262:24
precinct 21294:22
precisely 21191:24 21252:6
preclude 21175:5
precluding 21177:18 21177:20
prefer 21278:25
preliminary 21285:22
premises 21127:19
prepare 21234:11,17
prepared 21263:21 21268:10 21269:6 21271:15
preparing 21233:9 21234:11
prescripts 21227:12,15
present 21127:12 21132:16,17 21150:7 21164:11 21167:22 21204:10 21284:3,16 21288:23
presentation 21149:13
president 21231:14
presies 21154:24 21161:2 21226:9 21246:19 21252:12 21254:6
presiese 21180:11
presumably 21164:3 21269:19
presume 21147:22 21295:22
prevails 21297:18 21298:11,18
prevent 21162:17
prevented 21175:11 21183:23 21243:10
preventing 21160:19 21294:22
prevention 21281:4,5
prevents 21177:23
previous 21173:21 21176:24 21206:9 21274:1 21289:10
previously 21249:19
pre-planned 21208:8
Prinsloo 21210:11
prior 21142:12
private 21224:4,20 21249:23 21250:15 21250:20 21251:4,15
probabilities 21146:7
probeer 21159:24 21160:6 21179:22 21198:6 21199:6,16 21220:21 21238:9 21265:8
problem 21131:13,15 21131:15,19 21132:22 21149:23 21149:25 21151:15 21235:22 21246:1 21249:9 21278:13 21285:7 21287:5 21290:13,14,19,20 21291:18,23 21292:24 21293:23

21294:8
problems 21127:11,14
procedure 21244:24
proceed 21131:5 21133:5 21148:4 21184:18 21188:10 21189:8 21192:5 21201:5 21248:5,16 21274:3 21276:7 21285:8 21286:1 21287:8
proceeded 21215:20 21246:5 21247:11 21291:20
proceeding 21201:1 21264:21 21285:7
proceedings 21127:1 21278:25
produce 21210:23
professional 21270:25 21299:9
professionally 21297:17 21298:17
profitably 21285:24
progress 21148:19
progressively 21130:3
prohibit 21226:13
prohibited 21138:14
promise 21260:7,8
promised 21294:4
promote 21241:15
proper 21197:17 21260:22 21262:3 21278:24
properly 21165:15 21176:3
property 21175:12 21277:12 21282:4 21294:23
proposal 21157:6 21248:15
propose 21285:20
proposed 21174:8,16 21192:22 21209:7 21248:5
proposing 21166:25
proposisie 21157:3 21161:1 21263:4
proposition 21141:11 21141:11 21147:15 21156:15,24 21167:12 21182:8 21188:19
proses 21229:11 21244:23
protect 21247:3 21248:6,16
protection 21173:24 21174:1
protesters 21174:9 21247:4,5,19,22
protestors 21128:14 21130:22 21139:3 21156:18
prove 21164:15
provided 21200:22
province 21277:2 21280:11
Provincial 21202:2 21215:11 21276:18 21277:2 21280:7 21283:12 21296:14 21300:3,7,8
Provinsiale 21215:1
provoke 21189:8
prudent 21199:2,10 21204:24
public 21174:4 21221:24 21222:11 21222:18,21,24 21223:12,15 21265:18 21284:24 21294:3
publicly 21294:3
pulls 21132:24
punched 21275:7
punt 21128:21 21141:17 21179:19 21190:1 21226:6
punte 21194:14
purpose 21145:12 21230:17 21283:24 21286:8
purposes 21137:4 21150:7 21179:10
pursued 21222:4
push 21130:25 21133:20 21134:6 21135:5 21257:22,24
pushed 21137:8 21140:8 21258:14,23
put 21128:11 21129:23 21130:1,13 21131:11 21131:20 21148:6,16 21160:14,17 21162:16 21182:8 21184:17 21186:18 21187:6 21188:3,14 21188:16 21195:25 21196:5 21200:25 21201:3 21209:1 21217:11 21244:15 21250:18 21251:23 21256:14 21272:9 21275:8,21 21291:12 21297:2
puts 21182:23
putting 21129:6 21130:9 21141:5,11 21153:15 21156:16 21159:9 21259:18 21262:13 21283:21 21284:6,8,23 21285:11
P10 21153:4
P19 21153:4

Q

qualification 21150:8
quarter 21215:10 21245:4,5
question 21144:16 21145:9 21147:14,17 21149:19 21152:12 21163:19 21181:23 21182:7 21186:17 21187:23 21188:3 21222:19 21238:3,14 21238:15 21239:16 21244:12 21248:19 21256:15 21264:8,17 21264:24 21267:9 21269:8 21284:7 21291:12
questioned 21165:8 21291:10 21292:12
questioning 21225:1 21227:24 21285:1 21292:21
questions 21151:22 21164:13 21166:12 21166:12,18 21171:2 21224:3 21227:20 21231:7 21245:2,3 21259:14,18 21260:1 21260:13,13,14 21266:9,14,14,16 21268:2,23 21269:6 21269:13,14,17,19 21283:22 21284:7
quite 21136:8

R

raak 21140:18 21227:5 21253:4
radio 21220:22 21247:2,6 21267:23
railway 21296:1,11
raised 21189:7 21214:3 21222:19 21285:16
ran 21147:5,9,12,12
rang 21224:11
ranks 21276:18
rapport 21196:24
rapporte 21239:10
rapporteer 21221:18
rash 21221:25 21222:7 21222:17
rasionaal 21265:7
RDOs 21293:4,7
reached 21152:8 21166:14,15
reacting 21266:3
reaction 21219:10 21265:25 21266:1,2
reacts 21133:18
read 21231:17 21247:1 21297:25
reading 21283:23,25
reads 21298:2
reaksie 21140:14 21263:9 21265:22
real 21262:3
realisable 21172:9 21194:4 21208:9
realise 21241:4
realised 21241:13,19
really 21139:23 21164:7 21185:16 21190:14 21191:7,8 21283:20 21286:9
rearrange 21180:8
reason 21129:21 21130:10,12,16,20,23 21130:24 21164:2,19 21206:4 21243:16 21260:21
reasonable 21263:23 21264:3,4,6,7,8,10,22
reasonably 21181:25
reasons 21186:12 21284:21
recall 21156:21 21192:22 21221:8 21222:16 21224:5 21229:19 21237:22 21288:16
receive 21250:7 21269:6,20
received 21247:2,6 21279:7 21281:18
recognise 21276:10
recognised 21292:14
record 21139:14 21144:21 21148:4 21208:23 21222:5 21260:13 21272:9 21278:24 21284:1,4 21284:23
recorded 21251:21 21298:1
recording 21223:3
recovered 21144:6
recruit 21292:24
recruiting 21292:4,11
recruitment 21292:5 21292:13
rectangle 21272:16
red 21156:22,23 21278:1,2
rede 21203:22 21205:25
redes 21154:25 21162:5 21204:12 21218:17
reduced 21134:19 21267:12
reeds 21129:16 21134:3 21150:24 21178:25 21209:20 21215:14,14 21217:18 21218:16
refer 21277:10
reference 21168:21 21209:13 21210:10 21222:5,22 21234:2 21281:13
referred 21145:7 21182:10 21231:8,10 21231:19 21249:19
referring 21137:22 21189:15 21200:10 21200:24 21201:7 21281:2,3 21298:12
reflected 21247:12
refresh 21188:18 21197:7
reg 21143:9 21144:14 21149:2 21157:12 21159:2 21174:13 21175:7 21179:12 21193:8 21212:5 21213:1 21214:7,8 21246:10
regard 21129:21 21244:7 21250:10
regarded 21264:22
regarding 21237:6 21266:17
regs 21149:1,5 21194:25 21195:24
regstelling 21134:4 21156:1
regte 21185:7,10
regterkant 21195:23
regtig 21268:1
reguit 21154:1
rekenaar 21170:12
rekkie 21193:17
rekord 21155:11
relate 21277:6 21295:23
related 21202:20 21295:23
relates 21199:19
relating 21168:10 21200:4 21210:11 21250:20 21251:14
relation 21132:9 21173:7 21206:8 21230:25 21251:14 21252:4
relationship 21199:6
relatives 21132:16
relayed 21225:23
relevance 21286:1
relevant 21163:17 21165:9,10 21173:21 21273:19
relied 21233:11
reluctant 21206:3
rely 21130:10
remain 21294:22
remainder 21255:20
remember 21146:24 21192:20 21197:20 21199:24 21200:3 21202:25 21205:14 21208:3 21210:12 21212:12 21215:22 21219:6,24 21222:4 21225:2 21227:23 21232:22 21235:5,8 21239:16 21249:25 21250:1 21252:8 21260:18 21266:19 21288:25 21292:9
remind 21127:3 21195:17 21212:16 21298:21

remote 21146:7
remove 21183:15
repeat 21131:24 21159:16 21182:15 21208:7
repeated 21165:5 21182:22 21278:19
rephrasing 21200:6
reply 21269:15
report 21149:14 21241:15 21289:6,13
representation 21151:8
representing 21288:8
request 21295:1,4
requested 21281:15 21289:18 21294:21 21297:15
requests 21269:4
require 21270:9
required 21176:2
requires 21269:7 21275:12
res 21150:17 21255:14
resemblance 21218:5
resources 21193:11,15 21227:11 21281:2 21282:13 21286:9 21295:18
respect 21127:16 21222:14 21249:22 21259:3 21260:16 21261:18,20,21,23
respectfully 21262:18
respective 21177:17
respek 21218:13 21268:19
respond 21184:4 21261:22,25 21263:24 21264:3,6 21264:23 21298:25
responded 21176:25
responding 21147:4
respons 21184:7
response 21133:11,13 21145:15 21152:11 21281:7 21282:21 21286:14 21287:2 21295:3 21299:25 21300:4
responsibilities 21250:10
responsibility 21298:22
responsible 21165:9 21231:20 21250:8
rest 21221:24
result 21171:18 21244:16 21258:13 21283:3
resulted 21279:22
resumes 21127:2 21173:13,14 21221:3 21221:4 21245:8,9 21271:5,6 21287:13 21287:14
retaliation 21136:20
retreat 21162:2
return 21269:11
reverse 21128:19 21129:9,25 21130:4 21140:7,20 21141:12 21148:12
revert 21138:1
re-examination 21167:4,5 21173:18 21182:13 21231:5
right 21136:8 21139:6 21139:15,23 21141:1 21147:7 21151:10 21158:8 21167:14 21168:3 21184:12 21185:22 21192:15 21194:1 21201:8 21206:12 21223:5 21236:24 21237:7 21241:5,9 21242:14 21245:19 21253:20 21254:21 21256:5 21276:3,4,15,20 21277:8 21278:23 21279:5,10 21282:5 21282:15,25 21283:4 21286:6,20 21288:6,9 21289:7,20 21292:23 21295:9,19 21301:6
rights 21301:5
right-hand 21149:18 21274:14
rigting 21142:4 21180:6 21184:9 21194:24 21216:25 21252:22 21255:17 21258:16,21,22
rigtings 21194:25 21217:3 21255:6
rise 21234:19
risks 21207:16
riverbed 21254:15
road 21296:1
rods 21144:7
roepseine 21253:13
roete 21194:12 21227:4
roetes 21193:7 21208:12 21227:1
role 21250:14
roles 21250:10
Roll 21136:1
rollout 21213:12
rondom 21215:6 21242:3
rondtes 21138:23
rook 21258:5
room 21269:17
roughly 21255:24
round 21139:1
rounded 21128:16 21129:3
rounds 21138:23 21258:8
route 21180:1
row 21136:9,11 21137:13
rubber 21138:8,10,11 21138:14,18,19,21,23 21138:23 21258:8
rule 21127:9,15,17
rules 21127:21 21250:13,19,19 21251:14
run 21140:21 21147:15 21147:22
running 21247:5
Rustenburg 21281:9
rustig 21134:8 21219:3
ry 21254:6
Ryland 21228:19,22
rêrig 21250:24,24

S

saam 21141:9 21142:23 21153:22 21174:22 21211:1 21214:25 21218:3 21234:24 21235:18 21244:25 21254:18
saamgestem 21156:14
saamstel 21135:24
safe 21234:9
sagte 21239:7
sal 21142:4 21144:3 21145:4 21150:12 21153:9 21154:7 21158:14,20,21 21159:20,25 21160:2 21161:10,13,21 21162:25 21168:17 21172:1 21174:1,6,22 21175:14 21176:7,8 21178:6,8 21181:16 21182:3 21184:15 21185:9 21193:7,13 21195:9 21196:23 21199:12,14 21200:7 21201:13 21205:3,5,6 21206:7 21208:10 21212:21 21216:25 21219:2 21220:19,21 21227:15,16 21232:5 21232:10 21234:25 21236:5 21238:23 21239:4,4 21240:1 21250:24 21253:10 21254:23 21256:10 21261:13,14 21265:3 21265:10
salaries 21292:18 21293:12
samestelling 21170:12
samewerking 21224:12 21224:15 21225:9 21226:10 21265:12 21268:13
SAPS 21155:21
satisfactorily 21130:14
satisfactory 21234:2
satisfied 21292:22
Save 21137:6
saw 21127:6 21136:11 21136:11,15,16 21137:1,10,16 21139:4 21142:17 21145:17 21185:17 21186:9,15 21213:12 21213:20 21214:18 21215:22 21216:8 21222:25 21223:1 21234:18 21296:7
saying 21130:10,12,17 21151:5 21187:5 21188:2 21209:3 21215:12 21223:14 21224:3 21248:11 21255:18 21260:20 21263:20 21273:14 21292:10,12
says 21146:23 21147:19 21151:25 21154:12 21164:10 21165:7 21166:20 21186:19 21190:14 21191:16 21210:4 21266:21 21273:11 21274:11 21278:16 21279:24
scenario 21171:7
scene 21142:13 21143:6,10,11,16 21144:5,23,24 21145:1,8 21147:13 21148:2,3 21163:17 21164:12 21177:5 21212:1,12 21213:12 21213:22 21214:12 21214:18 21215:8,20 21216:2,3 21217:13 21220:14 21229:1 21236:15,18,19,21 21246:4 21247:11 21252:6 21261:20,21 21261:24 21263:22
schooling 21224:3
scientific 21145:23 21183:13
Scott 21169:13 21170:4 21232:11,15 21234:20 21260:25 21261:6
Scott's 21154:12
screen 21128:11 21139:24 21193:12 21260:17 21297:24 21297:24
screenshot 21181:4
se 21152:21 21198:4,5 21203:17 21226:6 21252:22 21253:2 21256:24
search 21197:18 21198:13,16,19 21199:10 21234:12
searches 21298:4
searching 21250:13
seated 21195:18 21272:3
second 21127:6 21130:23 21234:14 21264:19 21273:10 21273:17
seconds 21128:14 21129:2 21130:23 21132:3,12,13 21133:8,10,11,12 21137:25 21138:1 21139:5,18,19,20 21142:15,15 21176:25 21181:3,5,5 21189:12
secret 21200:23
section 21142:14
sections 21249:15
security 21225:23 21226:18 21227:12 21282:2 21289:2,14
seeing 21190:3 21220:25 21296:25 21301:8
seeking 21182:18
seen 21127:8 21148:6 21160:16 21183:3 21189:4 21190:15 21191:13 21196:16 21215:23
seer 21153:20 21154:17 21157:18 21158:19 21161:23 21220:21 21238:8
sees 21136:10 21152:4 21191:12,13,15,16
Segune 21186:25 21187:15
seker 21153:22 21177:21 21193:15 21230:15 21246:14 21252:11
sekere 21223:18 21228:21
sekerlik 21153:20 21154:17 21157:18 21158:19 21161:23 21220:21 21238:8
sekondes 21129:11,16 21134:5 21150:14,20 21150:20,21,23,24,24 21150:25 21151:1 21152:22 21156:7 21157:11 21161:2 21176:10,18,19 21180:13 21256:18
seksie 21158:25
seksielede 21211:22
self 21134:9 21141:16 21153:1 21167:25 21180:23 21185:3,25 21193:12,13 21224:4 21224:20 21226:8 21230:7 21243:19 21249:22 21251:14 21263:5
selfs 21129:14,15 21134:8,9 21143:1 21172:6 21223:17

self-defence 21251:3
semi 21269:12
send 21281:16 21298:20
senior 21153:5,8 21162:24 21164:11 21220:4,14,16 21254:9 21260:1
sense 21130:3 21131:1 21142:10,10,20 21145:18,20
sensible 21244:12
sentence 21285:13,13
sentrum 21225:18,19
sequential 21269:11,12
series 21245:14
seriousness 21283:3
served 21276:23
service 21245:15 21282:12,21 21299:10,15,15,20
Services 21299:23,25 21300:5
ses 21134:5
session 21295:22
set 21148:16 21277:5 21282:24
settlement 21237:6
seven 21138:1
sewe 21150:14,21
share 21285:23
shared 21230:16
sheet 21274:11 21275:24
she'd 21285:14
she's 21278:9
shooter 21137:22
shooting 21135:4 21138:7 21195:15 21196:1,2,6,7,12,16 21196:21 21212:7 21213:21 21215:20
short 21222:22 21266:1 21270:10
Shortly 21178:2
shot 21132:25 21133:17 21135:3 21136:10,11,18 21144:22,24,25 21145:10,11,16 21224:19 21279:23
shotgun 21144:23
shotguns 21138:8
shotist 21136:19,21 21137:19
shotists 21137:13,14
shots 21211:25 21229:25 21266:22 21267:6
shoulders 21298:22
show 21127:20 21131:1 21157:25 21158:4 21173:5 21295:6
showed 21155:20 21235:24
shown 21133:15 21134:25 21136:3,6 21138:4 21140:1 21295:22,24 21298:2
shows 21128:12 21158:2,8
sick 21279:4 21280:8 21283:7
sidder 21219:16
side 21134:23,23 21139:7,8,24 21294:5 21299:12,23,24
sideways 21135:18
sien 21129:16 21134:6 21134:6,11 21135:12 21135:14,14,15,15,21 21140:12,13,16 21141:22 21142:4 21150:13 21155:15 21158:17 21162:22 21178:6,8 21179:19 21182:3 21188:22 21190:1 21193:7 21209:23 21216:24 21253:7 21256:11,24 21267:15
sig 21181:17
sigbaar 21135:13 21141:15
sight 21189:1
signature 21276:11
signed 21285:12 21298:11
significant 21151:13
signs 21127:7,8
silence 21208:25
similar 21165:12 21183:16
simpatie 21268:21
simply 21132:8 21136:23 21138:2 21142:16 21143:24 21145:15 21151:5,23 21153:24 21159:9 21275:25 21283:23 21285:10
simultaneous 21269:24
sin 21179:7 21216:21 21226:3,25 21240:15 21240:20
Sinclair 21226:1,4 21227:1 21288:24 21289:2,21,23,25
Sir 21271:19 21276:12 21276:16 21277:9 21279:25 21281:11 21281:20 21282:10 21282:22 21283:5,9 21283:14 21288:2,6 21288:18 21291:8 21295:2 21300:14
sit 21161:10,20 21176:7 21176:20 21199:8 21218:18 21223:17 21228:21 21265:5,6,7 21265:19 21294:4
sitplek 21195:24
sitting 21146:16
situasie 21203:21 21239:10
situation 21162:8 21282:14 21283:3 21286:10 21289:6 21297:1 21298:10
six 21130:22 21133:10 21133:12 21234:3,4,4 21234:6
six-oh 21249:11
Sjoe 21176:5
skare 21194:24
skeidslyn 21207:2
skerm 21261:4
skietery 21151:2 21214:10 21238:11
skietvoorval 21214:7 21238:11 21243:1
skoene 21149:8
skoot 21134:8,9,10 21135:17,21
skreeu 21218:22 21228:20
skryf 21251:2 21252:2
skuiling 21135:20
sleeping 21197:25
sleutel 21226:5
slide 21128:11 21134:15 21136:17 21136:24 21141:19 21144:10 21149:11 21149:12,16,16,16,18 21150:23 21158:6,7,8 21160:15 21165:11 21166:4 21171:4,5 21173:1,5,6,7,20,21 21173:22 21176:22 21176:24 21180:9 21181:2 21232:23 21250:7,18 21251:22
slides 21141:18 21150:9,11 21160:15 21163:20 21164:6 21165:14 21181:1 21182:10 21232:23 21236:3,6
slightly 21129:4
slow 21134:20 21140:3
slower 21136:13 21137:15
small 21129:8 21179:17
smaller 21142:11,21 21231:15
smash 21159:23
sodat 21239:25
sodoende 21216:22 21229:10
sodra 21265:9
soft 21187:19
softness 21187:12
soliede 21157:19 21161:11
solution 21294:12
solved 21293:23
somebody 21220:5 21227:21
someone's 21132:21
soontoe 21207:13 21239:11
soort 21159:23
soos 21129:13 21134:12,13 21150:19 21154:6 21158:15 21180:13 21197:10 21199:7 21219:3 21220:20 21223:20 21226:2 21239:1 21243:25 21244:2 21253:11 21257:14 21265:15 21265:19
sorry 21129:19 21131:4 21135:25 21149:17 21151:4 21160:15 21166:9 21181:18 21186:5,6 21188:11,11,12 21190:7 21195:21 21203:24 21204:2 21214:21 21237:2 21238:13 21239:12 21241:14 21249:4 21256:14 21264:2 21270:16 21272:8 21274:18 21277:17 21283:19 21290:18 21291:8
sort 21162:17
sorts 21127:10
sought 21166:3 21202:20
sound 21131:8,17 21132:18 21133:19 21248:7,18 21269:20
sounded 21281:19
sounds 21145:23 21146:8 21148:14 21163:15 21248:1 21285:11
soundtrack 21278:18
South 21282:12
sowel 21163:8
so-called 21200:13
space 21159:8
spaces 21177:19
spasie 21134:2 21135:17 21157:15 21158:18,18 21159:20 21161:10 21163:10 21207:19
spasies 21142:4 21158:17 21160:2
speak 21169:14 21223:12 21279:3 21280:18
speaking 21163:24 21270:23 21278:9 21285:9
spears 21144:7 21296:8
specific 21164:9 21249:22
specifically 21158:4
speculate 21185:20
speculation 21136:23
speculative 21261:20
speech 21222:15,24 21239:17
speed 21134:19 21138:2 21284:20
speel 21134:5
spend 21269:24
spent 21163:15 21191:23 21192:2 21233:9 21269:22,25
spesiaal 21268:17
spesifiek 21254:13
spesifieke 21180:17 21244:18 21253:12 21263:18
spieëltjies 21159:22
spoed 21140:11
spoke 21223:2
spoken 21181:20
spontaneously 21175:18 21176:13
spot 21143:18
sprayed 21177:11 21256:16,21
spraying 21247:4
sprekers 21185:5
spring 21161:10
SS3 21231:21 21236:3
staak 21239:1
staan 21150:25 21156:11 21192:18 21193:16 21236:4
stadiger 21140:11
stadium 21129:17 21134:8 21143:1 21150:15 21154:8,20 21163:3,6 21170:25 21174:1 21178:9 21196:14 21198:22 21201:17 21203:12 21204:15,18 21211:16 21217:1,7 21224:24 21229:8 21230:7,13 21239:5 21243:25 21248:23 21248:25 21251:7 21253:7,14
stage 21130:1 21154:14 21168:21 21182:12 21182:15 21183:9 21187:24 21202:23 21203:10 21204:5,6 21205:14 21246:7 21248:9 21252:7 21272:20 21287:11 21301:22
stages 21170:8
stampede 21134:13 21142:3
stance 21148:18
stand 21197:8 21209:5 21235:5 21271:15

standard 21250:6,21
standing 21190:9,18,24 21191:4 21226:12
stap 21265:8
stappe 21230:15 21240:23
start 21132:4,19 21139:17 21163:21 21167:13 21276:8 21277:18
started 21143:23 21235:10 21279:9 21290:12 21291:23 21292:2,4
starting 21139:15,16 21139:18
starts 21133:19
state 21245:22 21281:19
statement 21145:15 21202:5 21209:12 21210:10 21231:8 21232:21 21245:23 21246:25 21249:7 21266:17,22 21272:23 21283:24 21283:25 21285:13 21285:18,21 21286:19 21289:18 21294:21
statements 21221:25 21245:14 21246:3
staties 21252:25
station 21280:24 21281:2
stationary 21137:15
status 21210:8
stedelike 21156:4 21194:13
steeds 21134:7 21158:21 21159:24 21159:25 21160:11 21161:25 21174:11 21175:8 21213:2 21265:20
stel 21203:20 21207:3 21233:7
stelling 21265:17
stem 21141:8 21142:23 21148:8,9,10 21219:2 21234:24 21235:18 21244:25
step 21296:2
STF 21130:4 21156:21 21172:5 21221:18
stilgestaan 21184:20
stop 21135:1 21136:13 21138:5 21140:2,13 21141:7 21153:21 21160:8 21161:3 21179:23 21182:5,14 21184:12 21212:23 21213:6,11 21223:3 21239:8,25
stopped 21156:18
stopping 21140:4,5
story 21186:25
strange 21285:12
strategic 21297:13 21298:7
strategiese 21223:17
strategy 21208:18
strengthen 21191:16
strike 21279:10,22 21289:24
striker 21184:8
strikers 21128:15,19 21133:14,18 21150:1 21150:5 21151:12,15 21151:23 21161:17 21162:10 21167:12 21167:18 21168:10 21169:1,11,19 21170:16,21 21179:10,16 21181:7 21181:11,15,19 21182:7,20 21183:2 21183:19 21184:12 21184:17 21187:22 21189:1,15,22 21190:22 21197:19 21197:24,25 21199:23 21206:3,16 21207:4 21231:13 21233:3 21239:22 21240:6 21241:19 21242:14 21253:20 21261:22 21265:23 21279:23 21282:4
striking 21160:19
study 21177:5
stuff 21146:11
stun 21256:16 21257:6
stuns 21258:4
Subject 21150:7
submit 21152:6,6
submitted 21290:25
subordinates 21219:23 21220:3
subsequent 21165:14
substantially 21137:5
substituted 21138:17
succeed 21259:4
succeeded 21148:2
success 21301:8
suffer 21191:17
sufficient 21206:17 21300:9
sufficiently 21211:19
suggest 21132:19 21134:14 21135:2 21143:24 21148:21 21164:17 21166:16 21203:9 21204:5 21210:17 21221:23
suggested 21156:19 21166:8 21182:11 21199:19 21202:22 21208:24 21211:24 21219:4 21222:12 21227:20 21240:11
suggesting 21161:15 21166:13 21207:25
suggestion 21197:17 21205:12 21278:19
suggests 21229:18
suidelike 21258:21,22
suksesvol 21217:1
suksesvolle 21229:6
summarised 21251:22
summarising 21151:17
Sun 21225:17
Sunday 21289:14
supplementary 21249:7
Supported 21187:10
supporting 21250:8
suppose 21246:23 21270:7
supposed 21171:6 21236:18,19 21237:5 21237:14 21277:20 21277:21 21299:2
sure 21134:19 21136:23 21146:9 21151:6 21182:11 21186:6 21188:9 21222:15 21257:5 21270:23 21279:19 21283:24
surely 21234:16,19
surface 21293:20
surprise 21233:12,14
surprised 21233:8
surprising 21234:20 21235:14
surrender 21185:18 21227:23
surrounded 21227:22 21236:17 21237:18 21237:22 21238:16 21239:14,21 21242:4 21242:11,14,17,19 21243:5,9,11,13
suspect 21213:21
sustained 21143:17
swear 21271:11,12,15
sweeping 21250:12
sweet 21194:14
switch 21131:12 21278:9
sy 21159:3 21170:12 21185:7 21209:24 21211:22 21212:3 21223:25 21226:4 21233:17,20 21236:6 21236:6 21261:4 21267:23
system 21265:18
sê 21129:13 21135:16 21135:19 21140:15 21140:17 21142:24 21150:14 21154:1 21155:7 21156:1 21157:19 21159:24 21161:2,20,25 21163:1,3,5 21177:20 21184:15 21188:20 21198:7,15 21200:1,7 21201:13,16 21203:18,19,20 21206:7 21209:23 21218:15 21221:20 21225:25 21228:6,18 21228:21 21229:8,12 21234:7 21235:2,15 21239:1,2 21240:24 21243:20 21251:5 21253:2 21255:16 21256:10,18 21257:17 21258:4 21259:9 21260:24 21261:1,14 21263:1 21263:16 21264:13 21265:9 21268:19,20

T

taak 21193:12,18
tactical 21172:7 21192:10 21201:1,6 21216:12
take 21127:23,23 21136:22 21137:16 21137:25 21142:11 21145:13,13,23 21148:3 21150:2,6 21171:25 21172:14 21172:20 21173:3,5,7 21173:9,11 21178:21 21185:21 21188:10 21192:5 21202:7 21221:2 21222:23 21232:13 21236:11 21245:4 21252:7 21264:2 21268:5 21269:14,16 21270:1 21270:10 21271:3,16 21284:5,24 21287:10 21287:11
taken 21153:16 21190:23 21201:24 21202:2 21231:12
takes 21148:18 21163:22
taktiese 21221:19 21250:25
talk 21178:21 21180:16 21196:22 21277:19 21280:3 21294:6,8
talking 21134:21 21153:3 21162:10 21182:1 21190:10 21202:1 21218:12 21221:15 21242:10 21274:21 21277:19 21277:22,23 21300:2
tally 21143:24,25
target 21221:14
tea 21173:3,5,8,11 21287:10,11
teams 21250:8,17
teargas 21130:21 21147:4 21256:15 21257:6
teatime 21275:1,5
technology 21278:7
teen 21157:15 21158:19 21159:21 21159:22,23 21203:22 21204:17 21212:4 21235:2
teenmekaar 21159:19
teenwoordig 21207:4
teken 21163:12
tel 21135:23 21141:20
telephone 21283:11 21286:5
television 21214:12
tell 21136:7 21144:9 21164:8 21165:22 21166:11 21167:13 21185:16 21196:2,7 21196:11 21197:2 21212:1 21220:18 21228:12 21266:25 21273:14 21276:14 21277:15 21279:4 21280:1 21281:8 21283:11 21286:14 21288:8,19 21289:24 21294:21 21296:19 21296:21
telling 21222:9,11 21286:3 21292:21
tells 21192:15 21279:21 21282:2,19 21288:12 21289:9
ten 21129:2 21149:3 21152:21 21242:21 21264:7
tensy 21162:3
term 21251:1
terme 21138:24 21159:6 21160:4 21251:4
terminologie 21251:5
terminology 21134:22
terms 21170:8 21176:1 21192:19 21193:1 21292:19 21297:4 21298:8
terrein 21263:8
terug 21150:20 21162:2 21199:14 21211:22 21214:15 21265:8
terugbeweeg 21156:13
teruggaan 21211:7
teruggekom 21201:14 21207:9 21211:15
terugvoer 21199:15 21201:17,18 21203:18
terwyl 21214:14
testified 21146:16 21186:1
testifying 21269:23
testing 21164:22
thank 21128:6 21132:2 21144:12 21166:23

21167:3,5 21173:19 21183:6 21188:4 21192:7 21221:7 21231:6 21236:14 21249:2,10 21252:3 21259:8,13 21260:6 21266:11 21268:4,24 21270:20 21272:4 21276:6 21287:21
thanks 21146:25 21271:2 21285:5
that's 21127:9,15 21130:23 21136:15 21136:22 21137:9,16 21140:25 21142:18 21144:15 21146:4,7 21147:8 21148:13 21151:15 21159:14 21164:15 21176:23 21181:6 21183:12 21186:2 21190:16 21193:23 21200:23 21204:1 21233:5 21236:10,24 21242:14 21247:20 21249:24 21264:18 21264:23,25 21268:5 21270:6 21272:10 21273:12,13,25 21274:2 21275:19 21276:3 21278:18 21281:9 21284:10 21285:6,14 21286:11 21288:6,11 21290:7 21296:23 21300:7
theme 21205:12
theory 21169:10 21208:6
thereabouts 21256:5 21257:10
there's 21129:21 21130:9,11 21131:21 21135:5 21136:1,9,17 21137:23 21140:24 21142:9,14,20 21146:12 21152:7 21182:10,22 21231:7 21273:3 21278:5 21283:24 21284:7,18 21284:22 21300:8
they'd 21200:22
they're 21131:20,22 21144:8 21158:7 21162:8 21284:16,16
they've 21127:21 21131:6,15 21222:9
thing 21131:21 21132:13 21222:17 21224:5 21290:24 21293:1 21301:9
things 21127:13 21144:8 21165:7 21185:15 21188:16 21191:15,16 21222:17 21259:21 21284:20 21293:25 21296:9
thinking 21245:17 21293:10
thinks 21284:23
third 21134:19 21192:14 21248:12
thought 21138:11 21144:22 21182:4,6 21217:21 21239:13 21239:18 21241:19 21243:5,13
threatened 21205:17
threats 21205:11,21
three 21181:21 21190:9 21190:18
throw 21163:19 21173:1
thrust 21202:7 21209:2 21210:16 21224:3
Thursday 21201:2,6,24 21202:6,21 21206:12 21231:9 21232:1 21245:16
tight 21128:23
time 21129:6 21130:25 21133:8,9,18 21134:15 21151:14 21152:14,14 21163:15,17 21164:11,12 21170:8 21173:4 21176:2,14 21177:6 21179:14,25 21180:7,16 21182:19 21191:22,25 21195:6 21196:11 21197:1,12 21202:24 21210:10 21211:11,18 21215:3 21215:19 21217:5 21228:3 21229:1 21234:2,4,5,17 21260:22 21261:9 21264:3,6,7,8,10,22 21266:1 21269:22,25 21279:4 21280:4 21281:6 21283:12,15 21285:24 21287:7 21289:7 21297:4 21299:21
timelines 21176:2
times 21164:15 21165:10 21291:23 21298:19
tipe 21238:7 21265:12 21267:24
tjopper 21215:6
tjoppers 21215:17
today 21151:17 21191:11
toe 21129:12,18 21134:8 21142:6 21151:1 21154:21,25 21155:3 21156:13 21157:5,7 21158:23 21162:2 21174:11 21178:25 21188:22 21201:14 21203:19 21207:19 21209:19 21211:7 21212:19 21214:6,9,9,15 21216:15,20 21218:18 21227:5 21228:5 21229:8 21235:1 21236:2 21242:1 21246:12 21252:11,13,14,18,19 21252:22,24,25 21253:2,6,7,24 21254:6,17 21255:11 21263:1 21265:8
toegelaat 21233:22
toegemaak 21158:18 21208:13
toegepas 21259:6
toemaak 21209:24
toeval 21153:25
toevallig 21155:12
tog 21159:23
Tokota 21262:12 21278:12,19
told 21131:6 21132:12 21132:13 21166:25 21171:7 21175:22 21176:24 21183:12 21189:11,13 21196:16 21206:9 21208:14 21227:22 21234:12 21278:11 21278:22 21286:3 21289:25 21290:9,10 21290:13 21291:5 21293:14 21294:1 21295:18
tolerated 21127:6
tomorrow 21137:22 21301:24
toneel 21153:12 21198:6 21213:25 21214:10 21215:25 21224:16 21228:9 21242:25,25 21243:24 21244:18
top 21274:19
topic 21249:12
topics 21167:10
tot 21135:17 21176:18 21185:11 21193:15 21198:11 21203:14 21204:15 21205:5,5 21211:15 21219:15 21219:20 21229:3 21230:6,7,12 21246:16 21253:1 21254:14,15,17
totaal 21143:10 21144:8 21261:12
totale 21175:14 21193:4 21224:12
totality 21230:25
touch 21286:4,19
touching 21158:9
track 21269:20
trade 21292:23
tragedy 21277:6,11
tragiese 21184:21 21219:15,17
trained 21158:11
training 21155:21 21160:16 21192:8
transcript 21154:23 21157:4,9 21188:22 21219:2
translation 21131:23 21269:24 21284:21 21285:4
transpired 21289:7
trawled 21170:3
tree 21135:20 21180:5
tref 21212:4
trek 21158:19 21163:4 21163:4
tried 21286:16
trigger 21206:10
triumph 21152:1
troublesome 21199:23 21200:6
TRT 21128:15 21132:4 21132:24 21133:1,8 21133:20,23 21139:21 21150:14 21151:14,22 21152:24 21153:1 21160:20 21167:13 21168:11 21169:1,11 21169:19 21170:16 21176:25 21179:10 21180:16,18 21181:3 21181:5,7 21182:7,20 21183:3 21185:17 21186:8,9,12,16 21187:7 21188:22 21189:12,19 21195:14 21196:10 21197:7,12 21212:23 21213:6 21221:18 21237:1,4 21238:8 21243:22 21249:13 21249:20 21250:6,8 21250:11,17,25 21251:6 21256:19 21258:24
TRT-lyn 21150:18
true 21142:10 21146:3 21276:24
trust 21199:5
truth 21217:14,15 21271:24,24,25
try 21221:13 21244:14 21253:6 21294:5,11 21294:11
trying 21169:9 21174:15 21179:24 21213:4 21278:6
Tuesday 21198:13
tuisland 21185:7
turn 21127:4 21128:12 21128:19 21131:15 21147:15
turned 21147:5,20 21203:25 21249:9 21270:18
turning 21129:20 21177:16 21277:18
tussen 21135:15 21142:4 21157:16,17 21157:17,18,21 21158:17 21160:2 21161:5,7,8 21163:12 21180:11 21184:2 21207:3 21216:10 21255:3 21256:13 21258:6,12
tussenin 21207:20
tussen-in 21161:24
TV 21213:20
twee 21133:23 21141:25 21157:18 21158:19 21184:2 21215:17 21256:13
two 21144:6 21148:20 21181:20 21185:15 21190:10,25 21245:4 21245:5 21247:20,23 21259:21,23 21260:12,13,14 21266:9 21272:21 21273:9 21282:2 21292:17 21294:2
twyfel 21256:23
tyd 21149:3 21154:2 21176:19 21177:13 21180:11 21193:6 21209:19 21211:14 21228:19 21233:15 21233:21 21234:24 21236:2 21249:1 21259:11 21263:18 21265:3,22
tydens 21194:18
tydperk 21176:10 21267:25
tye 21149:3 21150:13 21152:21 21242:21
type 21155:22 21159:9 21162:11,19 21204:19 21226:13 21230:10 21261:7 21300:20,23
types 21166:5 21192:16
typical 21193:25
Typically 21204:19

U

UASA 21292:8
uit 21141:25 21155:7 21157:9,9,16 21159:3 21159:4 21178:8 21203:20 21208:12 21209:25 21218:20 21218:20 21228:17 21230:13,13 21238:6 21238:6 21240:4,17 21240:22,24,25 21242:23 21251:1,1 21254:7,25 21258:11

21265:11,11,19 21268:20
uitbeweeg 21211:4 21240:25
uiteendryf 21184:3,7 21216:14,16,22 21218:25 21228:17 21229:11 21253:15 21258:7 21263:11 21265:14
uiteendrywing 21160:9 21174:12 21178:6,11 21178:13 21229:6 21244:1
uiteengedryf 21263:12 21265:5
uiteensetting 21233:7
uiteenvoering 21251:3
uitgegooi 21211:4
uitgehaal 21184:8
uitgeklim 21263:11
uitgekom 21265:16,20
uitgemaak 21172:11
uitgevoer 21174:11 21255:11
uitklim 21229:9
uitkom 21240:18 21265:4
uitlatings 21185:10
uitmekaar 21157:16 21254:7
uitrol 21194:18
uitsig 21150:17
uitvoer 21205:8
uitvoerbaar 21207:11 21207:14
uitvoering 21267:14,21 21267:24
uitwerk 21155:16
uitwys 21141:17
ultimate 21152:3
ultimately 21147:5,13 21197:8,12 21246:5
unarmed 21184:18 21185:19
unaware 21217:13
unclear 21210:18
underground 21293:4 21293:20
underpins 21149:14
understand 21127:7,11 21130:9 21139:14 21146:12 21162:6,8 21174:15 21189:14 21215:2 21232:7 21237:6,24 21239:13 21239:20 21244:5 21245:13 21246:1 21249:2 21261:19 21264:16 21269:3 21277:20 21278:7 21283:21 21285:15
understanding 21177:10 21200:21 21216:12 21242:7,9 21269:7 21270:6
understood 21151:9,10 21183:7 21210:17 21236:15 21241:3,12 21241:18 21253:18
undertake 21204:25
undertaking 21200:4,5 21200:24 21201:20 21280:18
undertook 21200:19
unduly 21241:15
unfolding 21282:14 21286:10
unfortunate 21289:13
unfortunately 21158:7 21292:9
unfurling 21206:10
uniforms 21189:17
union 21291:24 21292:2,3,14 21293:9
unions 21292:8,23 21293:8,13
units 21282:21
unknown 21281:19
unlawful 21230:4,8,17
unmarked 21272:15 21274:8
unnumbered 21274:22
unprotected 21279:22
unrest 21290:3,5
unrolling 21206:10
unscathed 21146:6
unsighted 21220:6,11 21220:18
unsuccessful 21257:20
untrue 21217:13
unusual 21294:25
unwilling 21244:9
un-contradicted 21186:10
urban 21193:25
ure 21226:4,4
use 21127:16,18,21 21138:19 21158:9 21161:15 21206:9,18 21206:25 21207:7 21225:6,14,22 21227:11 21251:2,4,8 21252:1 21254:3 21269:19 21285:24 21300:19
uself 21218:18
usual 21295:2
uttered 21205:11,22
uur 21209:20 21211:15 21215:6 21234:7,8
UU3 21181:4

V

vaagweg 21210:13 21219:8
val 21155:14 21157:22
valid 21292:17
value 21186:21
vanaf 21150:13
vandaan 21198:7 21255:3
vandag 21219:21 21255:13,21
vanwaar 21197:15
various 21136:17 21157:25 21163:20 21163:25 21164:14 21165:6 21167:9 21177:19 21179:9 21181:1 21182:10 21183:13 21188:15 21209:7 21230:25 21233:2,3 21282:20
vas 21236:6
vasgestel 21129:14 21198:9 21254:18
vasstel 21238:9
vat 21145:4 21160:22 21178:24 21194:15 21194:24
vehicles 21128:13 21133:20 21135:7 21149:22 21150:1 21151:11 21152:4,8 21152:24 21153:7,15 21154:13,13 21156:17 21158:9 21159:8 21160:19 21162:8,12 21163:25 21164:5,14 21165:10 21165:18 21209:3 21233:3 21253:3,8,19 21254:4 21257:8,11 21257:21
ver 21157:9 21220:19 21223:7 21225:25
verander 21203:21 21243:25
verbreek 21199:17
verby 21150:23,24 21228:6 21253:24
verbybeweeg 21184:7
verbygery 21253:8
verbykom 21141:22
verbyry 21150:19
verder 21212:25
verdere 21236:5 21251:8 21265:13
verduidelik 21155:14 21156:2 21206:22 21211:10 21226:5 21227:4 21251:8 21261:15
verduideliking 21209:22 21233:16
vergadering 21168:8 21205:3 21209:16 21226:8
vergaderings 21233:18
vergeet 21258:5
vergelyk 21150:11
vergesel 21226:25 21227:1,4
verhoed 21157:16 21161:5,6,9 21163:12 21178:12
verhouding 21199:8,16
verkeerd 21159:6 21171:21
verklaring 21212:3 21215:5 21267:3
verlies 21268:22
Vermaak 21177:2 21229:4 21238:6 21241:15 21273:5,10
verneem 21170:5 21212:3 21267:3,15
verras 21233:14
verrig 21226:10
version 21176:24
verskeie 21163:10 21255:6
verskil 21135:13 21157:3 21262:22 21268:1,20
verskillende 21217:2
verskoning 21217:20 21218:8
verstaan 21149:2 21159:24 21161:11 21171:21 21174:13 21175:7 21179:12
versus 21186:25 21187:15
vertrou 21245:20
verwag 21170:24
verwys 21129:11 21134:1 21135:22 21138:23 21140:12 21142:2 21150:16 21151:3 21154:1,18 21154:19,20 21155:12 21158:23 21162:15 21174:11 21174:24 21176:17 21185:5 21210:2 21225:9,16 21226:2 21232:3,11 21244:20 21247:24 21250:4 21252:1 21254:14 21267:16
verwysend 21193:13
verwysing 21185:6
vicinity 21248:8,19 21252:5
victory 21130:14,15
video 21129:14 21130:24 21131:1 21132:20 21133:6,15 21134:25 21136:3,6 21138:4 21140:1 21141:20 21145:18 21180:12 21184:1 21189:4 21223:1 21228:19,22 21255:13 21256:11 21257:14
videomateriaal 21178:1,5
videos 21143:4 21198:6
vier 21135:16 21193:9
view 21148:18 21150:22 21189:5 21202:23 21203:4 21261:6 21282:13 21284:20 21288:4
vind 21144:3 21150:12 21159:25 21227:15
vinnig 21141:20,21 21256:20
violent 21279:24 21289:10
virtually 21128:18 21129:8 21148:11
visibility 21182:7
visible 21151:14,23 21181:7,11,13,15 21281:8
visie 21218:23
vision 21189:21
visit 21235:10 21298:1
vital 21143:21
Vito 21260:17
vlag 21265:16
vlieg 21227:17
voer 21240:22
voertuie 21133:23 21149:1 21150:17 21153:23 21156:5,13 21157:10,14,17,18,21 21158:14 21159:4,19 21159:20 21161:3 21162:2,14 21163:13 21176:9 21179:22 21208:11 21211:9,17 21216:22,24 21219:1 21239:3,5,6,6 21242:23 21243:18 21244:22 21254:18 21255:3 21257:12,15 21258:6,12,22 21263:6
voertuig 21154:3,4 21157:18 21195:23 21212:4,4 21218:3 21248:24 21249:1 21253:13
voet 21239:7
volg 21178:24,25 21193:7 21216:18 21244:24
volgende 21199:14 21206:1 21232:6 21235:1
volgens 21152:21 21170:17 21190:6 21202:13 21216:25 21217:9 21242:2,6,8 21255:11 21256:19
volley 21256:19
volume 21131:20,21
voluntarily 21235:12
voor 21145:3 21150:14 21150:18 21152:16 21154:4 21156:8 21158:25 21162:23 21193:6 21197:15 21240:20 21251:9 21252:19 21253:16

21256:19 21257:15
vooraf 21156:3 21160:5 21163:5 21193:16 21194:14 21194:16 21195:4
voorbeeld 21159:2
voorberei 21267:16
voorbereiding 21236:7
voorgelê 21236:7
voorgeskrewe 21216:14 21244:24
voorheen 21142:2 21157:7 21175:8
voorkom 21155:5 21251:18
voorligting 21171:16 21171:22 21172:12 21176:7,8 21208:11 21211:6,7,10,17 21267:14
voorpunt 21216:15 21256:24
voorsien 21163:6 21194:17
voorskrif 21262:24
voorste 21135:16 21142:1 21160:10 21179:19 21189:25 21258:1,3
voorstel 21160:22 21171:9 21205:2 21223:7 21225:10
voort 21174:23 21204:14
voortgegaan 21241:2 21263:10
voortgesette 21204:13
voorval 21214:10 21225:16
vorentoe 21135:19,22 21140:16 21152:21 21153:23 21157:9 21161:4 21180:24 21216:21 21217:18 21218:16 21219:18 21254:6,14 21255:12 21257:16
vorige 21202:11 21233:18 21235:2 21252:11 21265:15
vra 21157:7 21160:22 21217:20 21218:7 21261:12
vraag 21155:13 21160:22 21179:12 21260:25 21261:11 21261:12 21262:22 21265:2,3
vreedsaam 21240:4
vroeër 21148:25
vroeëre 21129:11
vrylik 21240:25
vuurlyn 21140:15,17 21142:6 21150:14
vuurwapen 21230:2
vyf 21129:11 21135:16 21141:23

W

waar 21129:12,16 21134:13 21142:3 21150:17,18 21151:1 21155:14 21156:7 21157:8 21158:21 21160:2,5 21161:4 21163:1 21168:18 21172:11 21176:17 21177:8 21179:20 21180:12 21194:14 21194:15,24 21198:7 21198:8,23,24 21211:3 21213:24 21217:1 21218:19 21223:17 21226:5,6,9 21227:16 21228:19 21228:21 21229:13 21239:8 21243:1 21244:20 21246:10 21246:19 21247:25 21248:24 21250:4 21253:3,12,16 21255:2 21257:3 21268:20
waardeer 21268:19
waardeur 21159:20
waargeneem 21228:9
waarheid 21218:16
waarmee 21244:1
waarna 21129:10 21135:22 21140:11 21150:16 21151:3 21158:22 21210:1 21232:11 21242:1
waarnatoe 21194:15
waarneem 21257:4
waarom 21261:1
waaroor 21184:15 21202:9 21248:22
waarop 21254:2 21268:18
waarskuwing 21207:13 21240:19 21243:19 21262:23 21263:1 21264:14
waarskuwings 21244:4 21244:22
waarskynlikheid 21203:13
waarvan 21134:6 21209:9 21219:21 21226:15 21227:6
wag 21203:20 21241:24
wait 21266:2
waited 21199:20 21264:21
waiting 21201:4 21262:7,19
walk 21185:19
walking 21296:12
wanneer 21177:13 21209:17 21234:25
want 21133:10 21136:1 21137:17 21139:2,10 21143:12 21145:13 21153:22 21155:17 21156:24 21175:15 21179:16 21182:5 21188:12 21208:7,13 21208:25 21211:14 21215:3 21217:1 21223:17 21225:1 21228:20 21236:4 21238:3,13,19 21239:5 21246:7 21250:5,16 21255:11 21270:19 21283:20 21295:13
wanted 21143:24 21151:23 21160:17 21161:18 21176:13 21260:15 21270:22 21277:25
wants 21134:16 21143:20 21181:22 21269:14
wapens 21184:20 21198:8 21203:14 21204:14 21216:19 21228:21 21240:18 21265:19
warning 21132:5 21133:3 21237:23 21238:4,19,20 21239:15,18,22 21240:6,7 21242:19 21243:6,8,8,10,14 21244:14 21261:17 21261:19,22,23 21262:3 21263:24 21264:5,9,17,20,23
warnings 21132:8
Warrant 21245:17,18 21246:25 21248:10 21249:7
Warrant-Officer 21190:4 21266:17
wasn't 21222:20,24 21232:20,20,21,25 21233:1 21251:20
waste 21191:22
watch 21143:4
watching 21284:5,16 21285:19 21296:3
water 21147:4 21177:9 21247:3,4,10 21248:6 21248:16 21256:16 21256:21 21257:4,6
waterkanon 21229:8
waterkanonne 21241:24
watter 21193:6,7 21198:8,23,24 21253:12 21254:18
way 21131:19 21136:24 21140:25 21142:22 21143:3 21144:23,25 21145:19 21148:7 21153:21 21174:17 21185:19 21187:11 21187:20 21202:4 21230:4 21239:17 21257:7 21269:22,25 21270:4 21277:20 21278:17 21284:18 21285:3,6,17,23 21293:13,22 21301:1
weapons 21162:10,11 21200:17 21297:7 21298:5
web 21285:19
Wednesday 21200:13 21200:25 21201:25 21275:18
week 21293:17
weens 21142:24
weer 21134:11 21140:10 21154:22 21157:5 21162:22 21200:2 21221:17 21244:3,21,22 21253:9 21262:25 21265:8
weereens 21194:12 21195:4 21262:22
wees 21141:23,25 21152:22 21153:9 21158:15,21 21159:20 21160:2 21174:1,6,25 21175:4 21181:17 21194:14 21196:24 21199:15 21205:6 21209:23,24 21216:18,25 21232:11 21233:17 21253:10 21261:13 21263:9 21264:12
weet 21135:23 21141:17 21143:9 21149:7,8 21153:22 21153:25 21154:16 21156:4 21160:5,10 21161:2,11 21162:5 21185:4 21194:13,14 21198:5 21201:16 21203:16 21220:9 21228:15,17,19,21 21229:14 21230:7 21233:14 21235:1,2 21237:15 21238:25 21243:18 21248:23 21251:1 21258:20 21259:10 21265:11
weg 21155:14 21157:22 21178:12 21242:21 21243:20
wegbeweeg 21180:6 21203:17 21255:15
weggegaan 21246:19
weggehardloop 21134:11 21149:4,7 21217:2
weggeval 21155:10
weghou 21194:15
wel 21141:25 21145:3 21149:3,8 21156:10 21157:5,7,14,20 21163:1,7 21168:17 21178:7,24,24 21182:3 21197:9 21198:9 21202:10 21213:25 21224:18 21226:25 21228:16 21228:16 21232:4 21233:23 21236:2 21257:17 21262:23 21263:2,3,4
went 21146:19 21151:16 21221:23 21225:1 21235:9 21249:14 21276:17 21290:1 21291:3 21295:8 21299:1 21301:18
weren't 21223:12 21255:19 21256:8 21258:23
werk 21160:3 21199:7 21223:18 21230:23 21239:4 21253:7
werks 21226:4
west 21128:16 21129:7 21277:3 21280:11
westekant 21244:2
westelike 21180:6 21229:12 21255:16 21258:16
wet 21227:16
we'd 21137:2
we'll 21133:5 21143:13 21173:3 21188:18 21234:9 21245:4 21249:10 21251:12 21270:14 21271:3 21273:6 21275:11 21279:2 21287:11 21294:5
we're 21132:22 21134:21 21139:18 21140:4 21147:1 21148:19 21162:10 21183:8 21189:11 21242:10 21257:5 21264:18 21269:10 21269:10 21274:21 21275:20 21278:21 21300:12 21301:20
we've 21132:7 21147:24 21148:6 21149:15 21150:9 21160:16 21163:14 21165:6 21185:14 21275:19,23 21278:22
what's 21131:10 21139:14 21219:10 21246:24 21264:8 21284:18,22 21285:17,18
whilst 21214:13 21247:10 21295:25

white 21140:6
who's 21278:14
wide 21285:19
wie 21158:18 21253:12
wil 21141:17 21149:4 21154:22 21158:13 21160:8 21177:21 21178:4 21185:11 21194:15,15,24 21251:18 21259:9
wire 21206:9,10,17,18 21206:25 21207:7,10 21207:17
wish 21269:18 21271:17,19,20
wiskunde 21144:14
wit 21140:13,14 21265:16
witness 21129:23 21130:11 21159:15 21164:7,16,20 21165:7,15 21166:1 21166:20 21167:1 21182:9 21186:11 21187:10 21188:14 21191:10 21222:23 21231:5 21245:23 21246:2 21268:3,5,23 21268:25 21269:15 21269:21,23 21270:5 21270:10 21284:1 21285:11,17
witnesses 21165:8 21166:17
wonder 21132:4
won't 21164:16 21182:14 21239:18 21269:22 21283:23
woord 21145:4 21198:3 21225:11
woorde 21134:13 21135:19 21154:19 21158:16 21159:21 21185:7 21233:15 21238:7 21241:21 21251:6 21252:12 21253:15,25 21254:5 21263:11
word 21134:9 21137:19 21140:17 21142:3,3 21142:10 21156:5 21160:3,5 21190:19 21193:19 21198:9,21 21211:4 21218:15 21225:20 21236:6 21241:5 21242:18 21244:22 21251:4 21253:22 21291:18
words 21133:13 21139:5 21148:9 21190:22 21252:9,24 21264:21 21270:22 21279:1
work 21226:18,21 21227:13 21235:13 21270:8 21293:9 21297:2 21301:19
workers 21160:20 21291:11,12,14 21292:18 21293:12 21293:16,25
working 21293:3,19,20
world 21285:19
worried 21292:6
worry 21247:14
wou 21157:8 21160:11 21185:4 21209:19 21214:8 21223:19,20 21238:22
wouldn't 21132:5 21139:1 21237:23 21238:18 21240:10 21244:11,12
wounded 21144:5,18 21145:1,6,9,11,12,17 21145:24,25
write 21273:19
writing 21232:24
written 21274:19
wrong 21158:1,3,4 21159:10 21193:24 21222:9,21 21237:3 21278:21 21290:17
wrongly 21145:7
wys 21158:21
wyse 21268:18

X

Xhosa 21131:25 21269:5,15,18,20 21270:3,5 21278:10 21278:15,17,18,25 21279:3 21285:4

Y

years 21292:17
yesterday 21127:6 21130:21 21151:16 21152:13 21165:4 21182:5,16,21,23 21186:24 21231:19 21236:16 21239:13 21240:11 21241:5,13
YouTube 21284:5,17 21285:20
you'd 21152:17
you'll 21137:20 21138:7 21149:12 21156:21 21271:23 21280:18
you're 21128:2 21130:9 21151:5 21158:1 21166:11,12 21173:5,7,15 21182:18 21187:25 21188:2 21201:19 21215:11 21220:25 21221:5,5 21237:3 21238:14 21245:10 21255:18 21263:21 21268:7 21277:17,18 21277:19,21,21,22 21287:15 21296:3
you've 21127:22 21149:13 21163:16 21163:20 21166:14 21166:15 21185:20 21186:1 21218:11 21260:10 21262:13 21264:5,8

Z

Zokwana 21199:20 21200:1,4,14,15,19 21201:2,20 21202:1 21202:16
zoom 21177:2 21178:8
Zukiswa 21272:1,10 21287:17

0

000 21181:20
09:21 21127:2
09:41 21139:9

1

1 21143:6,10,16 21144:5,24 21145:1 21148:3 21167:16 21212:1,12 21213:12 21214:4,10 21215:8 21215:20 21216:1,2,3 21217:13 21220:14 21232:24 21236:18 21236:19,19 21246:4 21252:6 21261:21 21263:22 21265:8 21267:1
1st 21277:1
1-3 21144:5
1:30 21201:24 21202:5 21234:14 21235:10
10 21128:14 21139:18 21139:19 21150:20 21173:2 21176:18 21181:24,25 21189:4 21189:25 21206:21 21215:16
10th 21277:7 21290:11
10:01 21153:22
10:21 21167:5
100% 21224:14
11 21160:15 21171:5 21173:22 21246:5,7
11th 21279:3
11:02 21173:14
11:21 21185:13
11:41 21200:3
110% 21268:12
12 21206:21 21273:4,11
12th 21274:2 21281:18
12:01 21212:17
12:26 21221:4
12:45 21298:1
12:46 21233:20
13 21141:22 21142:17 21144:5,13,18 21145:6,9 21146:5 21247:1
13de 21198:5
13th 21168:6 21287:21
13:30 21168:2,8,16 21201:16 21202:13
137 21273:24,25
14 21129:15 21132:3,12 21132:13 21133:8 21150:20 21181:3,5 21189:12
14de 21199:4,12 21209:17
14th 21198:13,17
14:02 21245:9
14:21 21260:20
14:30 21167:14,18 21202:21 21204:5 21210:19 21211:14
14:42 21271:6
15 21158:6,7 21211:16 21275:15
15th 21199:10 21274:20 21275:18
15/8/2012 21276:1
15:01 21283:17
15:25 21287:14
15:30 21202:24 21233:17
15:45 21295:5
15:53:30 21163:21,22 21165:11 21171:4
15:53:35 21141:18
15:53:40 21128:14 21163:21
150 21243:7,20
153 21242:21
16 21143:6 21144:5,13 21144:19 21189:25 21193:23,23 21202:21 21231:12
16th 21169:24 21206:11 21245:16 21277:7
16:13:51 21247:13
16:21 21247:13
16:47 21214:4
160 21155:13
17 21131:4 21140:4,5 21143:6 21144:20 21145:1 21146:2,4 21157:4 21219:21
17h00 21215:6
18 21252:12
18de 21224:24
18th 21221:10
18,277 21155:13
180 21130:19
182 21250:7 21251:22
19 21157:4
19th 21276:10
1980 21276:15

2

2 21143:12 21144:23 21145:8 21147:13 21158:17 21160:9 21161:4 21165:12 21174:11 21177:5,6,7 21179:14,25 21180:4 21180:11 21213:25 21213:25 21214:18 21229:1 21232:4,25 21236:15,21 21237:5 21247:11 21250:12 21253:8 21254:11 21257:3 21261:20,24 21272:23
2IC 21283:13
2:30 21232:19 21249:14
20 21141:25 21176:18 21176:19 21211:16 21234:13 21261:22
2005 21276:20
2010 21276:23 21277:1
2012 21202:21 21273:6 21274:2,14 21275:15 21276:10 21277:8 21279:4
2013 21292:20
2014 21127:1
22nd 21273:21
24 21141:19 21167:7
25 21181:2,4
26 21167:6 21224:14
261 21144:11
28th 21273:5,18 21274:1
29 21127:1 21144:17 21146:2 21176:24

3

3 21148:3 21168:21 21177:8 21180:11 21181:20 21198:10 21202:23 21203:10 21204:6 21205:14 21211:15,15 21227:21 21228:13 21232:25 21233:7 21246:5,6,8 21248:13 21261:14 21266:23 21276:14
30 21146:1,5,23 21147:1,25 21156:7 21160:10 21176:10 21176:18 21178:9 21180:13 21255:13 21255:19,21,24 21256:2,5 21257:10 21257:15 21258:18 21261:22
31 21146:3,23 21150:13
35 21163:22,23
37 21297:25

4

4 21165:12 21170:21 21174:12 21179:20 21180:2 21208:1,24 21208:24
40 21163:23

45 21154:21 21155:1 21163:23
49 21150:22,24 21151:1

5

5 21176:22 21181:5 21208:1 21215:6 21274:10,12,19 21275:13,24
5A 21275:21 21276:1,4
50 21150:23,25 21163:23 21176:18

6

6 21128:11 21168:21 21169:13 21208:1 21209:20 21231:9 21232:1
61 21249:6

7

7 21149:12,18,21 21150:11
7:30 21234:10
76 21231:11,17
78 21143:9

8

8 21149:16,21 21150:11 21234:13
8:20 21234:13,14

9

9 21149:16,21 21150:11 21150:23 21276:9 21301:24
9.6 21294:20
9/10 21274:14 21276:2
90% 21257:16
99% 21257:16